Legitimate authority by Lindner, Anne-Kathrin


DIPLOMARBEIT
Titel der Diplomarbeit
„Legitimate authority.
An analysis of the theories of Raz, Simmons, Rawls and 
Peter.“
Verfasserin
Mag. Anne-Kathrin Lindner
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.phil.)
Wien, im August 2011
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 296
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Philosophie
Betreuerin: Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Herlinde Pauer-Studer

Abstract
In this paper I aim to analyze different conceptions of legitimate political authority, arguing 
that  only  a  theory  which  also  incorporates  insights  provided  by  theories  of  democratic 
legitimacy can account for a fully convincing argument. I first define the notion of legitimacy, 
contrasting  it  with  other  normative  concepts,  namely  “legality”  and  “justice”.  Second,  I 
systematize  theories  of  legitimacy  based  on  their  understanding  of  authority  and  the 
“normative conditions” they apply. Detailed evaluation will be provided for the conceptions 
of Joseph Raz, John Simmons, John Rawls and Fabienne Peter. I conclude that politics must 
be founded on reasons and a certain process of justification.  Only if  those conditions are 
satisfied,  a  political  authority  is  legitimate.  However,  this  does  not  answer  the  question 
whether democracy is necessary and itself a condition for legitimate political rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Politics are a constant aspect of reality.  We are all  subjected to political  authorities,  most 
commonly national governments,  and this  means we are all  subjected to their  rule.  What 
makes  political  rules special,  though,  is  that  they have the form of  law.  It  is  collectively 
binding, coercively enforceable and hence a matter of obligation. For the most part, at least 
under  reasonably  effective  authorities,  one  cannot  not comply  with  law,  because 
transgressions are punished or control is exercised so that failure to comply simply is not 
possible. From the viewpoint of political theory, there are two ways to deal with this. One way 
is to describe what it takes for an authority to actually be effective and how this makes it 
relate to its subjects. The other way is normative. From a moral perspective, the fundamental 
question is how it can even be that we are under someone else's authority. What does it take 
for us to be obligated to subject ourselves to someone else's will?
Theories of legitimacy aim to answer this question by proposing normative conditions to the 
authoritative rule. The more an authority lives up to those conditions the more legitimate it is.  
If it is legitimate, this means that at the very least the authority is morally permitted to impose 
its rule. Some go even further and argue that it establishes a duty of the persons themselves to 
subject  themselves  to  the  authority.  In  any  case,  legitimacy  is  fundamental,  because  it 
constitutes  a  certain  relation  between  the  two  involved  parties;  a  relation  which  is  best 
described as morally significant, because it tells us something about the basic rights and duties 
of both sides. In the present paper I have therefore decided to adopt a normative view and 
question what conditions can render a political authority legitimate. Quite obviously, there are 
various different conceptions and they radically disagree on which moral requirements are 
appropriate. My argument will therefore consist of two parts.
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Part one is meant to provide some preliminary clarifications that will be relevant due to the 
course of this paper. In particular, this means that I will explicate the two central concepts of 
my work, “authority” and “legitimacy”. Note that it is necessary to distinguish the notions I 
endorse from related questions and issues. For example, it is vitally important not to confuse 
the concept of legitimacy with other normative ideals like “justice” or “legality”. At the same 
time, it would be equally detrimental to neglect the distinct nature of political authority as 
compared  to  other  relations  of  hierarchy  or  power.  In  the  context  of  my  work  I  will 
furthermore rely on the  assumption that  legitimacy is  a  normative concept  which  applies 
particularly moral claims to the authoritative rule. This view requires justification as it may 
not be obvious how morals fit into the sphere of political decision-making. Finally, part one of 
this paper is also meant to outline the analytical approach and concrete research question of 
my work.
Part two then contains the substantive analysis of four distinct conceptions of legitimacy. This 
means that I will analyze potential sources of normativity in the context of political authority.  
The core question is what exact condition can most plausibly establish legitimacy. For this 
purpose I turn to the work of Joseph Raz, John Simmons, John Rawls and Fabienne Peter and 
argue that their conceptions of legitimacy fundamentally differ in the “normative condition” 
they apply to political authorities. Joseph Raz proposes an instrumental approach, arguing that 
an authority is legitimate if its rule leads to beneficial consequences. John Simmons, on the 
other hand, argues that only actual consent of particular individuals can ground a legitimate 
rule.  In  contrast,  John  Rawls  argues  that  it  is  not  actual  but  hypothetical  consent,  or 
reasonable  acceptability  and  an  overlapping  consensus,  which  establishes  legitimacy. 
Fabienne  Peter  adopts  a  different  approach  in  that  she  defends  a  purely  proceduralist 
conception. That is to say, in her view only a deliberative democratic procedure which is built 
on the values of political equality and epistemic fairness is legitimate.
Note that in part two I proceed by firstly explicating the framework of each theory, then I  turn 
to evaluate its plausibility. This means that I first examine how the theorists conceptualize 
legitimate authority in general, for instance which properties and virtues they ascribe to it and 
why they believe legitimate authority is different from other sorts of authoritative rule. In 
addition to that I then give a more detailed outline of the normative condition they propose, 
i.e. of the properties they suggest render an authority legitimate. Following that, I then turn to 
analyze  the  plausibility  of  each  theory.  On  the  one  hand,  this  means  that  I  evaluate  the 
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persuasiveness of their argumentation, on the other it also requires me to test the plausibility 
of  the  so-developed  normative  condition.  In  the  end  I  shall  not  only be  able  to  draw a 
conclusion regarding the merits and holes of each theory, but also determine how they fare 
compared to each other. My argument will have a constructive form, with insights gained 
from preceding chapters fundamentally shaping the claims I make in succeeding sections of 
my work.
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II. PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS
The present chapter is meant to provide some preliminary clarifications that will be relevant 
due to the course of this paper. In particular, this means that I will give an outline of the 
approach and subject of my work, but also distinguish my own focus from related questions 
and issues.  Since my argument will  revolve around two central  concepts,  “authority”  and 
“legitimacy” I will concentrate on elaborating the notions I endorse.
Regarding the concept of authority, I will only be concerned with  political authority within 
the context of his paper. This is relevant, because I will point out a variety of ways in which 
political authority is special, and indeed distinct from other forms of authority. Second, it is 
also important that I adopt the common view that political authority is, for the most part, 
practical authority. This points to the fact that power is an important element, but we should 
not make the mistake to think that we can reduce one to the other. Third, when it comes to 
conceptions of authority, we need to distinguish between descriptive notions and normative 
theories. As for this paper, I will only deal with the latter, focusing on the normative concept  
of legitimacy.
Note that while it is commonly accepted that legitimacy is in fact a normative concept, I urge 
that we must not assume that it is the only normative conception of political authority. Instead, 
“justice”  and  “legality”  can  also  be  understood  this  way.  What  distinguishes  the  three 
concepts,  I  maintain,  is  that  they are  unequally demanding.  That  is  to  say the normative 
claims they make are of a different weight; legality being least demanding, justice being most 
demanding and legitimacy representing some sort of middle ground. I will briefly sketch all 
three  notions  in  order  to  clarify  the  scope  I  ascribe  to  legitimacy.  This  will  reveal  its 
distinctness, but is also meant to show that those concepts are nevertheless related, because 
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their claims are all founded on morality.
On the basis of these examinations I last turn to clarify the approach and research interest of 
this paper: the normative conditions of legitimacy. That is to say, in the main part of my work 
I  will  turn to  analyze potential  sources of legitimacy,  the core question being what  exact 
condition can render a political authority legitimate. I turn to the work of Joseph Raz, John 
Simmons,  John Rawls  and Fabienne Peter  and argue that  their  conceptions  of  legitimacy 
fundamentally differ in the “normative condition” they apply, i.e. in the idea of what makes 
for  a  legitimate  authority,  what  the  source  and condition  of  legitimacy is.  I  give  a  brief 
overview of those conditions, before later turning to a more comprehensive evaluation.  
  1. “Authority”  
  1.1 Political authority
The first thing that comes to mind when we speak of authority is that it is not obvious what 
kind of entity we refer to. Quite certainly it could be both, a person (or set of persons) or an 
institution, perhaps even a whole institutional system. However, in general to have authority 
is to have authority over a certain range of actions or issues; it  is authority  “over certain  
persons, and with respect to certain matters” as Leslie Green put it1. He gives the examples 
of family, school, church, army and state in order to illustrate his point that there may be 
several separate entities claiming authority over a particular individual at the same time2. As 
for  the  context  of  my  own  paper,  Green's  clarification  is  important,  because  I  will  be 
concerned, not with all kinds of authority, but with political authority only.
Turning back to the beginning, one might then be tempted to reiterate the question what kind 
of entity  political authority refers to. As a matter of fact, it is not obvious (or universally 
accepted, for that matter), that “political authority” should be equated with  state  authority. 
Quite a few theorists have actually pointed out that there is an important distinction between 
1 Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 42
2 See Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 63.
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state and government, and that this needs to be acknowledged in studies concerning authority 
(especially legitimate authority)3. I accept this demand, but due to the limited scope of this 
paper I nevertheless choose not to elaborate on it. This is to say, my reasoning will rely on a 
conception of political authority that does not enforce the distinction, but treats “state” and 
“government” as closely related and, for the purpose of this paper, as interchangeable. This 
approach can be justified, because the theorists whose work I aim to analyze deploy different 
understandings  of  what  entity  “political  authority”  refers  to.  In  neglecting  the  proposed 
distinction I remain able to treat those concepts as comparable, without losing too much time 
examining a difference that is not the central focus of this paper. What I aim to analyze are 
conceptions of legitimate authority, with the emphasis being on the conditions of legitimacy 
rather than on the characteristics of authority itself.  Note that this implies that my use of 
“political authority” remains open to further examination regarding its relation to either state 
or government. This analysis, however, escapes my present research and would have to be 
pursued elsewhere.
Hence when I use the notion of political authority throughout this paper, I have in mind a 
“system  of  animated  institutions  that  govern  the  territory  and  its  residents  and  that  
administer and enforce the legal system and carry out the programs of government”4. This 
matches the idea of a territorial nation state as we live in today, but does not prescribe it.  
Neither does it prescribe a specific form of political organization or government, or does it 
exclude economic and social  institutions  relevant  for carrying out  political  programs.  For 
example, there is no stipulation of a necessary separation of powers, or of a particular form of 
government (e.g. democratic vs. non-democratic). The notion nevertheless remains true to the 
every-day experience that political authority, in general, is not exercised as a merely personal 
relationship between individual human beings, but “in the context of institutions”5.
A few more things that have to do with the unique nature of politics are essential to note here.  
First, political authority is wide in scope6, because it applies to “many people”. Arguably, it 
applies to more people than most other authorities do, that is if we compare, for example, the 
average nation state with “family” (understood as a particular family) or the army. Second, 
3 See e.g. Buchanan, Allen: Recognital legitimacy and the state system, In: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 
28, No. 1, 1999 for an argument how state and government legitimacy require different sorts of arguments.
4 Copp, David: The idea of a legitimate state., Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1999, p. 7
5 Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 42
6 See Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 83-86.
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political authority is comprehensive7, in that it has a say over a broad set of issues. We simply 
need  to  look  at  the  variety  of  policy  sectors  in  any  given  country  today,  ranging  from 
education and health to security and arts/culture, to confirm this statement. Third, political 
authority does not only claim to regulate a broad set of issues for a wide set of persons, it is  
special, above all, because it concerns the “vital interests of everyone”8. This is true in two 
ways. On the one hand, politics do not stop at every-day coordination issues, but it steps in 
where  people's  lives  are  affected  fundamentally.  For  example,  John  Rawls  argued  that 
political decisions shape the “basic structure” of society, i.e. the “main political, social, and  
economic institutions, and how they fit together”9, and this has profound effects on people's 
prospects  and  chances  in  life  as  well  as  on  their  attitudes.  On  the  other  hand,  political 
authority affects people fundamentally also because it is primarily concerned with making 
collectively binding decisions10. Politics creates law, i.e. the rules that every subject is bound 
to abide by. What is more, those rules are enforceable and hence a matter of coercion. This 
means  that,  fourth,  political  authority  stands  out  because  of  its  characteristic  means,  i.e. 
(physical) coercion, which it claims an exclusive right to, at least within the nations state.11 
Note that in this latter sense political authority seems to maintain supremity over other forms 
of authority, because it claims a monopoly on the use of force.
  1.2 Practical authority and the notion of power
In the previous section I have pointed out that the subject of this paper is particularly political 
authority as opposed to other forms of authority, such as that of science or religion. I have also 
clarified what I take to be the distinct nature of politics and why I deem it justified not to 
distinguish between state and government throughout the course of this paper. One of the 
arguments I have made is that political  authority is  unique for the monopoly it  claims to 
(physical) coercion. This points to another important distinction that is commonly made in 
regards to authority: that between practical and theoretical authorities.
7 See Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 83-86.
8 Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 83
9 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 11.  Note that I use his argument  
in  a slightly simplified version here,  because for  Rawls,  the basic structure of  society has  much graver 
implications. He presupposes that it refers to a “closed” (ibid, p. 12)., “democratic” (ibid. p. 11) society that  
members enter only by birth and leave only by death (ibid. p. 12).
10 See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, pp. 106-107.
11 See e.g. Green, Leslie: The authority of the state., Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 75-80.
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As a matter of fact, many theorists endorse the view12 that political authorities are practical 
authorities in the sense that their commands require action, not belief. This is contrasted with 
so-called theoretical authorities that, as experts within certain areas, give reason to belief, but 
do  not  impose  a  duty to  take  a  certain  action.  Heidi  Hurd  has  suggested  an  even  more 
elaborated distinction when she proposed that we can classify authorities according to the sort 
of utterances they make: epistemic authorities are in a position to offer “good advise” on how 
others ought to act,  influential authorities on the other hand may request actions, but only 
practical authorities can issue commands13. I deem those distinctions relevant in the present 
context, because they shed some light on the kind of relation we talk about when we speak of 
authority. It is a relation where one party, the authority, makes a certain sort of claim against  
another  party,  the  subject.  The  claim they make  is  a  command,  it  is  claim to  action  (or 
omission of action), and it is a claim that is effective regarding a certain set of persons who 
have to subject to them.
In  this  sense,  political  authority  might  be  understood  as  a  relation  of  power,  because 
individuals can be made to do something they might not want to do14. However, I urge that it 
is of the utmost importance not to confuse those two concepts. Power is an important feature 
of political authority – as it is for practical authority in general, one might argue. Yet, while  
political authority may always involve power, not all power relation is tantamount to political 
authority.  Put  differently:  Power  constitutes  (or  at  least  can  constitute)  authority in  some 
contexts, but it is not sufficient to constitute political authority. The interesting question, it 
seems, is not even about power, but about how else a political authority takes effect, how else 
it compels action in its subjects. As we will see, this is one of the key points where legitimacy 
can come into play, because in most theories legitimate authority is seen to evoke obligation 
on part of the subjects. In this case, duty and not power may be the appropriate explication of 
the relation between an authority and its subjects.
12 For  an  overview on  this  distinction  see  e.g.  Christiano,  Tom:  Authority.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of 
Philosophy, 2008 (online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/>; last visited on 12 
December 2010, 01:25).
13 See Hurd, Heidi: Moral combat., Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 63-67.
14 Note that this understanding of power is inspired by Max Weber and can for example be found in Christiano,  
Tom: Authority.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/>; last visited on 12 December 2010, 01:25).
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  1.3 Normative vs. de facto authority
The previous sections have been meant to clarify the sort of authority I will deal with in the 
present paper (political authority) and the effective nature I ascribe to it (practical force). In 
the present section I now turn to a third distinction, that between descriptive and normative 
approaches to authority15.
Descriptive theories of authority try to capture the spirit of real-life instances of “authority”, 
generalizing the most important features they all share. A person, institution or system is thus 
called an authority if it actually lives up to those descriptions. Quite often, whether or not 
something or someone qualifies as an authority is seen to depend on the perception or attitude 
of those who would be subject to it16.  For example,  issuing commands that are generally  
obeyed by a certain group of persons subject to it17 could be named as the key qualification. 
As a consequence, authority is not seen to rely on any independent or moral standard, but on 
its effect or efficiency. This is why authority in this descriptive sense is often referred to as de 
facto authority, i.e. an authority that is such qua acting and being accepted as one.
In contrast, one can construe normative notions of authority in one of two ways; either dealing 
with  their  creation  and  existence  or  with  their  rule.  First,  authority  can  be  dealt  with 
normatively by defining conditions of what ought to be acknowledged as authority. On this 
view, not what is merely accepted as authority, but what satisfies certain other requirements 
“is” an authority . For example, one could claim that only those people ought to be recognized 
as authorities that have a certain education. If a person does not have that education, he must 
not be an authority at all.  Note that this argument is not normally cited under the flag of 
“normative authority”, but we can find a lot of similar argumentations when it comes, for 
example, to discussions regarding the moral status of the current world order. Some theorists 
actually suggest that before we talk about the “normatively right” exercise of authority, for 
example by states, we should question whether the state system ought to exist that way at all  
15 See  e.g.  Christiano,  Tom:  Authority.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/>; last visited on 12 December 2010, 01_25).
16 See e.g. Morris, Christopher: An essay on the modern state., Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 102 for a  
reference and critique of attitude-based conceptions of (legitimate) authority. (Note that he cites Weber as an 
example of this view.)
17 See  Christiano,  Tom:  Authority.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/; last visited on 12 December 2010, 01:25).
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or how it came to be that way.18 In contrast, an alternative view does not deal so much with 
whether  or  not  someone  or  something  ought  to  be  an  authority,  but  applies  normative 
conditions to those authorities. This is to say, normative conceptions of this sort presuppose 
descriptive notions of authority, because they refer to certain entities as authorities, i.e. they 
assume their objects to be authorities without asking whether they ought to be that. Instead 
their aim lies in the definition of external standards which are applied to authorities and which 
are meant to provide measures that they should live up to. What they are concerned with is  
how authorities ought to act or relate to their subjects.
In  any  case,  normative  conceptions  are  fundamentally  evaluative19 notions.  They  allow 
conclusions about how “good” an authority is in regards to a certain virtue, i.e. whether or 
not, and to what degree, an authority lives up to a predefined standard. Note that for those 
standards to be normative means that not all authorities actually do live up to them, rather 
they are something they ought to live up to. For the context of the present paper, I will deal 
with  authority  only  from  a  normative  viewpoint,  and  in  doing  so  I  focus  on  the  latter 
approach. That is to say, I will not deal with the creation of authorities, but only with their  
exercise of power.
  1.4 Authority thus defined
I have clarified that within the scope of this paper I will only be concerned with  political 
authority, which is distinct from other forms of authority not least because of its exclusive 
right to physical coercion within the state. In so far as political authority is usually concerned 
with commanding ways to act (or not act), it should be understood as practical authority. This 
implies that  power is an important element of the relationship between an authority and its 
subjects. Furthermore we can either adopt a descriptive or a normative view; i.e. dealing with 
either what makes an authority or how that authority ought to be. Within the present paper I 
choose to focus on the latter approach with the additional restriction that I do not examine 
“good” ways of gaining authority but only focus on how existing authorities ought to rule. 
One concept that attempts to answer this question is that of legitimacy and I will outline its 
18 See e.g. Buchanan, Allen: Justice, legitimacy and Self-Determination., Oxford University Press, 2003.
19 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 2 for a similar assumption.
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significance in the following chapter.
  2. “Legitimacy”  
  2.1 Basic concept and scope
In the foregoing chapter I have suggested that I will deal with authority in the context of 
legitimacy.  Three clarifications are now in order to clarify the meaning of this and to avoid 
misunderstandings. First, I maintain that legitimacy applies only to the context of politics, in 
particular to the exercise of political authority. Second, I have suggested that legitimacy is a 
normative concept, and third I have presupposed the view that it applies specifically  moral 
standards to politics.
On my approach legitimacy is understood as  “a virtue of political institutions and of the  
decisions (…) made within them”20 and this is to say that for the present context, legitimacy is 
treated as a strictly political concept. In other words: The standards defined by legitimacy are 
that  which  apply  to  the  specific  subject  of  political  authority  and  cannot  be  applied  to 
“private” situations unless a separate argument is made to show why this should be the case. 
Moreover, I add the conceptual limitation that for X to be a legitimate authority is understood 
to mean that it is legitimate in exercising authority. This does not necessarily imply, however, 
that X is legitimate in being/existing (an/as an authority). For example, to define under what 
conditions a state can have legitimate authority is not tantamount to stating that only states 
can have legitimate political authority, or that we need states to create it, or that the current 
world order of states is legitimate. Separate arguments would be necessary to found those 
claims, but those no doubt exceed the scope of this paper. This is why I introduced the two 
notions  of  “normative  authority”  in  the  previous  chapter.  There  is  a  difference  between 
examining what makes for a normatively sound creation of authority and what it takes for this 
authority's rule to be legitimate. Both questions are essential, but in this paper I focus only on 
the latter aspect.
20 Peter,  Fabienne:  Political  Legitimacy.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2010  (online  at  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/, last visited on 3 December 2010, 15:25)
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Apart from that, a further clarification concerns the application of legitimacy to the subject of 
political authority. Note that traditionally there has been disagreement, not so much about the 
political  nature of  legitimacy,  but  about  whether  “authority”  is  the appropriate  focus.  For 
example, this has been pointed out by Fabienne Peter: Instead of talking about authority, some 
theorists have applied the notion of legitimacy only to the narrower concepts of “political 
power” or “coercion”.21 This controversy can also be located  within theories of legitimate 
authority, because here we find discussions about what special functions legitimate authority 
entails – does it consist only in justified coercion or is there a more extensive right to rule? 
Does  it  have  a  capacity  to  impose  duties  or  does  it  even,  more  fundamentally,  create 
obligation(s) towards a particular authority? I deem those differentiations important, because 
they point out the various aspects of legitimacy. However, within the scope of this paper I will 
go along with Christiano's approach which states:
“It is not a useful aim of philosophers or political thinkers to determine which one of these  
conceptual accounts of political authority is the right one. Each one of them grasps a kind of  
legitimacy of political authority that is worth taking into account and distinguishing from the  
others.”22
This is to say that I will not proceed by committing myself to one predefined definition of  
legitimate authority. Instead I will carefully analyze which definition of authority is actually 
embraced within different conceptions of legitimacy.
What all of them have in common is that they deal with political authority from a normative 
viewpoint. However, for the sake of completeness it has to be noted here that this is a focus  
chosen by me and for the purpose of this paper. Indeed there are also descriptive notions of 
legitimacy. Those are concerned with the question whether people actually support certain 
political institutions or decisions – not with whether they ought to23. That is to say that on the 
descriptive view, political decisions have binding force simply because they have the form of 
law and are effectively backed by coercive measures. In contrast, normative legitimacy argues 
that the binding force of authoritative directives is defined by them imposing the (moral) duty 
to  obey24.  On the  one  hand we have  effectiveness,  on  the  other  obligation.  Furthermore, 
21 See  Fabienne:  Political  Legitimacy.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2010  (online  at  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/, last visited on 3 December 2010, 15:25).
22 Christiano,  Tom:  Authority.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/>; last visited on 12 December 2010, 01_25).
23 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56.
24 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57.
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descriptive  legitimacy  is  measured  empirically,  referring  to  people's  actual  beliefs25. 
Normative legitimacy, on the other hand, is specified through theoretical principles and can be 
applied to any political process, even hypothetical ones. It defines moral standards that hold 
as a measure for evaluating political authority from a viewpoint of morality.
Treating legitimacy not only as a normative, but also as a moral concept, is again a premise 
set  by me.  What  is  interesting  is  that  theorists  often  put  it  like  “legitimacy”  is  the  only 
normative  concept  that  can  be  applied  to  authority;  like  the  only  possible  distinction  is 
between legitimate and de facto authority. However, it is a fundamental premise of this paper 
that  I  do  not  share  this  view.  Instead  I  suggest  that  normative  conceptions  of  political 
authority can be based on different conceptions of “the good”. Just as legitimacy, “justice” or 
even “legality” could (analogously) be defined according to moral standards of a different 
ambition.  Furthermore,  we  must  not  forget  that  morality  is  not  the  only  measure  that 
normative notions can rely on. For example, normative demands can also be formulated based 
on notions of “efficiency” or “productivity”, both of which need not be moral claims. What I 
urge to keep in mind is that just as not all theories deal with authority normatively, not all 
normative theories are moral theories. However, for the purpose of the present paper I will in 
fact deal with moral-normative perspectives on authority only.
In short I conclude that legitimacy is a normative concept applying to political authorities. In 
doing so, it presupposes their de facto existence; it does not justify their being authorities, but 
only deals with how they ought to rule. Traditionally, there are three aspects to this – the right 
to rule, the justified use of coercion, and the obligation on part of the subjects. The demands 
that legitimacy makes towards authority are moral claims. That is to say, when we speak of a 
“right to rule”, this is meant to be a moral right, just as “justified coercion” refers to  moral 
permissibility and the “obligation” is understood as moral obligation.  The obvious question 
is:  How  are  the  claims  of  legitimacy  distinct  from  those  of  other  (moral-)normative 
approaches? This is what I will try to answer in the following section.
25 See  Peter,  Fabienne:  Political  Legitimacy.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2010  (online  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/, last visited on 3 December 2010, 15:25).
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  2.2 Contrasting concepts
So far  I  have  established that  in  this  paper  I  deal  with legitimacy as  applied  to  political 
authorities. I have also introduced the view, that legitimacy is a normative concept whose 
claims are of a specifically moral nature. The aim of the present chapter is to give an idea of 
how we can define the substantial scope of those claims, which is relevant, because I suggest 
that legitimacy is not the only moral concept we can use to evaluate political  authorities. 
Instead,  “legality”  and “justice”  can  be construed as  analogous views.  I  want  to  give  an 
outline of how those two concepts can be distinguished from legitimacy by arguing that the 
main difference lies in the demandingness of the moral claims they make.
  2.2.1 Legality
As I have pointed out, legitimacy is a normative concept which makes moral claims about 
how political authorities ought to act. In what follows I will sketch an argument for how and 
under  what  conditions the same is  true for  legality.  At the same time I  suggest  that  it  is 
actually  a  less  demanding  concept  than  legitimacy,  because  its  moral  claims  are  less 
substantial.
The first important thing to note is that traditional positivist thinking denies the normative 
notion of  legality. For them it is a descriptive notion, more specifically an empiric condition 
that is satisfied by the mere existence of and adherence to law. Law itself is not seen to relate 
to  moral  considerations,  or  what  Herbert  Hart  calls  “what  ought  to  be”26. Instead  law 
establishes “what is”27, i.e. rules and norms that actually exist and which have a certain form. 
As Hart puts it:  “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.”28 Lon 
Fuller observed that, on this view, law's function is to create order, but this order need not be 
“good” in the sense that it  “corresponds to the demands of justice, or morality,  or men's  
26 Hart, Herbert: Positivism and the separation of law and morals., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4,  
1958, p. 594
27 Hart, Herbert: Positivism and the separation of law and morals., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4,  
1958, p. 594
28 See Hart, Herbert: Positivism and the separation of law and morals., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, 
1958, p. 594. (Note that he refers to Austin here.)
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notions  of  what  ought  to  be”29.  It  means  that  “legality”  is  defined by formal,  not  moral, 
validity30. Even morally outrageous law thus remains law31 and is hence authoritative over its 
subjects.
In  contrast  to  this  positivist  approach  a  conception  along  the  lines  of  Fuller  provides  a 
framework for understanding legality as a distinctly normative notion. He suggests that “The 
´morality implicit to law` must be respected if we are to create anything that can be called  
law,  even  bad  law.”32 Now  what  does  this  mean?  Fuller's  concern  is  for  the  creation, 
elaboration and workability of law. The basic idea is this:  Not anyone can make law, not 
anything  can  be  called  law.  In  fact  it  makes  sense  to  speak of  “legality”  only if  certain 
minimum  requirements  are  satisfied,  such  as  the  fact  that  “the  relevant  interpretive  
methodologies” do not “lend complete arbitrariness to the application of law”33. Law owes 
its validity not to legality itself (because this would lead to an infinite regress), but to certain 
“fundamental  accepted  rules” that  specify  “the  essential  lawmaking  procedure”34.  Two 
questions  are  bound  to  arise  from those  explications:  First,  what  makes  this  approach  a 
normative one and what do its claims have to do with morality? And second, how does this 
relate to the subject of authority, when actually all Fuller talks about is law?
As a matter of fact, Fuller's conception of legality is normative, because he defines standards 
that real-life law ought to live up to if it is to count as properly “legal”. Sure enough, not all  
de facto legal systems actually do live up to those standards (for instance, the Nazi regime is 
cited as a counter-example because of its excessive use of retroactive statutes35), and so we 
can classify them according to evaluative benchmarks of “legality” in order to determine their 
merit.  Kristen  Rundle  has  picked  up at  this  point  and argues  that  the  distinct  normative 
condition employed by Fuller is the so-called “rule of law”. As she points out “we can have 
29 Fuller, Lon: Positivism and fidelity to law: A reply to Professor Hart., Harvard Law Reiew, Vol. 71, No. 4, 
1958, p. 644.
30 See Dyzenhaus, David: The Grudge Informer Case revisited., In: New York University Law Review, Vol. 83,  
2008, p. 1006.
31 See Hart, Herbert: Positivism and the separation of law and morals., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, 
1958, p. 600.
32 Fuller, Lon: Positivism and fidelity to law. A reply to Professor Hart., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No.  
4, 1958, p. 645
33 Rundle,  Kristen:  The  impossibility  of  an  extermination  legality.  Law  and  the  Holocaust.,  University  of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, p. 84
34 Fuller, Lon: Positivism and fidelity to law. A reply to Professor Hart., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No.  
4, 1958, p. 641
35 See Fuller, Lon: Positivism and fidelity to law. A reply to Professor Hart., In: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71,  
No. 4, 1958, p. 650.
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law without the rule of law”36. However, it is essentially the latter that is morally desirable, 
because rule of law depends on an “inner morality of law”37, that is, a law whose underlying 
conception of the person is that of a moral agent38.  Only if a legal system is created and 
structured such that the people subjected to it have a chance to live up to its requirements, and 
only if the execution of law follows predictable patterns, subjects have a chance to live under 
authority and still  remain actors, i.e. in control of their fate. In short,  a legal system only 
establishes a rule of law if it excludes arbitrariness in both the making and application of law.
I am confident that this last point makes it obvious why I argue that legality is a normative 
concept applicable to political authorities. But why does it relate to political authorities and 
not just law? The reason is this: Its moral claims are about how law ought to be (made), but 
below the surface this implies a claim about how an authority, the law-maker, ought to relate 
to its subjects39, how it ought to treat or not treat them. Note that the requirements it invokes 
are minimal when regarded from a moral view-point. For example, the specification that there 
ought to be “congruence between official action and declared rule”, or that “laws should not  
require conduct that is impossible”40 does not seem to demand much of the political authority, 
because there is little limitation for the potential making and content of law. Rundle herself 
admits that law, on this view, still remains “indifferent to substantive aims” and that therefore 
the “possibility of iniquitous ends” cannot be precluded41. Yet, though its claims are not too 
substantial, legality still demands something, and I argue that this demand has a distinctly 
moral basis, because it is about how persons are to be related to. This is why I suggest it can 
appropriately be understood as a normative concept, more specifically one that applies certain 
moral minimum requirements to political authorities.
36 Rundle,  Kristen:  The  impossibility  of  an  extermination  legality.  Law and  the  Holocaust.,  University  of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, p. 116
37 Rundle,  Kristen:  The  impossibility  of  an  extermination  legality.  Law and  the  Holocaust.,  University  of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, p. 80
38 See Rundle, Kristen: The impossibility of an extermination legality. Law and the Holocaust., University of  
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, pp. 89 and 106. Also see Dworkin, Ronald: Philosophy, morality 
and law. Observations prompted by Professor Fuller's  moral  claim.,  In:  University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 113, No. 5, 1965 for a similar thought.
39 See Dworkin, Ronald:  Philosophy,  morality and law. Observations prompted by Professor Fuller's  moral  
claim., In: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 113, No. 5, 1965, pp. 672-673.
40 See Rundle, Kristen: The impossibility of an extermination legality. Law and the Holocaust., University of  
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, p. 81. (Note that she refers to Fuller here.)
41 Rundle,  Kristen:  The  impossibility  of  an  extermination  legality.  Law and  the  Holocaust.,  University  of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2009, p. 105
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  2.2.2 Justice
I  have  argued  for  legality  as  a  normative  conception  that  imposes  minimum  moral 
requirements on political authorities. Without having gone into detail, I made the assumption 
that legality is a less demanding concept than legitimacy, because its moral claims are not 
substantial.  In  the  following,  I  now turn to  an alternative concept,  justice,  and sketch an 
argument for why it can be perceived as other end of the spectrum, i.e. the most demanding 
version of a moral-normative concept applying to political authority. It relies on the idea that 
justice imposes heavy demands on the substance of authoritative directives and that its scope 
is wider and more universal than that of either legality or legitimacy.
The first important thing to notice in the context of theories of justice is that there is actually 
no univocal agreement on the fact that justice is actually a concept distinct from legitimacy. It 
is a fact that ever since John Rawls' publication of “A theory of justice”42, there has been a 
revival of normative political theory43, yet terminology varies and what some authors argue 
for under the flag of “justice” is an exact match for other's conception of legitimacy. This is 
why in the present context I cannot rely on an obvious or even commonsensical approach for 
discriminating  between  the  two.  However,  it  is  quite  commonly  accepted  throughout  the 
discourse is that if legitimacy is distinct, it is “related to but weaker than justice”44. In many 
cases it  is treated as a  “normative minimum”45,  less demanding than justice and therefore 
achievable  even  under  imperfect  circumstances.  On  my account  it  is  not  legitimacy,  but 
legality which is the appropriate conception of a normative minimum, but I nevertheless agree 
that justice is more demanding than legitimacy and indeed specifies a normative maximum, 
i.e. ideal requirements for political authority. That would then leave the “middle position” to 
legitimacy.
In fact, there may be two ways to justify my claim that justice specifies the moral maximum. 
One  is  indicated  by  Fabienne  Peter,  who  suggests  that  theories  of  justice  are  usually 
concerned with the substance of policies, while legitimacy is often conceptualized in terms of 
42 See Rawls, John: A theory of justice., Harvard university Press, 2001 (first printed 1971).
43 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57 for a brief overview of how Rawls'  
writing influenced the development of political philosophy.
44 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 58
45 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
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procedure. On this perspective, justice answers questions of “what  46   is owed to people”47 and 
in  most  cases  it  is  thus  concerned  with  distributive  issues.  In  contrast,  the  concept  of 
legitimacy is seen to apply to political procedure, e.g.  “how48 decisions about distributive  
policies ought  to be made”49.  I  suggest  we should be cautious about accepting this  view, 
because not all conceptions of legitimacy are indeed procedural (although Peter's is, as we 
will  see  in  a  later  chapter  of  this  paper).  Yet  I  do  believe  that  there  is  truth  in  Peter's 
observation: If we are to measure the demandingness of moral claims, one thing to consider is 
substance.  As  we  have  seen,  legality  only  imposes  minimal  normative  requirements  on 
political authorities and this can, for instance, be gathered from the fact that there is almost no 
limitation to the potential content of policies/law. All it requires is that there is some inner 
consistency  and  reasonableness  to  the  systemic  whole  of  law,  but  there  is  no  explicit 
limitation to  its  substance.  In contrast,  theories  of  justice often center  around distributive 
issues, which is an indication for the fact that substance matters. When determining the justice 
of an authority's rule there is likely to be a focus on the kind of directives it utters, the content 
of the laws it enacts, and in this sense, I suggest, it is more demanding than legitimacy.
A second way of arguing that justice is indeed demanding is to focus on its target: Some 
theories of justice criticize the idea that that there is a difference between the relationship a 
state (or government) has with its own subjects, the citizens, and that which it has to persons 
who  are  not  members  of  or  subject  to  their  authority50.  Most  commonly,  this  kind  of 
assumption is explicated by arguing that different standards of justice apply to an authority as 
it acts towards its subjects and towards “others” (be it other authorities or other's authorities 
subjects).  For example,  an authority might be required to ensure economic re-distribution 
among its subjects, but not among all human beings. While it is not my aim here to discuss 
this  particular  conception  of  justice,  I  do  insist  that  there  is  a  significant  thought  here: 
Normative claims regarding political authority can be more or less demanding depending on 
how far their consideration goes. Put differently, it matters whether we impose demands only 
on how a political authority ought to act towards one person, or a certain group of persons, or 
all people. Legality and legitimacy are both primarily concerned with how political authorities 
46 Note that this emphasis was added by myself, not the author.
47 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 1
48 Note that this emphasis was added by myself, not the author.
49 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 1 (Also see pp. 56-57.)
50 See Buchanan's distinction of internal and external justice requirements (as can be found in his book “Justice,  
legitimacy and self-determination. Moral foundations for international law.”, Oxford University Press, 2003) 
or  Rawls'  discrimination  between  justice/legitimacy  within  closed  societies  as  opposed  to  the  “law  of 
peoples” (see his “The law of peoples” (1999), “Political Liberalism” (1993), “A theory of justice” (1971)).
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ought to relate to their subjects. Justice, on the other hand, should probably also regard how 
those authorities behave “in general”, that is, towards all other people too. Note that this does 
not call for the conclusion that a just authority has to treat everyone the same way; all it 
asserts is that it matters how a political authority acts towards anyone, be it their subject or 
not. There may still be different sets of normative requirements applying in the one case and 
in the other, but nevertheless, for the overall evaluation it matters whether the authority lives 
up to both.
In sum, I thus conclude that justice is a more demanding concept than legitimacy in the sense 
that  its  moral  claims impose more substantive restrictions on the government and that its 
scope is more universal, considering not only the authority's relation to their own subjects but 
going well beyond that.
  2.3 Sources of legitimacy
Up to now I have made an attempt to distinguish legitimacy from other normative concepts 
that make moral claims towards political authorities. The basic argument was that legitimacy 
represents  a  sort  of  middle  ground  between  legality  and  justice  when  it  comes  to  the 
demandingness of its moral claims. On the one hand, it  is  more demanding than legality, 
because it is not only concerned with the “inner morality” of the authoritative system, but it 
imposes some restriction on its substance too. On the other hand, it is less demanding than 
justice,  because  (just  as  legality)  it  is  concerned  primarily  with  the  relation  between  the 
authority and its subjects, and does not consider “external” relations. Moreover, its claims 
regarding content should only be perceived as “minimum” requirements while those of justice 
are more aspirational.
With the scope of legitimacy so clarified, I can now turn to the fundamental question of this 
paper: What are the normative conditions of legitimacy? What sources does it stem from and 
what moral claims does it make? Obviously, the answer to this question varies across different 
conceptions  of  legitimacy.  In  this  paper  I  distinguish  four  potential  sources  –  beneficial 
consequences, consent, reasonableness and proceduralism51 - and pick an example for each in 
51 See  Fabienne:  Political  Legitimacy.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2010  (online  at 
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order to explicate the approach. The aim is to examine the theories'  argumentation and to 
asses the plausibility of their moral claims. The leading questions are: What is the “normative 
condition” applied by each conception? How is its use justified? And: Does this make for a 
plausible explanation of moral requirements in the context of political authority?
In order to answer these questions I will firstly turn to the theory of Joseph Raz and argue that  
in  his  conception,  legitimacy  stems  from  beneficial  consequences.  At  the  center  of  his 
thinking we find the “Normal Justification Thesis” which suggests that authority's directives 
are obligating for the subjects if this is likely to lead to better compliance to reasons. In fact, 
this will be one of my main criticisms, because while I find the general idea underlying his 
view appealing – the idea that “reasons” are normatively basic and the central category that 
moral evaluation should refer to (i.e. that legitimacy depends on whether the authority's rule is 
supported by good reasons or the right sort of reason-ing) – I criticize that he remains too 
vague about what this actually means for political authority, or morality in general. He does 
not offer a convincing account for where those reasons come from, what exact reasons he is 
talking about and why they are even binding on us.
Second, I turn to the work of John Simmons who has defended “consent” as necessary (and 
indeed sole) legitimizing condition of authority. One of the key arguments he makes is that 
individual consent is necessary because of the natural freedom of persons. In his view only 
voluntary choice can bind particular individuals and create obligation towards an authority. 
However, in my examination I will raise some serious doubts about this understanding of 
freedom and instead suggest that normativity stems not so much from our actual choices, but 
rather from the fact that there are some choices that we  ought to make. His theory cannot 
provide a solution for where this “ought” could come from, though, and this will be my main 
objection against his approach.
The third account I will look into is that of John Rawls. He argues that legitimacy requires 
that the exercise of authority is guided by a political conception of justice, i.e. a conception of 
justice that can be justified based on reasons that all fair-minded and rational persons could 
accept. The normative condition he applies is “reasonable acceptability”, because legitimacy 
means that “reasonable” (fair-minded) persons would be able to accept the authority's rule. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/,  last  visited  on  3  December  2010,  15:25)  for  a  similar 
differentiation.
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This is significant, I suggest, because through this explication one can remedy one of the main 
weaknesses we find in the theory of Raz; the question what kind of reasons it is that ought to 
govern the exercise of authority. Rawls provides an answer to that, and I deem it a convincing 
one. However, what I do not find entirely satisfactory is the merely hypothetical justification 
he requires. All he asks for is that an authority, in relating to its subjects, is able to justify its 
rule in a certain way. He does not require, though, that they actually do engage in justification, 
so how do we know we rely on the “right” reasons?
Last,  I  turn to the work of Fabienne Peter,  whose work stands out because she explicitly 
rejects the assumption that legitimacy is a virtue of political authorities that can be realized 
regardless of their mode of government. Indeed she claims that it is only through a certain 
process of reasoning and justification that legitimacy can be realized. This process cannot be a 
merely intellectual or hypothetical one, but it needs to be an actual part of political reality and 
it is valid only if all subjects are included. This, she claims, requires democracy and thus 
legitimacy is dependent on a democratic mode of government. The main difference to Rawls' 
approach  is  that  he  contends  with  defining  the  sort of  reasons  which  should  govern  the 
process, while Peter argues that the process of determining the “right” reasons is itself what 
constitutes  legitimate  authority.  It  has  to  be  questioned,  however,  whether  this  claim  is 
plausible and whether her line of argument succeeds in defending democracy as a requirement 
of legitimacy.
  
  3. Approach and research interest  
In the previous sections I have defined the approach and subject of this paper by explicating 
its central concepts and research question. The subject is that of political authority and I aim 
to deal with it from a normative perspective; i.e. the perspective of legitimacy. So far I have 
clarified the scope of legitimacy, arguing that it represents a moral middle ground between the 
less demanding concept of legality and the more demanding concept of justice. In particular 
this means that legitimacy makes moral claims about the relation between political authorities 
and their subjects and these claims impose minimum substantial requirements regarding the 
exercise of authority. 
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Different conceptions of legitimacy can be classified according to various categories Option 
one  would  be  to  focus  on  the  appropriate  subject  of  legitimacy,  for  example,  whether  it 
regards political authority, certain institutions or merely the decisions made within them. In 
my paper I will actually leave aside those distinctions and assume political authority to be the 
appropriate subject. This can be justified, I suggest, because it is the most comprehensive 
option  available  and  it  subsumes  most  other  alternatives  (such  as  law,  governmental 
institutions, etc.). 
Another  way  to  go  would  be  to  distinguish  conceptions  of  legitimacy  according  to  the 
function they ascribe to it. Legitimacy can either be seen to justify coercion, or to ground 
political obligation, or to grant a right to rule. Again, I decided to leave these distinctions 
aside, because while I deem them relevant I do not believe that this is the most interesting 
issue when regarded from a normative viewpoint.
The last and, to me, most essential distinction regarding conceptions of legitimacy can be 
made by reference to the “normative condition” that is applied. That is to say, conceptions of 
legitimacy most fundamentally differ in what they assume to be the source of legitimacy, i.e. 
the question what makes an authority legitimate.
In what follows I will turn to give a detailed evaluation of four different approaches – consent, 
beneficial consequences, reasonableness and democratic proceduralism. Note that I will do so 
by using the example of specific theories and analyzing the plausibility of their argument. As 
for structure, I will begin in each chapter by giving a brief overview of the theory and then 
explicate the normative condition defended therein. The main focus of each chapter will be to 
analyze the plausibility of that normative condition and the arguments put forward to defend 
them. In the end I shall not only be able to determine the plausibility of each conception, but  
also to compare them and perhaps find a way to combine them in order to remedy potential 
weaknesses. The central questions that will guide my research are: What is the most plausible 
normative condition of legitimate political authority? And: Is there any reason to assume a 
special role for democracy?
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  III. JOSEPH RAZ  
  1. Legitimacy via instrumental justification  
In the present chapter I will  deal with a conception of legitimate authority as it has been 
presented by Joseph Raz.  The argument will  consist  of two parts;  the explication of Raz' 
theory and its evaluation. In the end I shall be able to give a balanced account of the merits 
and holes of Raz' theory.
I proceed by firstly giving an overview of the main points of his theory. On the one hand, this  
involves an explication of Raz' definition of “authority”, i.e. of how a legitimate authority is 
different  from  an  illegitimate  one,  which  rules  and  rights  are  captured  by  it,  and  what 
obligations it entails. Once I have thus clarified the basic features of legitimate authority, I 
will turn to flesh out the actual normative conditions that Raz develops in this context: the 
Normal Justification Thesis and consent. I argue that their normative force draws on the same 
basis,  which  is  that  of  “reasons”  and  their  justificatory  power.  Raz'  conception  can  be 
classified as an instrumental account of authority, because legitimacy is measured based on 
the subjects' compliance to reasons.
After  this  general  overview  I  then  evaluate  Raz'  concept  and  examine  some  possible 
objections  against  his  view.  The first  question  is  whether  Raz'  complex thinking actually 
presents a consistent account of legitimacy. In this  context I  take up an idea of Margaret  
Martin, who argues that Raz fails to give a unified account of authority. Second, I turn to 
evaluate the plausibility of Raz' normative conditions. For instance leading questions will be: 
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Is the NJT a convincing account of legitimacy? How is its normativity established? Does it 
actually ground moral  obligation? What can consent add to this  view? The third and last 
evaluation turns to the the scope of Raz' conception of legitimacy, questioning whether it is 
sufficient to apply this standard only to authorities, but not to their making or qualification.
  2. Raz' theses on legitimate authority  
  2.1 Definition of legitimate authority
Right to rule correlating with political obligation of the subjects
In the first part of his book „The morality of freedom“ Raz defines legitimate authority as 
„centrally involving a right to rule, where that is understood as correlated with an obligation  
to obey on the part of those subject to authority“52. He thus endorses a rather strong notion of 
legitimacy which consists in two parts. First, legitimate authority involves a “right to rule”, 
which can be described as the right to utter directives and to  “require action”53 from their 
subjects. It is important that this is not merely understood as a description of power, i.e. as the 
fact that an authority actually does utter directives or does require action (perhaps even on 
pain of penalties), but that legitimate authorities have a moral right to do so. This right is 
complemented by the second aspect of legitimacy, because what distinguishes a legitimate 
from a mere  de facto authority is the correlating political obligation. Authority consists not 
only in a right to rule, or in merely having the power to, rather it requires that the authoritative 
directives are binding in such a way that subjects are duty-bound to obey54.
Regarding this kind of political obligation Raz states that it is  “much more and much less  
than an obligation to obey the law”55 and that it is not equitable with the more general set of 
“political  duties”.  There are  two reasons for this.  First,  the duty to  obey law(s)  need not 
52 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 23
53 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 38
54 Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 2006, p. 1012 – Note that Raz “argues that all governments claim morally legitimate authority, but not  
all  of  them  actually  possess  it”  (Martin,  Margaret:  Raz'  “The  Morality  of  Freedom”:  Two  models  of 
authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 53).
55 Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 2006, p. 1004
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depend on whether  an  authority  is  legitimate56,  but  could,  for  instance,  result  from law's 
content. While political duties are generally not dependent on the nature of authority, but can 
have independent normative force, this is not true for the kind of obligation Raz has in mind. 
For example, even the most illegitimate government might legitimately enact a law against 
theft and thereby enforce an independently existing moral duty not to take what is not ours. In 
contrast, a legitimate government might have a claim to their subjects' compliance even if 
there is no independent moral reason for obeying a certain law, for example regarding tax 
payment.  A second  important  distinction  is  that  Raz  is  concerned  with  the  obligation  of 
subjects, i.e. the obligation that members of a political community have specifically towards 
their particular authority and its institutions57. In contrast, “political duties” can be understood 
to be more universal, since they concern political action in general and need not connect to 
only one particular authority or community. For example, one might have a political duty to 
fight severely unjust law, but this does not only apply to the legislature in my own state, but  
also that of foreign countries.
From those clarifications it becomes obvious that the correlation of right and obligation make 
for the distinct nature of Raz' concept of legitimate authority58.
  2.2 Normative condition of legitimacy
Instrumental justification: better compliance to reason(s)
For Joseph Raz, the question of legitimate authority arises because of individual freedom. 
While he rejects the intrinsic value of liberty59, he does conclude that it is valuable in staking 
out grounds for the issue of political authority. The principle of liberty is fundamental to what 
he calls “political morality”,  i.e.  the  “morality which governs political action”  and which 
“sets a goal as well as limits to the actions of (…) political institutions”60. Authority requires 
the subjection of one's will to that of another person. However, it is not immediately obvious 
56 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1004.
57 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1004.
58 Note that Raz distinguishes between four separate but related issues: “(1) the authority of the state; (2) the  
scope of its justified power; (3) the obligation to support just institutions; (4) the obligation to obey the law” . 
(See  Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 104.)
59 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 21. Also see chapter I of his book.
60 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 3
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how it can ever be a duty to defer one's will and judgment in this way61. Raz claims that only 
if an authority is legitimate, its subjects are under a general obligation to comply and follow 
its directives. This is because political morality requires the authority to protect and promote 
individual  freedom62 so  that  only  if  certain  normative  conditions  are  met,  subjection  is 
necessary.
What is the normative condition of legitimacy, then? Raz distinguishes legitimate from mere 
de facto authorities in that he argues legitimate authority is justified, while the latter is nothing 
more than effective power.  Thus,  the normative condition of  legitimacy is  “justification”, 
more specifically moral justification. This distinction is significant, because it suggests that 
the exercise of authority must be supported by a special sort of reasons. Raz elaborates this by 
claiming:
“It is not good enough to say that an authoritative measure is justified because it serves the  
public interest. If it is binding on individuals it has to be justified by considerations which  
bind them. Public authority is ultimately based on the moral duty which individuals owe their  
fellow humans.”63
Thus, authority is legitimate only if it is morally justified. In turn, moral justification depends 
on  moral  duties  that  individuals  have  anyway,  regardless  of  their  being  subject  to  this 
particular authority.  Raz develops four theses in order to explain the relationship between 
authority and the “moral duties” that apply to persons. 
First, the “Dependence Thesis”, is a normative claim about how a legitimate authority ought 
to use its power64: 
“(...)  all  authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently  
apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances  
covered by the directive.”65
It is called the “dependence” thesis, because an authority should base its directives on the 
61 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1012.
62 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 5.
63 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 72
64 See e.g. Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 47.
65 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 47
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same reasons that apply to its subjects, hence act on „dependent“ reasons. As Christiano puts 
it:  “what should guide government decisions about what commands to give subjects is what  
the subjects already have reason to do”66.
The “Dependence Thesis” is complemented by the “No-difference Thesis”. While the former 
is a normative claim about how legitimate authorities ought to make their decisions, the latter 
is a description of the condition that allows us to recognize a legitimate authority:
“the exercise of authority should make no difference to what its subjects ought to do, for it  
ought to direct them to do what they ought to do in any event”67
The basic idea is this: If the authority's decisions reflect the subjects' reasons correctly, the 
exercise of authority will make no difference to what the subjects ought to do – whether one 
acts based on the applying reasons directly, or whether one follows the law does not make a  
difference, because both considerations require the same action.
However, Raz' „Normal Justification Thesis“ assumes that in case of a legitimate authority the 
subject  „is likely to better comply with reasons which apply to him (...)  if  he accepts the  
directives of the alleged authority“68.  Chances are that if we deliberate on the reasons by 
ourselves we might get it wrong. This might still happen if we rely on the authority to tell us 
what to do, but if the authority is generally more likely to get it right, then this authority is 
legitimate in exercising its power; it has a right to rule: “An authority does its job well and is  
therefore legitimate when it enables subjects to act better on the reasons that apply to them  
when they take the commands as giving them preemptive reasons.”69
This then gives way to the “Pre-emptive Thesis”, which asserts that in the case of legitimate 
authorities, decisions do not merely act as an additional reason for subjects to behave in a 
certain way, but rather they pre-empt, basically replace, the reasons that were to be considered 
by the subjects:
66 Christiano,  Tom: Authority.,  In:  Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  first  published 2004 (to  be found  
online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/, last visited on 6 March 2011, 16:51)
67 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 48
68 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 47
69 Christiano,  Tom: Authority.,  In:  Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  first  published 2004 (to  be found  
online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/,  last visited on 6 March 2011, 16:51)
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“the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is reason for its performance  
which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should  
exclude and take the place of some of them.”70
Authoritative directives justifiably preempt what Raz calls “background reasons”, because in 
issuing its directives the authority has considered them anyway71. Thus, an authority preempts 
the subjects' reasons, but at the same time it is bound by them itself.
Putting  those  four  theses  together,  we  get  the  picture  that  authority  is  legitimate,  (i.e. 
justified),  if  it  is  likely  to  lead  to  better  outcomes  (i.e.  better  compliance  to  applying 
reasons)72.  In turn, if it  is legitimate,  its directives are pre-emptive reasons for action, i.e. 
sufficient and beyond the need of any further justification.  This is the core of Raz' „service 
conception“ (SC) of authority and meant to answer the moral question of “how it can ever be  
that one has a duty to object one's will and judgment to those of another”73. It is based on a 
form of instrumental justification, because in Raz' argument it is not for (a) reason itself, that  
authority is justified, but because it will lead to better compliance to reason(s). The directives 
of a legitimate authority create obligation, regardless of their particular content, because they 
depend on reasons that apply to the subjects anyway. Furthermore, Christiano points out that 
the cogency of Raz' theory depends on the thought that “as long as the subject does better by  
reason overall by obeying certain classes of commands, the subject has a duty to obey every  
one of the commands: the correct as well as the incorrect.”74 This is important, because it 
underlines why the difference between the broad but content-dependent set of political duties 
and the obligation stemming from legitimacy is so significant to Raz' thinking.
  2.3 Additional normative condition of legitimacy
Consent to reasonably just authorities
As we have seen, Raz offers an instrumental justification of authority, arguing that legitimacy 
70 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 46
71 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1019.
72 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 61.
73 Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 2006, p. 1012
74 Christiano,  Tom: Authority.,  In:  Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  first  published 2004 (to  be found 
online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/,  last visited on 6 March 2011, 16:51)
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stems from correctly reflecting the subjects' reasons and enabling them to better comply with 
those  reasons  if  they treat  authoritative  demands as  pre-emptive  and binding.  For  Raz  it  
follows that one „has a duty to uphold and support authorities if they meet the conditions of  
the service conception“75. It would seem that the scope of this duty for a particular individual 
depends  on  the  extend  to  which  the  SC is  met  for  him/her  personally:  The  more  one's 
compliance with the authority's directives is likely to lead to better compliance with one's 
applying reasons, the greater the duty owed to that particular authority. As Raz puts it: “The 
government may have (…) more authority over one person than over another.”76 This grants a 
certain flexibility, because the actual scope of obligation depends on the individual's capacity 
to conform with the applying reasons77.
However, what adds to the complexity of this case is that Raz demands that we are not only to 
consider how our subjection to authority helps our own compliance with reasons, but also 
how it affects the compliance of our fellow human beings. Hence, if it serves the „public 
interest“,  our subjection to  authority may be required even if  it  doesn't  improve our own 
compliance, or if it demands certain sacrifices. The reason for this is itself a normative reason 
applying to us: We have a moral duty towards our fellow human beings78. Since the actual 
authority over a particular individual depends on individual capacities on the one hand, but 
also on  „its legitimate authority over the population at large“79, government's authority is 
„legitimate to various degrees regarding different people“80. Raz suggests that the scope of 
any current government's authority cannot be legitimate, because it is both too wide (covering 
areas not included through the SC at all) and not flexible enough (claiming authority over all 
individuals to more or less the same degree)81.  The fundamental question therefore is whether 
the scope allowed for by the SC can be widened, whether there is a supplement for the NJT.
Raz claims that this is indeed possible: Consent as well as an attitude showing similar features 
(e.g. acceptance of the obligations introduced by the law) may legitimize authority beyond the 
75 See e.g. Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 66 – Note: He contrasts the scope of this  
duty with the  „duty of  supporting and upholding just  institutions“.  Those duties  are wider  because just 
institutions do not necessarily have authority over the subject, therefore they are primarily „other regarding“ 
(p. 67) In general, there seems to be some ambiguity regarding the term „just“, but in this context I take it 
that „legitimate“ and „just“ are used interchangeably.
76 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 74
77 See e.g. Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 73.
78 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988,  p. 72.
79 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 74
80 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 104
81 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, pp. 77-80
29
ground covered by the SC82: “consent does extend the bounds of authority beyond what can  
be established without it”83. However, this supplementary condition holds only for reasonably 
just authorities, because it is the intrinsic value of consent/attitude, possible solely under the 
condition of reasonably just authorities, which validates its effect84: “It is binding only if there  
are  good  reasons  to  enable  people  to  subject  themselves  to  political  authority  by  their  
consent.”85 Thus, only if there is reason for our consent to bind us, i.e. if there is consent-
independent reason to subject oneself to an authority, consent creates obligation. Since unjust 
governments  would  not  give  us  any  moral  reason  to  subject  ourselves  to  them,  even 
consenting to being their subject will not solve the problem – even if our consent is given 
freely and would be considered “valid” consent, it does not bind us.
It  is  important to  acknowledge that “reasonable justice” is  not  itself  enough to legitimize 
authority,  instead  it  is  only  our  consent  or  attitude  towards  it  which  has  this  result. 
Furthermore consent  can  only widen the  scope of  authority,  but  it  cannot  itself  establish 
legitimacy, because it is  binding only if certain background conditions render it permissible 
for it to be binding:  “consent can only be held binding if it is so qualified that its effect is  
almost entirely confined to reinforcing independently existing obligations to obey”86 and “it  
cannot be used as a way of endowing anyone with authority where that person had none”87. 
However, if all those conditions are met, consenting to a government's authority, or accepting 
their authority as binding, creates an obligation similar to that established by the NJT, because 
it makes us duty-bound to obey and treat authoritative utterances as pre-emptive reasons for 
action.  It  is  nevertheless  a  qualified obligation,  because it  depends on the subject  having 
consented and does not stem directly from the government's performance the way it does in 
case of “standard legitimacy obligation”.
82 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 100.
83 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 93
84 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 92.
85 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 89
86 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 90
87 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 90
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  3. Evaluation  
  3.1 Incompatible models of authority
Joseph Raz' service conception of authority consists of four theses which are very different in 
their aim and structure. The Dependence Thesis (DT), for example, is a normative claim about 
how authorities ought to make their decisions, while the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT) 
defines the normative condition of legitimacy via the instrumental value of an authority's rule. 
The Pre-emptive Thesis (PT), on the other hand, describes the nature of political obligation 
stemming from legitimacy.  Last,  the  No-difference  Thesis  (NDT)  describes  the  condition 
which allows us to  recognize a legitimate authority.  When assessing Raz'  theory the first 
important question is whether it actually represents a consistent model of authority or whether 
the complex combination of his theses leads to analytical conflicts. 
In fact, this is the very argument Margaret Martin has made in her article “Raz' The Morality  
of Freedom: Two models of authority.”88. She asserts that Raz only claims to present a unified 
model of authority, when actually he proposes two essentially incompatible conceptions89. She 
suggests  that  the Normal Justification Thesis  is  a  moral  argument,  while  the Dependence 
Thesis represents a form of positivist thinking. In her view this means that those two are 
antagonistic and cannot be used to complement each other, consequently suggesting that one 
has to be prioritized over the other.  In the following I aim to assess this claim.
Raz' Normal Justification Thesis states that
“the  normal  way  to  establish  that  a  person  has  authority  over  another  person  involves  
showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him  
(other than the alleged authoritative directives) if  he accepts the directives of  the alleged  
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow  
the reasons which apply to him directly.”90
88 See Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010.
89 See Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 
2010, p. 72.
90 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 53
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According  to  Martin  this  makes  the  bindingness  of  norms  a  moral  matter  and  content-
dependent in the sense “only morally legitimate legal norms have pre-emptive force”91. This 
invites case-by-case assessment92,  because it  seems that subjects  are only bound by those 
directives that actually improve their compliance to reason(s). Hence one ought to determine 
the validity of any authority's decision before obeying it.
In contrast, the Pre-emptive Thesis claims that legal norms are exclusionary reasons for action 
and pre-empt any other considerations:
“the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance  
which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should  
exclude an take the place of some of them.”93
This is to say that when confronted with an authoritative rule, subjects are not allowed to go 
back to the original, or “background”, reasons for action, i.e. the reasons that apply to them 
directly, but they must act based on the rule itself. This is because the rule already reflects all 
relevant  applying  reasons,  hence  “pre-empting”  any  force  they  might  have  had  for  the 
individual subject.
This then seems to create a conflict, because “the very act of determining whether the norm  
meets  the  normal  justification standard undermines  the  pre-emptive  force of  the norm in  
question”94. Either the bindingness of norms depends on their content and instrumental moral 
value, or any directive uttered by an authority requires pre-emptive commitment independent 
of their particular content. This problem is intensified when keeping in mind that Raz “rejects  
the claim that we have a general obligation to obey the law”95 even in a relatively just society. 
It stands to question whether there is a way to circumvent this dilemma and, if not, whether  
and to what extent that would matter.
One way of trying to reconcile the NJT and the PT could consist in simply presuming that an 
91 Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, 
p. 58 (Also see p. 61.)
92 See Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 
2010, p. 57.
93 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 46
94 Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, 
p. 58
95 Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, 
p. 72
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authority  is  competent  and  usually  fulfills  the  requirements  of  the  NJT.  One does  better 
complying with one's  reasons if  one generally defers one's  judgment to that  authority (as 
proposed in the pre-emptive thesis), then, because “(...) authority has it right or, at the very  
least, is more likely to have it right than I am.”96 In that case one would be able to pre-commit 
oneself to the rule of authority, simply presupposing – without questioning – that it does live 
up to the NJT. If it actually does ,both conditions would be fulfilled. Yet there is an obvious 
problem with this approach: Without a solid argument for why and under what conditions a 
particular authority can be held to actually be in line with the NJT – empirically, universally 
and perpetually – this argument is not convincing. First, what kind of evidence would enable a 
person to reasonably “presuppose” a government's legitimacy along the lines of the NJT? 
How often would it have to be renewed? The problem is posed by the fact that it is not at all  
obvious  how  one  should,  or  could,  decide  when  and  under  what  conditions  the  NJT is 
generally satisfied97. As Martin points out: “who gets to decide whether a given norm meets  
the requirements of this thesis?”98. There might be good reason to believe that there is, and 
always will be, reasonable disagreement about what “reason” requires us to do99. Second, and 
even more important, it stands to question whether there would be any substance left to the 
NJT if it is reduced to a mere presupposition. Legitimacy would then be a “claim-feature” of 
authority, i.e. exactly what Raz has been trying to deny100.
An alternative resort for trying to escape the dilemma posed by the conflict between the NJT 
and the  PT could consist  in  the argument  that  a  case-by-case assessment  of  authoritative 
directives is unnecessary since they are pre-emptive not only if and when they satisfy the NJT, 
but also due to other moral reasons. For example Martin suggests: “The law allows a large  
number of people to co-exist peacefully. Because law coordinates our behavior on a large  
scale, and in so doing we reap many benefits, we therefore have an obligation to obey it  
(...)”101 This would indeed be a an instrumental justification for authority that is quite similar 
to that of Raz, but it would impose much less demanding moral requirements on authority. In 
96 Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, 
p. 64
97 See Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 
2010, pp. 67-68.
98 See Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 
2010, pp. 67-68.
99 See the following chapter on Rawls.
100 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1005.
101 Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 2010, 
p. 72
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fact, rule of law (legality) would be sufficient to create obligation – an assertion that Raz 
rejects when he argues we have no general obligation to obey the law, even in a relatively just 
society102.
I  conclude that  Martin  is  right  in pointing out  the conflict  between the NJT and the PT, 
because  they  do  seem  to  exclude  each  other,  at  least  if  we  accept  that  they  are  both 
“absolutes”. But where does that leave us?
I suggest that Martin's observation is important, because it calls attention to some weak spots 
in  Raz'  theses.  The  problem is  not  only  that  the  combination  of  his  theses  is  not  fully 
consistent, but rather that each for themselves would not be fully convincing either. The NJT 
is  the normative framework of legitimacy because it  defines its  conditions – authoritative 
directives are legitimate if they improve our compliance to reasons. Even if this makes for 
morally sound judgment, though, it invites a case-by-case assessment which is simply not 
practicable in complex modern societies. In contrast, the PT offers a solution for practicable 
authoritative rule, but at the price of moral requirements – which is to say that an authority is 
likely to rule effectively if its subjects treat their directives as pre-emptive reasons for actions 
without questioning them, but if the only reason they do that is the authority's power, this is 
probably not the most plausible explication of the normative notion of legitimacy, . If the 
authority's decision pre-empts our own process of justification in any case, we risk actually 
being morally worse off by complying with it, at least if should there be cases where our own 
judgment would lead to better compliance to reasons. Thus one might conclude that neither 
thesis would be sufficient to stand as an adequate concept of legitimate authority, because it 
would be either at the cost of practicability or morality. However, their combination is not 
fully convincing either, because they cannot be seen to balance but rather to annihilate each 
other.
  3.2 The Normal Justification Thesis
In the previous section I have argued that Raz' concept of legitimacy is not fully convincing, 
because I  find that  the combination of his  NJT and the PT leads to inconsistency.  I  also 
102 See Martin, Margaret: Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two models of authority., In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 
2010, p. 71 and Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, e.g. p. 67.
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pointed out that without the PT, the NJT would not be workable since it requires the subjects 
to develop their own moral judgment in a way that defeats the purpose of efficient rule. Apart 
from this practical problem, though, one could also question the normative force of the NJT. 
Raz suggests that an authority's legitimacy depends on whether our subjection makes us better 
comply with  morally relevant  reasons,  i.e.  reasons which  apply to  us  independent  of  the 
authority's rule. The question is whether this account is actually persuasive, or put differently, 
whether justification via reasons is the appropriate normative condition of legitimacy.
Raz argues that “reasons” are essential for legitimacy, because authority needs to be justified 
in order to be legitimate, and the normal way of justifying authority is to argue that we better 
comply with reasons that apply to us if  we treat the authority's  directives as pre-emptive 
reasons for action. In short, reasons are important because they (can)  justify an authority. 
They apply to us, but they indirectly also apply to the authority. Only if an authority reflects 
our reasons correctly it has a right to rule, which then entails that we follow its directives and 
treat them, instead of the original reasons, as our primary reasons for action. There are two 
obvious questions regarding this summary, one analytical and one substantive. First, what are 
those reasons and how do they apply to us? Second, does it actually make sense to assume 
that those reasons can justify an authority; justify us being subjected to someone else's will? 
On  an  analytical  level,  Raz  introduces  four  distinctions.  First,  he  distinguishes  between 
normative and explanatory reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of an action, make its 
choice intelligible103, while explanatory reasons merely explain  “how or why” things are104. 
Within the context of legitimacy, he is concerned with normative reasons, which means that 
we are dealing with reasons that make claims on us.
Second, he continues to distinguish between action and outcome reasons. In the first case, the 
value lies in  the  “performance” of  an action105,  but  in the latter  it  lies in  its  outcome or 
consequence106. Put differently, we could explicate this to mean that the claim is either for us 
to  perform a certain act  or it  is  for us  to bring about  a  certain outcome.  Either  way the 
following action might be the same, yet its justification is not, because it either lies in the 
103 See Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 90, 2006, p. 1006.
104 Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 2006, p. 1006
105 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 279
106 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 279
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action itself or in its consequences. This is important also because it might be relevant for 
whether or not a person has to perform the required action him-/herself.
Third,  Raz'  distinguishes  between  agent-relative and  agent-neutral reasons.  Agent-relative 
reasons are “reasons for some people and not for others”107, their claims do not apply to all of 
us but only to some people in virtue of some significant feature. Agent-neutral reasons are 
reasons “for everyone”108, which I take to mean that they apply to all of us, in virtue of some 
common  feature,  most  likely  our  common  humanity.  They  do  not  discriminate  between 
humans based on personal features, but rather they make claims on anybody and in just the 
same way.
Note that the above discrimination has its focus on the agent, while Raz' last argues that we 
can also distinguish between reasons based on the origin of their normative force. As a matter  
of fact he argues that some reasons are content-dependent while others are not, and he takes 
this to mean that sometimes there is “no direct connection between the reason and the action  
for which it is a reason”109. For example, a credible threat might be a viable reason to do 
(almost) anything, regardless of what particular action is required.  In that sense, a person 
holding a gun to my head and threatening to shoot me will give me a reason to do what he 
wants me to do – be it lie to a police officer, pay them money or order pizza. The primary 
reason for performing any of those actions would not lie in their content, but rather in the 
specific circumstances.110 As Scott Hershovitz has summarized, content-independent reasons 
are “facts that achieve their status as reasons in virtue of features other than their content”111. 
Note that content-independent reasons are similar to what Raz calls “pre-emptive” reasons, 
because in that case too, the  nature of the reason, rather than the required action, is what 
makes the normative claim on us. 
Taking stock of those clarifications we can conclude that Raz tells us quite a lot about the 
nature and variety of reasons. However, the question remains how they actually relate to us, 
or, put differently, what they mean. What claims to reasons make on us? Here, I suggest, Raz 
remains  disappointingly vague.  The only real  clue  he gives  us  is  when he mentions  that  
107 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 314
108 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 146
109 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 35
110 Needless to say that of course the actions following from a threat differ in regards to their own moral worth,  
and thus threat might be a more or less valid reason to actually perform them.
111 Hershovitz, Scott: Legitimacy, democracy and Razian authority., In: Legal Theory, Vol. 9, 2003, p. 203
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“moral duties” toward others are “reasons” in the context of authority. For example he writes: 
“It is not good enough to say that an authoritative measure is justified because it serves the  
public interest. If it is binding on individuals it has to be justified by considerations which  
bind them. Public authority is ultimately based on the moral duty which individuals owe their  
fellow humans.”112 This implies that authority is legitimate if it makes us better realize our 
moral duties towards our fellow human beings. Moral duties are usually based on rights113, but 
there are also some “intrinsic duties” that do not derive from rights114. On some occasions he 
suggests that moral duties are not the only reasons, but he provides no further explications, 
either regarding the sort of claims they make on us, or what source they trace back to.
This, I suggest, is problematic, because it seems the normative force of the NJT depends on 
the sort of reason Raz has in mind. For his argument would appear to go:
A. Freedom matters.
B. Reasons matter.
B1: Compliance to reasons matters.
C.  If  authority  improves  our compliance to  reasons,  it  is  legitimate  (even if  it  limits  our  
individual freedom).
What bothers me is that if both reasons and freedom are important it does not seem sensible 
that  all reasons matter equally. Moral duties toward other humans seem a straight-forward 
case of reasons that we are ought to comply to, but how about other sorts of reasons? Most 
people agree that rain provides me with a reason to take an umbrella when I leave the house. 
The question is whether this reason really is morally fundamental enough as to justify an 
authority enforcing it as a rule, thus limiting my personal freedom. I believe that Raz did not 
mean to say that, however, I deem it a serious weakness of his argument that he does not take 
the time to clarify what kind of reasons his NJT refers to. The NJT's normative force depends 
on the normative force of reasons, but while all reasons might have some normative force, 
there still are crucial differences in the scope of their normativity, and this makes it necessary 
to clarify which reasons are fundamental enough to justify a limitation of freedom.
That  said,  the  fundamental  question  remains  whether  Raz  is  successful  in  defending 
112 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 72
113 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 183.
114 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 210.
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“justification” as normative condition of legitimacy. I personally am not sure that he is. On the 
one  hand,  I  do  find  his  idea  that  justification  –  more  particularly:  justification  based on 
morally relevant reasons – is what legitimizes authority,  intriguing. It makes sense that in 
order for a directive to be legitimate, there must be “good reasons” for it and on an intuitive 
level I thus agree that “reasons” are normatively basic. Reasons justify, and what is justified 
by reason(s)  can  count  as  legitimate.  However,  while  I  believe  that  Raz  is  successful  in 
describing justification as the condition of legitimacy, I think he is too vague when it comes to 
making the actual argument. He seems to assume that it  is obvious, beyond dispute, what 
reasons there are; that “the” reasons are just “there” and apply to us, so that we can have a  
good estimation of whether or not we are conforming with them (and, consequently, whether 
we  comply  better  by  following  one  course  of  action  or  another).  However,  simply 
“presupposing” reasons and our knowledge of them is oversimplifying the matter at hand, and 
this, in my estimation, undermines the persuasiveness of the NJT.
I  conclude  that  the  NJT  provides  an  appealing  condition  of  legitimacy,  because  it 
acknowledges the normative force of reasons. However, Raz' conception of reasons and their 
relation to the justification of authority seems underdeveloped to me: It suggests that there is 
one thing we have to know in order to determine whether an authority is legitimate or not: our 
applying reasons and how we best comply to them (either subjecting to the authority's rule or 
not). Yet it remains unclear to me what the appropriate answer to this question is, or how one 
might discover.
Perhaps this  weakness could be remedied if we change our view on the relation between 
reasons and justification. On Raz' account of “justification” authority is legitimate not because 
it complies to reasons, but because it makes us better comply to reasons. This makes it appear 
as if reasons are not directly relevant for the justification of authority, because they do not 
justify  its  actions  dorectly,  but  merely  ground  them in  the  sense  that  authority  ought  to 
“consider” them. The actual  justification, and thus legitimacy, depends on the subjects, not 
the  authority,  because  it  stems  from the  subject's  compliance  to  reasons.  Justification  is 
therefore a  state, one defined through the realization of reasons on part of the individuals. I 
believe an alternative view could be more successful in defending “justification” as relevant 
normative  condition  of  legitimacy.  This  is  because  one  could  argue  (along  the  lines  of 
Christine  Korsgaard  and  Fabienne  Peter,  for  example),  that  reasons  are  not  just  “there”, 
applying to us like raindrops fall on us. Rather, they are arguments that we use in the process  
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of  justification,  i.e.  the  process  of  justifying  things  to  one  another.  What  matters,  for 
legitimacy, then, is not some objective over-all compliance score, but rather a specific way of 
an authority relating to its subjects. Justification would not depend on the substance of reasons 
so much, but focus on the conditions that make them have normative force on us. This in turn 
suggests that we need  a certain conception of practical reason in order to get a grip on the 
normativity of reasons.115
  3.3 Consent 
As we have seen, the NJT forms the core of Raz' conception of legitimate authority. It is the 
basic  standard  of  justification,  the  normative  condition  of  legitimacy.  However,  Raz 
introduces a second standard that might be seen to supplement the NJT: consent. As he puts 
it:“consent does extend the bounds of authority beyond what can be established without it”116. 
This suggests consent is a normative supplement to the NJT, because it can render authority 
legitimate  even where  the  NJT does  not  hold  for  every individual  who is  subject  to  the 
authority.
For  me this  gives  rise  to  two questions:  First,  what  does  the  normative force  of  consent 
consist  in?  And  second,  how does  it  fit  in  the  broader  framework  of  Raz'  theory?  Is  it 
consistent with the NJT; does it succeed in adding moral justification? 
Regarding the normative force of consent, Raz argues that “consent can only be held binding  
if  it  is  so qualified that  its  effect  is  almost  entirely  confined to  reinforcing independently  
existing obligations to obey”117.  What  he means is  that  consenting to  being subject to an 
authority creates an obligation similar to that of the NJT only if there is good reason for this 
consent to bind us. Free consent to a severely unjust authority does not put us under any 
obligation, then, because this obligation would not be justified by moral reasons. If, on the 
other hand, an authority implements reasonably just law, and we consent to being subjected to 
it, this binds us, because there are independent moral duties that are thus enforced. While the 
NJT refers  to  an  improvement  in  our  compliance  to  reasons,  the  normative  condition  of 
115 For detailed evaluation of this view see the following chapter on Peter.
116 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 93
117 Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 90
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consent does not require that we become better, only that the rule itself is supported by good 
reasons. It is therefore less demanding, but also less powerful than the NJT, because the actual 
obligation is grounded in independent moral duties – in “reasons” – more than it is grounded 
in actual consent. The authority's right to rule is  reinforced, not established, by our consent. 
That is to say legitimacy still  depends on the fulfillment of the NJT, and consent merely 
widens  the  legitimate  scope  of  the  authority's  rule  regarding  my own  person.  Note  that 
consent  or  its  withholding  can,  in  Raz'  view,  never  reduce the  legitimate  scope  of  an 
authority's rule, rather it can only be used as a means of its extension. This could be explicated 
as follows:
A. By consenting to the rule of an authority which does not live up to the NJT I do not  
create any obligation for myself.
B. By consenting to the rule of an authority which does live up to the NJT I only create  
“new”,  or  additional,  obligation  for  myself  regarding  what  is  beyond  the  scope  
covered by the NJT but can still be deemed “reasonably just”.
C. I cannot reduce my obligation by not consenting to the rule of an authority which  
lives up to the NJT  and which is reasonably just even beyond that .
If those explications are fairly accurate, it seems that consent, while introduced as a normative 
condition in its own right, does not actually add much normative insight into legitimate rule: 
What is justified by the NJT is legitimate and puts me under obligation, regardless of whether 
or not I decide to give my consent. Regarding directives that go beyond the scope of the NJT, 
my consent can add to obligation, but only if those directives are “reasonably just”. Again, 
consent  does not create this  obligation,  but  only reinforces it.  By definition it  seems that 
“reasonably just” directives are utterances that do not live up to the NJT because they do not 
improve our compliance to reasons, but which are still justified by exactly those independent 
moral reasons which I   need to comply with.  If  that is  true,  though,  I  am not sure what 
normative force is actually added through consent. Perhaps our recognition of a duty ought to 
make our compliance more likely, but what more is consent supposed to do, supposed to be,  
than this recognition of duty, if what we are then bound by binds us anyway?
I conclude that Raz argument for the bindingness of consent is insightful and dissatisfying at 
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the same time. On the one hand his argument that consent can only bind us where “there is a  
reason for such consent to bind us”118 bears an important truth. At the same time, however, 
this statement also seems to imply that consent never really changes our normative situation, 
it is only an explication, an acknowledgment of it. That is to say: Consent may be significant  
for  a  subject's  relation  to  an  authority  for  all  sorts  of  reasons;  for  example  because  it 
represents  an  individual  endorsement of  reasons.  Yet  it  does  not  directly  establish  (or 
invalidate,  for  that  matter)  normativity..  But  how,  then,  can  it  be  a  (separate)  normative 
condition of legitimacy? Raz' description of consent leads us back to the realization of why 
reasons  are  normatively  basic,  and  in  which  way  they  are.  I  even  believe  that  his 
argumentation in the context of consent makes this much more evident than his conception of 
the  NJT  does,  but  that  does  not  make  “consent”  a  convincing  standard  for  legitimacy. 
However,  this  does not establish a direct  link to  legitimacy.  Moral obligation stems from 
reasons, because they make normative claims on us, that much becomes evident from Raz' 
work. Yet, what I have come to conclude is that neither the NJT nor consent are convincing 
conceptions of how this relates to legitimate authority.
  4. Conclusion  
  
This chapter has provided an overview of Raz' conception of legitimate authority. For him it 
entails  a  right  to  rule  as  well  as  a  correlating  obligation  to  obey.  He thus  proposes  two 
normative conditions, the more important of which is the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT). I 
have argued that Raz' service conception is an instrumental account, because it suggests that 
authority influences our compliance to reasons and legitimacy depends on whether we comply 
better or worse when subjecting to the authority's rule. The NJT is supplemented by a second 
normative condition; consent. It can render an authority's rule legitimate beyond the scope of 
the NJT, but only if it is at least reasonably just. The obligation that arises from the NJT and 
consent depends on the same normative basis, that is, reasons. An authority is legitimate if it  
is justified, and this justification depends on moral reasons which exist independent of the rule 
and which oblige the individual. Throughout my evaluation of Raz' view, I found that this is 
actually  the  most  promising  aspect  of  his  theory.  However,  I  raised  various  concerns 
regarding the plausibility of how Raz incorporates it into the NJT and his defense of consent 
as a legitimizing condition. It seemed to me that he sometimes presupposes what should be 
118 Raz, Joseph: The problem of authority: Revisiting the Service Conception., In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 2006, p. 1039
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justified.  For  example  I  argued  that  the  relation  of  reasons,  justification  and  legitimacy 
requires  some  clarification,  or  limitation,  of  what  the  relevant  reasons  are,  otherwise  it 
remains too abstract what legitimacy actually means. All in all I am not convinced that the 
normative force of reasons is best explicated when making individual compliance the relevant 
measure and I therefore suggest that a different incorporation might be more successful.
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  IV. JOHN SIMMONS  
  1. Legitimacy via consent  
In the present chapter I deal with the conception of legitimate authority developed by John 
Simmons in his famous article “Justification and legitimacy”119. The argument will consist of 
two parts; the explication of Simmons' theory and its evaluation. In the end I shall be able 
judge the plausibility of his view.
In order to give an overview of Simmons' thought, I will first clarify the notion of authority 
that  he relies upon in his  paper.  In particular  this  requires  me to explicate  his  distinction 
between “justified” and “legitimate” authorities and the implication this has for the moral 
rights and duties involved. In the following section I then specify the normative condition he 
defines regarding legitimacy and how it is distinct from other moral considerations. As we 
will see, Simmons draws on a Lockean conception of natural freedom in order to confirm 
“consent” as the legitimizing condition for authorities.  This means that his  theory neither 
refers to instrumental nor intrinsic arguments, i.e. he neither uses arguments of the form “A is 
legitimate if it leads to X” or “A is legitimate qua being a”. Instead his notion of legitimacy 
depends  on  the  subjects'  free  deferral  of  the  right  to  rule.  Put  differently:  For  Simmons 
legitimacy does not demand that a specific sort of consequence follows from an authority's 
command, or that certain principles are realized, but it requires actual transactions between 
the two partied involved (the authority and its subjects).
119 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999.
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In the second part of the present chapter I evaluate Simmons' claim that consent is a necessary 
and indeed the only normative condition of legitimacy. First, I assess his thesis that consent is 
necessary due to the natural freedom of persons. I conclude that the assumption of freedom is 
plausible,  but  that  the specific version of Simmons'  argument  is  not.  That  is  to say:  It  is  
plausible to assume that persons are free and equal, not naturally under a certain political rule. 
What is not plausible, though, is that Simmons therefrom deduces that the only thing that can 
ever bind us despite our freedom is what we consent to. This is why the concept freedom is 
plausible,  but  in  my  view  the  conceptions  of  Simmons  is  not.  Second,  I  explicate  the 
“particularity requirement”, which demands that obligation has to be established in regards to 
particular individuals in order to be binding. I concede that this is significant, but still deny 
that consent is necessary. Third, I then turn to the core of Simmons' theory, i.e. the idea that 
“justification”  and  “legitimacy”  are  distinct  concepts  which  require  distinct  normative 
conditions. In fact, I agree with the first part of his claim, but not the second one. Instead I 
argue that the two normative conditions should cohere. Last, I assess the validity of Simmons' 
claim that legitimacy requires consent because it is the best way to accord for the motivation 
of subjects, concluding that I do not find this assumption convincing.
  2. Simmons' theses on legitimate authority  
  2.1 Definition of legitimate authority
Right to rule includes infliction of duties and use of coercive force
In  his  article  “Justification  and  Legitimacy”  Simmons  argues  for  a  distinction  between 
justification and  legitimacy in regards to the vindication of political authority. He suggests 
that even if an authority is justified in being an authority or in exercising its power, this is not 
sufficient  to  actually  legitimize  it.  That  is  important  because  only  a legitimate 
government/state has  „the complex moral right (...) to be the exclusive imposer of binding  
duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to  
enforce the duties“120. What sets legitimate authorities apart is thus the „logical correlate“121 
of a  right  to  rule  with the (moral)  duty to  obey.  Legitimate authority for  him signifies  a  
120 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 746
121 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 746
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morally significant relation between the state/government and its subjects122. This means that 
there is more to this relation than that the state provides a “stable and lawful”123 environment 
for its citizens, because it both imposes and enforces duties; duties which the subjects have 
specifically towards  their  particular  government.  To be under  a  legitimate authority's  rule 
hence  means  for  an  individual  to  be  subjected  to  its  directives,  law,  and,  arguably,  their 
coercion.
Two  things  are  of  special  significance  in  this  context.  First,  Simmons  does  not  only 
distinguish between mere authorities and “legitimate authorities”, as for example Joseph Raz 
does124. Instead, he emphasizes that legitimacy is a distinct normative concept which must not 
be confused with other moral ascriptions such as justification or justice. This is important, 
because just as Raz argues that mere de facto authorities do not infuse obligation on the part 
of their subjects, Simmons suggests that even if the normative condition of justification holds, 
obligation is not yet established. This can be contrasted with the view of John Rawls, who is 
not so much concerned with the difference between authorities that do impose duties and 
those that do not, but who focuses on the difference between “justice” and “legitimacy”, both 
of  which  are  normative  concepts  and both  of  which  create  obligation,  but  of  a  different 
scope125.  That  leads  to  a  second  important  clarification:  Simmons  might  have  a  rather 
conservative view of what “legitimacy” means – a right to rule correlated with a duty to obey 
– but his  theory is  nevertheless important,  because he defends a  very different  normative 
condition than either Raz or Rawls do.
  2.2 Normative condition of legitimacy
Deferral based on freedom of persons
As we have seen, Simmons' main claim regarding legitimacy is that any political authority has 
to  pass  a  two  stage  challenge  when  it  comes  to  the  normative  question:  First  its  mere 
existence has to be justified, but a second step is necessary to legitimize the actual authority 
over a particular individual. On this view, the main assumption is that justification is not the 
normative condition of legitimacy, but instead a separate concept altogether. It is not a rival of 
122 See  Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 746.
123 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 748
124 See the preceding chapter on Raz for details.
125 See the following chapter on Rawls for details..
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legitimacy, though, but better understood as its pre-condition. This means that justification 
and  legitimacy  are  moral  concepts  that  draw  on  distinct  normative  conditions126.  In  the 
following I will clarify how Simmons distinguishes between the two concepts and give an 
account of his argumentation.
Regarding  normative  conditions  Simmons  argues  that  while  “justification”  can  be 
accomplished by pointing to the rational desirability or moral virtues of governments/states in 
general,  legitimacy  requires  the  free  consent  of  particular  individuals  towards  particular 
governments/states127. An authority is justified, for example, if it has a tendency to produce 
good outcomes or consequences128, if it is  “on balance” a good thing to have129. However: 
“The fact that a state (...) has virtues that can be appealed to in order to justify its existence  
cannot itself argue for its having special rights over any particular individuals.“130 Simmons 
offers the analogy of a useful business in order to prove this point. He argues that a “good”, 
business does not, as a result of its general qualities, have the right to have particularly me as 
a client131. For example, even if we can prove that Amnesty International is a morally good or 
useful business, this fact is not sufficient to legitimize the use of coercion to make me join its  
ranks. Similarly, the existence of window-washing companies might be justified by a variety 
of valid reasons and yet this does not put me under any obligation to hire them. Just because 
an authority is “a good thing to have” does not mean that I am obligated to be their subject132.
In making his argument Simmons does not rely on intuition alone, but he bases his view on a 
Lockean approach that relies, for its foundation, on the  „natural freedom“133 of persons. In 
Simmons' view, an individual's natural freedom renders it impermissible for anyone to claim 
authority over them unless it is freely granted through consent. This is because humans are 
born free and equal and under no-one's authority. Hence it requires free deferral to put me 
under  someone's  rule  and  to  establish  obligation  towards  that  authority,  because  “I  am 
constrained only by how I have in fact lived and chosen”134 and not by how I might have 
reason to choose.
126 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 739.
127 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 745.
128 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 743.
129 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 755.
130 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 752
131 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 752
132 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 742.
133 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 754
134 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 762
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What this means is that justification is a general concept whose normative condition can be 
established abstractly, by giving reasons. An authority is justified if it can be shown to be 
rationally desirable, but this does not need to relate to any specific person or context; general 
virtues will suffice. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is particular in the sense that it stands for a 
special  moral  relation  between  a  particular  authority  and  its  particular  subjects.  This 
particularity in turn requires for the relation to be an actual one, and not merely hypothetical; 
it  is  about  an  actual  authority  and  its  actual  subjects.  No  state  or  government  can  have 
legitimate authority over an individual unless this sort of relation is established.  Since I am 
born free and under no-one's obligation, there is no way for me to be put under their rule 
unless I  make this  transaction myself:  “The legitimacy of  particular  states thus  turns on  
consent, on the actual history of that state's relations with its subjects.”135 The normative 
condition of legitimacy therefore depends on the actual consent of particular individuals. This 
means  that  an  authority  may be  justified  regarding all  of  its  subjects  (and  perhaps  even 
beyond that) without ever having a legitimate right to rule any one of them – if none of them 
consents to being subjected to their rule, that is: “Political power is morally legitimate, and  
those  subject  to  it  are  morally  obligated  to  obey,  only  where  the  subjects  have  freely  
consented to the exercise of such power and only where that power continues within the terms  
of the consent given.”136 
In  presenting  his  theory  of  legitimacy,  Simmons  explicitly  rejects  Kantian  notions  of 
legitimacy and in particular the Rawlsian conception. He actually objects that their theories 
entail  an  impermissible  „conflation  of  questions  about  justification  and  legitimacy“137. 
According to him, Rawls fails to establish legitimacy, because actual consent is neglected in 
favour of   some  version  of  “hypothetical  consent”.  That  is  to  say,  in  his  conception  of 
legitimacy, Rawls appeals to what people would endorse were they in a certain state of mind138 
and therefrom develops his normative conditions. However, in Simmons' view this approach 
is flawed. It is not sufficient to establish legitimacy, because all it might go to show is whether 
an authority is “desirable”. Rational desirability is an issue of justification, though, not of 
legitimacy, because it does not account for the freedom of persons (i.e. for the fact that we are 
under  no  authority  unless  we  have  freely  consented  to  it).  As  he  puts  it:  “If  the  
135 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 745
136 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 745 – Also see p. 746 for 
comments on the possibility of “partial” legitimacy.
137 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 758
138 See the following chapter on Rawls for details.
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virtues/justifiability of institutions made by others gave those institutions power over me, they  
would “injure” my natural freedom and so be impermissible.”139. So Simmons rejects both 
the impersonal and hypothetical element of Rawls' argument and suggests that Rawls does not 
succeed in providing a plausible conception of legitimacy. On a similar note, Simmons also 
rejects Kant's theory. He quotes Kant to claim that we have an obligation towards the state 
(both to enter and to respect it), because political authorities are necessary in order for us to 
carry out our duties towards others: “for Kant the justification of the state – its necessity for  
the realization of freedom and rights and justice – entails an obligation to enter civil society  
and accept the duties society imposes.”140 In Simmons' own view, however, there is neither a 
“natural” obligation towards an authority,  nor is  there a natural duty to put oneself  under 
someone else's authority for the sake of others. Thus the acquisition of obligation is optional 
to  Simmons  and  he  therefore  defends  an  „opting-out“  option  in  regards  to  (full)  state 
membership141. Only through free consent can we acquire political obligation, therefore he 
concludes that Kant's theory is inappropriate.
One  more  detail  is  important  to  note  in  this  context:  Regarding  the  issue  of  acquisition 
Simmons does not give any explicit statement as to which definition of consent he is actually 
working  upon.  However,  he  does  make  a  lot  of  effort  to  dismiss  concepts  that  ground 
legitimacy on the “attitudes” of its subjects142 and he also emphasizes the need for  actual 
transactions143. Complementing this with statements from some other papers144, I take it the 
key aspects are: actual free and deliberate choice („voluntarism“, „signing up for“) and direct, 
particular interaction. Beyond that it is not entirely clear what exactly persons need to consent 
to  in  order  for  an  authority  to  be  legitimate.  Obviously  they  need  not  consent  to  their 
existence, but to being their subject. Whether this means that they acquire state membership 
and are then bound by all decisions of the government as long as they do not oppose some 
constitutional  essentials,  or  whether  it  allows  for  the  subjects  to  withhold  their  consent 
regarding individual  policies is  not  clear.   In another  context  he states:  “all  consent  (…) 
should be understood to be consent to all and only that which is necessary to the purpose for  
139 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 754
140 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 755.
141 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 760
142 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, pp. 748-50.
143 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 764.
144 See  Simmons,  A.  John: Justification  and  Legitimacy.  Essays  on  Rights  and  Obligations.,  Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, espec. ch. 5 and 8 and Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligation,  
Princeton University Press, 1979, espec. ch. 3.
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which the consent is given”145 In general what seems to matter most is that the normative 
condition  of  legitimacy  is  a  form  of  consent  which  realizes  freedom,  particularity  and 
actuality.
  3. Evaluation  
  3.1 Freedom of persons and the necessity of consent
Simmons  adopts  „natural  freedom“ as  the  central  moral  basis  of  his  argument.  He 
continuously refers  to  it  as  the central  criterion for  whether  or  not  an action  or  claim is 
morally permissible and, indeed, whether an authority is legitimate146.  In his view, natural 
freedom is the reason why legitimate authorities need to be based on actual consent147. In the 
following I will evaluate Simmons'  proposal for a connection between freedom and consent. 
On the one hand, this means to question whether consent is actually necessary in order to 
account for human liberty, as Simmons claims it is.  On the other, it  means to assess how 
persuasive his conception of freedom is.
Simmons argues that since all  persons are born free we can only be under the rule of an 
authority if we freely agree to it. This is because to be subject to an authority means that we 
are under an obligation, and obligation is defined as a “limitation to our freedom”148. It means 
to  accord  to  the  authority a  special  right  to  act  within  areas  within  which only a  person 
himself is “normally free to act” 149. Simmons asserts that this sort of obligation can only be 
generated by the performance of some voluntary and deliberate act/transaction150, because the 
state of freedom cannot be changed bar freely, i.e. deliberately. Authority is a right that is not 
naturally there but can only be deferred by the individual him-/herself.
From this explication it becomes obvious that in order to plausibly establish the link between 
145 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy. Essays on rights and obligations., Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p. 167.
146 See e.g. Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 750.
147 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p.740.
148 Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligations., Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 7
149 Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligations., Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 14-15 
and p. 76.
150 See Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligations., Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 14-
15 and p. 57.
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freedom and the necessity of consent, Simmons has to defend a certain notion of freedom. It 
can  essentially  be  understood  as  „being  under  no-one  else's  authority  (without  having 
consented to it)“. This is why he can consistently claim both, that „I am constrained only by  
how I have in fact lived and chosen.“151 as well as „If the virtues/justifiability of institutions  
made  by  others  gave  those  institutions  power  over  me,  they  would  „injure“ my  natural  
freedom and so be impermissible.“152 Surely this makes sense, because if I am naturally under 
no-one's authority, and if only my own choices can bind me – then any legitimate authority, 
understood  as  having  „the  exclusive  moral  right  (...)  to  impose  some  group  or  persons  
binding duties, to be obeyed by those persons, and to enforce those duties coercively.“153, must 
result from my own choice. In Simmons view we therefore need consent, because it is what 
signifies a deliberate undertaking of obligation.
I  am not  sure  that  this  argument  succeeds  in  convincingly  establishing  the  necessity  of 
consent,  for  it  seems  that  Simmons  does  not  even  rely  on  reasoning  so  much  as  on  a 
convenient definition. In principle Simmons might be right in assuming that the premise of 
natural freedom is  “basic and plausible”154 (at least nowadays and within Western culture); 
and if  we define freedom as being under  no-one's  authority it  seems plausible  that  some 
transaction or deferral has to happen in order to change that status, hence consent would be 
necessary. Yet I think the weakness of this claim lies in the fact that it is not obvious why we 
should actually adopt such a conception of freedom in the first place; why freedom is to be 
understood  as  “being  under  no  obligation  whatsoever”.  Simmons  does  not  provide 
justification for his choice and, what is more, I think we could raise serious doubts about 
whether he is actually true to this notion himself. 
This is because Simmons himself admits that certain general conditions have to be in place in 
order to actually validate consent as a legitimizing condition. For example, he wouldn't call a 
government legitimate that has blackmailed people into consent.  Hence consent has to be 
„informed“ and „free“155 in order to be binding. This does not yet need to pose a problem for 
consistency, because it could be derived directly from the assumption of natural freedom itself 
(for instance in the sense that freedom means freedom from threat too). However, it does not 
seem to account for a second set of clearly problematic cases, in which we could make an 
151 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 762
152 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 754
153 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 769
154 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 752
155 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 750.
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informed and free decision that openly contradicts the purpose of protecting the individual's 
natural freedom, such as consent to get killed. In order to exclude those cases, we have to add 
the further condition that consent is valid only if it has (or does not have) a certain content or 
scope. This means that consent is valid only if its content is morally sound and if the scope is 
justifiable,  which in turn implies that consent is  not actually the normative condition that 
Simmons  makes  it  out  to  be:  Consent  depends,  for  its  legitimizing  force,  on  external 
conditions.
Of course one could raise the objection that  whenever  such “invalid” consent  is  given it 
cannot actually  be „free and informed“, that this is an error of the mind and that a mind can 
be called free  and informed only if it does not give such consent This way we would not 
seem to require anything but the right kind of consent for legitimacy. However, in widening 
the definition of consent this way, I think one one would not only be obscuring the very 
notion of freedom Simmons intends to defend, but it is also quite pointless. This is because 
we would simply be shifting the location of where the problem arises. Whether we apply 
substantial conditions as an additional requirement, or whether we incorporate them into the 
concept of free decision itself, does not make any difference to the fact that it is a condition 
independent from actual consent. This means that even once consent is given, an authority is 
not free to do whatever they want, because their right to rule does not depend on consent so  
much as it depends on that consent's validity, which has to be defined according to consent-
independent standards.
Taking this  concession seriously therefore suggests that consent might be a necessary but 
nevertheless  insufficient  legitimizing  transaction,  because  it  may  become  void  if  certain 
additional conditions are not met. If this  is true, it  implies that there is at least one more 
standard for legitimacy in place, determining the validating premises of actual consent. In fact 
I think Simmons acknowledges that himself on two occasions: His criticism of Kant is largely 
based on the argument that, firstly, we have no independent moral duty to consent to full state 
membership, and that, secondly, full state membership is not necessary for fulfilling other 
moral duties either156. At the same time, he accepts  that we may be coerced by an authority 
we have not consented to – that  is, in cases where we would otherwise violate our moral 
duties157.  Both claims seem to show that he does believe in independent moral standards, 
156 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 756 or p. 767 
157 Simmons,  A.  John:  Justification and  Legitimacy.,  In:  Ethics,  Vol.  109,  1999,  pp.  770-71  (For  a  similar  
thought also see Raz, Joseph: Morality of Freedom., Clarendon, 1986, pp. 88-94.)
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signified by the „moral duties“ and „moral rights“ he ascribes to persons158. This demands us 
to acknowledge a problem also identified by David Estlund – the problem that there might be 
cases  when  actually  not consenting  is  morally  impermissible  and  hence  morally  „void“, 
because it does not make a difference to what others may or may not do, and it does not make 
a difference to what our duties are159.
The question then is: If there are substantial and consent-independent160 conditions that have 
the power to validate the bindingness of actual consent as well as rendering it void, and which 
by the same token may validate and  invalidate non-consent – what  „force“ can we actually 
ascribe to it at all? It seems that it has moral force only within an independently determined 
realm of permissible choice. Thus, actual consent can oblige us only if non-consent is in fact  
morally  permissible.  This  makes  consent  look  quite  weak  as  a  normative  condition  of 
legitimacy, because the real moral force does not lie in actual consent itself, but in its being 
permissible.161
If this is true it would have serious implications for the „moral basis“ of Simmons' theory, i.e.  
his notion of natural freedom, itself: The way he states it, it is clearly a misleading view. If  
there are cases in which others can obligate – and in fact even coerce – us, even if we have not 
consented, then surely he is mistaken in stating that „I am constrained only by how I have in  
fact lived and chosen.“162. Of course I can be constrained by my own consent to someone's 
authority, but more fundamentally, in certain cases others can make legitimate claims against 
me, even if I don't. I believe this is what a concession to fundamental moral rights entails; it  
entails that we can invoke them, thereby making legitimate claims against others, no matter 
whether they consent or not. Hence, if I act on the basis of those rights I have legitimate  
authority over them: I do have the moral power to oblige them, I may in fact even enforce my 
158 See  Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 750. Also see Simmons, 
A. John: Moral Principles and political obligation., Princeton University Press, 1979, pp.62-63. Note that he 
seems to adopt the Lockean idea of natural law here; for the original see: Locke, John: Two treatises of 
government., Cambridge University Press, 1960.
159 See Estlund,  David  M.:  Democratic  Authority.  A Philosophical  Framework.,  Princeton  University Press, 
2008, pp. 10-12.
160 Note: At this point I think it is obvious why those standards cannot be determined through actual consent – if  
they were, we could never avoid cases as the ones cited above. Of course we could simply accept that, but  
Simmons does not want to (and I think rightly so).
161 Note: I thereby don't deny that actual choice has moral significance (for several ways in which it does see: 
Scanlon, Thomas M.: The Significance of Choice., part of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, to be found 
online:  http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/scanlon88.pdf, last visited 20 February 2009, 
13:34), but I am denying that it has an unique significance in regards to moral obligations as discussed in this 
paper.
162 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p.762 [emphasis added by me, 
ed] 
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claims, and I thereby impose duties on them. 
Summing up we get the picture that Simmons is not fully consistent regarding the kind of 
freedom he upholds. On the one hand he makes it seem as if no rule applies to us, but at the 
same time he suggests that “natural law” still holds, and that therefore we do have to submit 
to  certain  fundamental  obligations. The  crux  is:  If  we  accept  that  there  are  consent-
independent  moral  rights  and duties,  consent  does not  actually seem to be the normative 
condition of legitimacy like Simmons claims it is This is because its moral force then depends 
on its  being permissible,  rather  than on it's  being actual.  Perhaps one might propose that 
Simmons' account of legitimacy rests on the assumption that his notion of natural freedom is 
of somehow superior importance to that of moral rights, but this is not the impression I get 
from his work.
  3.2 Particularity problem and the necessity of consent
In the previous section I have shown that Simmons proposes a Lockean notion of natural 
freedom in order to ground his claim for the necessity of personal consent as the normative 
condition of legitimacy. I have also argued why I believe this to be a misleading approach. Yet 
I  cannot  deny that  there  is  some strong moral  force  in  the  idea that  authority cannot  be 
“natural”,  because  if  it  was,  there  would  be no point  in  even defending a  conception  of 
legitimacy. It  is plausible that we are born free, and that this freedom requires us to give a 
good justification for how we can ever be obligated to bow our will to the decisions of an 
authority.  For  Simmons,  though,  giving  a  justification  is  not  enough.  Instead  he  requires 
consent. How can he back up this claim without having to escape to a conveniently adjusted 
definition of freedom?
In fact I believe his theory allows for an alternative approach that is much more forceful: the 
particularity requirement. Simmons' main objection against Rawls is that he does not present 
an account of legitimacy that is distinct from justificatory aims. His complaint is based on the 
assumption that only personal transactions, favorably in the form of actual individual consent, 
can establish legitimacy, while general justifications cannot.  Basically, the main reason for 
why he argues for a distinction between „justification“ and „legitimacy“ is his claim that no 
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matter how many reasons, how many justifications there are in favor of anyone's exercise of 
power, we can still dismiss the claim that this obliges us personally: „The fact that a state or  
a business has virtues that can be appealed to in order to justify its existence cannot by itself  
argue  for  its  having  special  rights  over  particular  individuals.“163 Perhaps  a  merely 
“justified” authority also has a “right to rule” in the sense that it is justified in exercising 
power. But even if it has this right, why should that put me under an obligation? Why should 
their right entail a normative claim against me; let alone a normative claim that goes beyond a 
mere duty of non-interference?
Simmons  maintains  that  in  order  to  create  effective  obligation,  this  obligation  has  to  be 
personal. It has to attach to particular individuals, because otherwise it cannot be enforced 
without  violating  our  personal  freedom164.  Freedom  matters,  then,  because  it  stands  for 
individuality and only if an obligation succeeds in attaching to that, it can be binding for a 
particular  person.  So how does  an obligation “attach”  to  us?  Simmons maintains  that  an 
obligation applies to us personally only if it is established through a transaction that founds a 
special  link between me (as  a  particular  individual)  on the one hand,  and the individual, 
institution, or system claiming authority over me on the other. Even if there is reasonable 
ground for obligation this is not sufficient to make obligation personal. Only if it is personal  
though, it is actually binding for particular individuals. Thus, we need to make obligation 
personal for it to apply, and since we are free, it can only apply if we make it apply ourselves,  
if we defer the right to act within our scope of freedom through consent165. 
Now, in order to evaluate this claim two steps are in order. First, we need to evaluate whether  
the  particularity  requirement  is  plausible.  Since  Simmons  himself  does  not  provide  an 
elaborated argument, I will explicate how I think one could support his claim with reference 
to the work of Christine Korsgaard and Tom Christiano. Second, I will then assess whether 
the  particularity  requirement  renders  consent  necessary  for  legitimacy  the  way Simmons 
claims it does.
As a matter of fact I believe that Simmons realizes a very real intuition when claiming that 
obligation has to be personal. It does seem reasonable to assume that moral claims have to 
attach to  real,  particular individuals,  because they are the ones that actually invoke those 
163 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 752
164 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 754
165 See Simmons, A. John: Moral principles and obligation., Princeton University Press, 1979, p.77.
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claims  and they are  the  ones  that  those claims are made against.  For  example,  Christine 
Korsgaard points out:  “it is we who  make the  [moral]  laws”  but also it is we  “who give  
ourselves the [moral] laws”166 That is to say that as persons, we are the source and subject of 
obligation. Therefore it is not sufficient to establish that there is obligation, it also has to be 
established whom it concerns, because obligation is owed by someone to someone. It signifies 
a particular relation and is  not simply “there”167.  That is  to say,  if  obligation is  meant to 
concern  us,  it  certainly  matters  that  there  is  a  link  between  the  two parties  in  question. 
Consequently, exactly who is obligated towards which authority is a relevant question when 
we mean to talk about legitimate rule. So I believe that Tom Christiano has actually pointed in 
the right direction when he observed:
“The instrumentalist approach168 seems to be committed to the idea that an authority can be  
legitimate even if most of the members of the society do not agree with what it is doing. (…)  
consent theory clearly makes an attempt to make political authority compatible with a due  
respect for the opinion of subjects.”169
He  thereby  suggests  that  what  makes  consent  appealing  as  a  normative  condition  of 
legitimacy is that it gives due weight to respect to us as persons. This is because freedom is  
not so much about whether we are under an obligation or not, but about the fact that we are  
persons,  i.e.  autonomous  agents,  who  have  a  right  to  think,  decide,  reason  and  act  for 
themselves. It is because we are agents that the claims of morality even apply to us170. That is 
to say that morality is not a “general” fact, not a watering-can that is spilled from nowhere 
onto whatever being there is. It comes from somewhere and it addresses someone, it has a 
source and it has a target, it is not simply there. Only if we acknowledge that, only if we 
acknowledge that morality addresses persons, the concept of obligation makes sense. 
Against  this  line  of  argument  one  might  object  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  work  with  an 
argument that has been developed for the moral context while the issue of authority belongs to 
166 Korsgaard, Christine: The standpoint of practical reason., Garland Publishing, 1990, p. 279 (emphasis added 
by me) – Note that she makes this statement in the context of Kant's categorical imperative, which is why I 
added the term “moral” to her sentence as to not cause confusion (e.g. as if she were talking about political  
instead of moral law). 
167 See Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligation., Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 7-11 
and pp. 31-37 for emphasis that obligation signifies a “special relation” between persons.
168 Note that “instrumentalist” refers to an approach which claims that an authority is legitimate if it leads to 
certain outcomes or aids in bringing them about (e.g. Joseph Raz).
169 Christiano,  Tom: Authority.,  In:  Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  first  published 2004 (to  be found  
online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority, last visited on March 6th 2011, 16:51)
170 See Korsgaard, Christine: The sources of normativity., Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 19.
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the political sphere. Those readers I urge to keep in mind that in my view legitimacy actually 
is a moral concept, because the normative requirements it defends are inherently moral in 
nature. Thus, the obligations we are talking about here are also meant to be thought of as  
“moral” (not legal, for example). Also note that I have used the work of Korsgaard although 
Simmons'  explicitly  rejects  the  Kantian  tradition  she  upholds.  However,  I  deem  this 
permissible, because Simmons himself does not offer fundamental justification for his view. 
His key claim is that obligation has to be acquired171, and that it has to be so, because we are 
free. Yet, as I have pointed out in the foregoing section, his defining freedom this way is not 
entirely plausible  and so I  think we have to turn to alternative views in  order to find an 
appropriate  basis  for  the  particularity  requirement.  That  is  to  say,  even  if  Simmons' 
justification of the particularity requirement is flawed, this need not affect the plausibility of 
the requirement itself.
Thus, I conclude that the particularity requirement is indeed a highly significant claim and 
that  Simmons  is  right  in  pointing  out  its  importance.  Consequently,  the  next  question  is 
whether that makes consent a necessary condition for legitimacy the way Simmons claims it 
does.
In stating that the particularity requirement demands consent as the normative condition of 
legitimacy,  Simmons  asserts  two  things.  First,  he  suggests  the  normative  condition  of 
legitimacy needs to be particular. Second, he presumes that in order for a normative condition 
to be particular it needs to trace back to, and apply to, particular human beings. In his view 
justification via reasons is not particular (enough), because it need not trace back to every 
individual subject of a society, but it could, in principle, be provided through the reflective 
process of only one person, while still claiming to obligate everyone. In contrast, consent is an 
individual transaction that, if actually performed, can account for particularity. This is why 
Simmons'  theory  is  based  on  the  premise  that  the  only  way to  establish  particularity  is 
consent. Is that plausible?
In fact, I do not think it is, because he underestimates the potential particularity of reasons. 
Simmons claims that just because something is  „consent-able“ in the sense that I would be 
justified or even morally and/or rationally compelled to consent, that does not mean I am 
bound by it, because I have not in fact consented. He asserts that reasons do not – without my 
171 See  Simmons, A. John: Moral Principles and Political Obligation., Princeton University Press, 1979.
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consent – apply  to me, instead they are general, abstract and universal norms. This means 
they are not particular enough to create obligation and thus consent is required instead (or, 
rather, in addition to reasons). But that begs the question: If there is reason to act morally, 
does that not mean that I ought to act morally? If there is reason not to kill humans and this 
reason consists in the fact that every human has a right to live, does that not mean that I must 
not kill you, that it is (amongst others) my duty not to kill you? Granted, those sorts of reasons 
do not only apply to me, but seem to apply to anyone. In this sense Simmons might be right to 
assert that moral reasons are general. But that does not mean that they cannot be particular 
too. The fact that they have the power to apply to us all does not mean that in the end they 
apply to no-one because they are not anyone's own. Universality and particularity do not seem 
to exclude each other when it comes to moral reasons. In fact I would go even further and 
suggest that reasons cannot be universal if they are not particular too. For universality seems 
to imply, not that a reason is anyone's, but that it is everyone's. So I would think that reasons 
do apply to particular persons, because otherwise where would they come from?
Against this line of argument one could object that while my claim of universality is true for 
the examples cited above, it is not true for all normative reasons. For example, Thomas Nagel 
argues that there are reasons that spring from a person's  special  relationship to their  own 
projects and that have no direct normative force for others: A person's desire to climb the 
Kilimanjaro might give him reason to do it, but this reason need not apply to me. Perhaps his 
reason gives me reason to respect his project or not to interfere, but it is not a reason for me to 
climb the Kilimanjaro172. I agree that this is a problem if we suppose that by “justification” we 
refer to a state where there is  some reason supporting authority. Just because there is some 
reason, does not mean that there is reason for me, hence the particularity requirement would 
not be fulfilled. However, I do believe that one can escape that problem by clarifying what 
sort of justification is required for legitimacy. For example, one could specify procedures for 
how to discover the relevant reasons, which would then limit the sort of reasoning that can 
justify legitimacy. To conclude one could thus state that while not just any justification can 
ground legitimacy, justification on the right kind of reasons may well be sufficient.
172 See Nagel, Thomas: The view from nowhere., Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 167.
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  3.3 Motivational force and the necessity of consent
So far I have evaluated two arguments for consent as the normative condition of legitimacy – 
natural freedom and the particularity requirement Simmons actually offers a third reason for 
why we need consent, and that is its “motivational force”.
In short,  his  deduction seems to rely on the premise that  in  order for legitimacy to have 
practical meaning, it needs to be effective. Any legitimate authority also needs to be a de facto 
authority, because without the actual ability to implement their rule, we cannot speak of a 
(practical) authority at all, and hence cannot speak of a  legitimate practical authority either. 
Since it is unlikely, or at least highly impracticable, that an authority could rule without at 
least minimal compliance on part of the subjects, legitimacy needs to involve some kind of 
motivational force. This is to say, no authority, legitimate or not, can coercively enforce every 
rule on everyone all the time, so obligation cannot be discharged “at gunpoint” alone, subjects 
need to live up to their duties themselves. In order for them to do so – so goes the assumption 
– they need motivation.  Therefore, all  things being equal,  a conception of legitimacy that 
accounts for the motivation of subjects is to be preferred over one that does not.
If Simmons is able to establish that consent has a greater likelihood of establishing motivation 
on part of the subjects than other normative conditions of legitimacy do, this would be one 
weighty  argument  to  require  consent  for  legitimacy.  Were  consent  the  only  normative 
condition that has this virtue, the argument would be that much weightier. Thus, the obvious 
question is: What motivational force does consent have regarding the fulfillment of obligation 
towards an authority? How does it fare compared to other conceptions of legitimacy?
Simmons makes an attempt to answer both questions. As a reference point he uses Rawls' 
conception of legitimacy, but it seems to me that this is seen (by Simmons) as a place holder 
for virtually any theory that does not base legitimacy on consent, be it more instrumentally 
oriented (like Raz') or have its focus on the conditions of justification (like Rawls'). Due the 
course of the following assessment I will try to generalize Simmons'  arguments, avoiding 
explicit  reference  to  Rawls'  for  two reasons.  One is  that  I  myself  have  not  yet  given an 
account of the Rawlsian argument, so I would need to do this now in order to make sense of 
Simmons' argument: However I think this would be confusing, which is why I will come back 
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to Rawls in a later chapter. Another reason is that even if I did consider Rawls in this context, 
I  would  also  need  to  consider  possible  discrepancies  between  the  Rawlsian  view  as  I 
understand it and the view as perceived by Simmons, which would surely exceed the scope of 
this paper. Thus, the focus of this section is on Simmons' own account and the claims he 
makes, not so much on the approach he tries to defeat.
In fact, Simmons' main claim regarding motivation is that obligations acquired through actual 
choice  are  „more  likely  to  be  motivationally  efficacious“173 than  those  derived  from 
hypothetical  choice.  He does  not  provide  an  explicit  argument  for  this,  but  he  seems  to 
assume that an obligation must be perceived as „direct“, „internal“ and „obvious – that I have 
to  feel bound – in order for it to have motivational effects. For example: If you bring up a 
good reason why I am obligated to do X and I consent to do X, then I perceive the obligation 
to  stem from my consent.  I  feel  bound by it  because I  have  freely,  and personally,  and 
actually, accepted it. Simmons suggests that I feel bound, not by my reasons for consenting, 
but by the fact that I have consented. The fundamental question of motivation for Simmons is 
“Why should I?”, and in case of consent the immediate answer is “Because it was my own 
choice.” Note that there is a twofold emphasis here: I feel bound because I  have consented, 
but  also  because  I  have consented.  The  actual  as  well  as  the  personal  is  important  to 
Simmons, and both is relevant for our motivation. After all, if I personally have consented to 
something, how could I not be motivated to do it? That is, if I did not want to do it, I probably 
would not have consented to it in the first place. Therefore, the things that we have actually 
consented to ,seem to be a save bet in terms of fulfillment and this means that obligations that 
are acquired through consent are likely to be motivationally effective.
Is this plausible? At first sight I think it might seem this way. Yet, after closer examination it 
appears misleading, because it neglects the following fact: I feel bound by my consent only if 
I sincerely believe I was  right in consenting. For example, I will keep a promise only if I 
believe that it is right to keep promises and that my making the particular promise was right. 
Clearly there are situations where this will not be the case and where I will, permissibly or 
not, deny my obligation and not feel bound by it, no matter whether I gave my consent or not.  
Note that this is not a claim about what makes a choice „right“, or even permissible, but,  
along Simmons' lines, it is a claim about what it takes to feel bound, to believe I am right, to 
perceive my actions to be the right ones.
173 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 762
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For emphasis I propose the following example: I promise you to let myself be killed by you. It 
is  a  case  of  actual  consent  and  according  to  Simmons  it  should  therefore  establish  an 
obligation to follow through with it. He furthermore claims that usually I will want to go 
through with this, have a motivation to do so, because I have consented. After all, I would not  
have  consented  if  I  were  anything  but  motivated.  Now,  besides  the  fact  that  it  is  highly 
questionable  that  this  particular  promise  would  morally  oblige  me,  I  also  doubt  that  an 
average suicidal person would let themselves be killed, because they agreed to it. That is to 
say, I doubt that they would do it because they feel bound by their consent. It seems more 
plausible to me that if they are motivated, they are so for the reasons that made them consent  
in the first place. If I agreed to it because I am unhappy, then the reason I will let myself be 
killed is because I am unhappy, not because I agreed to be killed. 
Of course there could also be the opposite case: I promise you to tell you my best friend's  
secrets. It is a case of actual consent and it is obviously much less extreme than the previous 
example, meaning that the content of my consent is probably permissible as an outcome of 
free choice (though it is probably not ethical, but that is a different question). Now, I might 
think that I was wrong in making this promise in the first place, maybe because I made it for 
the wrong reasons (for example because I was mad at her) and therefore I may not feel bound 
by it. In that case, the previously given consent would not be “motivationally efficacious”. I 
do not feel bound by an agreement I made for the wrong reasons and that is not because I was 
un-free or un-informed at the time, it is because I aim to act for the right reasons and after re-
evaluation I would see that this does not hold in this particular case.
The point I am trying to make is that motivation depends on my belief of being right, of 
having good reasons,  and of being able  to  justify myself  to  others,  rather  than on actual 
consent or non-consent. We claim that others should accept our choices, because we have 
good reasons, not simply because we  did make them..174  Of course I might do what I have 
consented to, but whether I do it or not does not seem to depend solely on whether I have 
consented to it or not. Even if the facts in virtue of which we feel an action is „right“ aren't 
themselves motivating, neither is actual consent. But if the latter can motivate us then this is 
because the former can, and thus the motivational effect counts for both, and the one does not  
174 See Korsgard, Christine: Creating the Kingdom of Ends., Cambridge University Press, 1996,  espec. Ch.11 
and Korsgaard, Christine M.: The Sources of Normativity,  Cambridge University Press,  1996 for similar 
thoughts about practical reason and motivation.
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have more force than the other.
Some might object that this claim is weak, because it relies on mere intuition. I admit that I  
am making assumptions about average empirical behavior without offering actual proof that 
this is how persons feel, and I agree that this renders my argument unsatisfactory to some 
extent. However, against this objection I counter that my approach is permissible, because 
Simmons too makes his argument on this level and so in order to confront his claim I need to 
meet  him there.  All  in all  I  thus conclude that  Simmons is  mistaken in  thinking that  the 
motivation to  live up to our obligations  needs to be derived from actual  consent.  This  is 
because the motivational force of consent relies on our reasoning, or rather our belief that we 
are right in reasoning so. For having this belief we do not require consent, and this is why I 
would be very cautious to accept a special role of consent when it comes to the motivational  
basis of legitimacy. 
  3.4 Justification vs. Legitimacy
In the foregoing sections of this paper I have raised some serious doubts about the plausibility 
of Simmons' claim that only consent can establish legitimate authority. In particular, I have 
argued that  his  theory is  based on a  misleading conception of freedom and that  it  is  not 
entirely convincing why the particularity requirement, which I have accepted as a reasonable 
demand, should call for consent, or why consent should be more motivationally effective than 
justification.  All  of  my  objections  are  based  on  the  suggestion  that  reasons  are  more 
significant than consent when it comes to morality. On the one hand I have shown that the  
normativity  of  consent  is  fundamentally  rooted  in  its  being  permissible  and  that  this 
permissibility, since it cannot itself depend on consent, needs some independent standard most 
likely to be provided through reasons. On the other hand, I have rejected the view that reasons 
are not particular and thus insufficient to create obligation for non-consenting individuals. In 
so doing I seem to have rejected the central premise of Simmons' work, i.e. that justification 
and  legitimacy  are  two  different  normative  concepts  characterized  by  distinct  normative 
conditions. Does this mean I need to dismiss his distinction altogether?
Simmons argues that justification is a general concept,  whose normative condition can be 
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established abstractly, by giving reasons, for example by arguing that the authority achieves 
rationally desirable outcomes or that it lives up to certain moral requirements175. Legitimacy, 
on the other  hand,  cannot  be established abstractly,  but  is  signified  by an actual  relation 
between a particular authority and its particular subjects.  It can only be established if the 
individual  consents  to  a  limitation  of  his/her  natural  freedom,  thereby  deferring  to  the 
authority  a  right  to  make  binding  decisions  for  him/her176.  Thus,  if  we want  to  find  out 
whether an authority is justified,  we need to ask whether its existence and its exercise of 
power is supported by good reasons, whether there is good reason for it to be an authority. If, 
however, we want to inquire about legitimacy, we need to ask whether those subject to the 
authority have  actually consented  to  its  rule.  Anyone might  be able,  with  an appropriate 
knowledge of the subject, to determine whether an authority is justified. To determine whether 
an authority is legitimate, though, is not possible without reference to the the actual choice of 
particular persons, and thus more likely to be a first-person question. This is because in the 
end only I myself can know for certain what it is that I have (not) consented to.
Note that it is easy to be misled by Simmons' distinction. One might think that the difference 
between justification and legitimacy is whether an authority's rule is good in general, or if it is 
good  for  particularly  me.  But  this  is  certainly  not  what  Simmons  means  to  say,  for  he 
explicitly states that no matter how good an authority's rule is for me personally, that does not 
legitimize it in the sense that it creates a comprehensive obligation for me to comply with 
their directives, nor does it give them a right to enforce them on me177. The thing is, no matter 
how good a consequence a rule might have for me, only I can legitimize their authority over 
me. I think we could therefore rephrase the questions to read: First, is there reason for anyone 
to consent to that authority's rule? If the answer is yes, the authority is justified. Second, is  
there reason for me to consent to that authority's rule? If the answer is yes, the authority might  
be justified in exercising its rule over me, though it is nevertheless illegitimate. As Simmons 
points out: “I can pass up morally acceptable good bargains if I wish.”178 In this case it might 
have a justification right to rule, but this right does not correlate with an obligation on my 
end. Instead my obligation is achieved only if the third question can be confirmed, which is: 
Have  I  consented  to  that  authority's  rule,  and  has  this  consent  been  free,  informed  and 
deliberate?
175 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 740.
176 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 745.
177 See Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 752.
178 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p. 754.
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In evaluating this aspect of Simmons' theory I find myself ambivalent. On the one hand I find 
Simmons'  argumentation  analytically  compelling,  because  it  allows  for  a  more  nuanced 
assessment regarding the moral status of political authorities. This is to say, I think there is 
merit in differentiating between authorities for which there is justification in being authorities, 
and those that are actually justified in exercising their authority towards their actual subjects.  
It helps us classify authorities more accurately, thereby improving our ability to formulate 
moral concerns. Furthermore it might be useful in order to judge the status of an authority 
towards different  social  classes.  For  example,  a  state  might  discriminate  between societal 
groups based on sex, race or income, being legitimate ruler of some but not of others. In such 
a context, to differentiate between overall-justification and particular-legitimacy would help 
us  make  sense  of  the  authority's  moral  status  better  than  a  view that  distinguishes  only 
between legitimate and illegitimate authorities. 
That said, I remain unconvinced by Simmons' conception of legitimacy. Neither the notion of 
freedom he refers to, nor the particularity requirement can conclusively ground the necessity 
of  consent  as  its  normative  condition.  In  fact,  I  suggest  that  while  Simmons  is  right  in 
distinguishing between justification and legitimacy, I do not believe he is right in asserting 
that their normative conditions are equally distinct.  Simmons suggests that only questions 
regarding justification  can  be  answered through reasons,  while  legitimacy needs  personal 
consent which does not necessarily need to depend on (good) reasons179. In contrast, I have 
pointed in the direction of a view through which both questions could be answered by the 
appeal to reasons. For example, one could suggest that the difference lies in which sorts of 
reasons are referred to, or rather, which sort of reasoning applies. On a Rawlsian approach, 
perhaps the difference is  between  rational and  reasonable  justification180. Thus one could 
incorporate  both,  the  instrumental  (=  justificationary)  as  well  as  the  particular  (  = 
legitimatory) aspect of Simmons' demand, while still relying on reasons as the central moral 
category.  Or one could follow Raz in distinguishing between reasons that are reasons for 
everyone (“agent-neutral reasons”) and those that are reasons just for some persons or groups 
of persons (“agent-relative reasons”)181. This would allow for the argument that only certain 
agent-neutral reasons can establish legitimacy, and perhaps that any legitimate authority must 
be supported by a sufficient amount of  them. Either way I  believe one could live up to 
179 Simmons, A. John: Justification and Legitimacy., In: Ethics, Vol. 109, 1999, p .740
180 See  Rawls, John: Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition), Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 48-54.
181 See Raz, Joseph: The Morality of freedom, Oxford, 1988, p. 146 and p. 314 for details on this distinction.
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Simmons' distinction without having to defer to consent (or another normative condition that 
is (seemingly) independent of reasons, for that matter)182.
I conclude that Simmons' call for an analytical distinction between what he calls justification 
and legitimacy deserves support. Yet I think that their normative conditions should cohere, 
meaning that both are based on morally sound reasoning. The question that is then still open is 
what exact kind of reasoning is required in either of those cases.
  4. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have provided an overview of Simmons' conception of legitimate authority. 
For him it entails a right to rule and coercively enforce decisions, and it correlates with an 
obligation to obey on part of the subjects. Legitimate authority has to be distinguished from 
merely justified authority which does not infuse the subjects with an obligation to obey, even 
though the authority's rule is morally permissible or even desirable. The reason for this is that 
all persons are born free, and therefore they can be under no obligation unless they themselves 
defer the right to make binding decisions. Legitimacy therefore depends on the free consent of 
individuals, because only this transaction can found the special link between an authority and 
its subjects. Furthermore, only if the subjects have consented to an authority's rule, they are 
motivated to comply with their  obligations,  and this is  relevant because only an effective 
authority can be a legitimate authority.
The main objection I have raised against all  these arguments for consent is that I do not 
believe that it actually has the normative force ascribed by Simmons. This is because consent 
can only be binding if it does not oppose morally fundamental reasons or rights, and when it 
is binding, it is so because it lives up to those reasons /or at least does not oppose them).  
Actual  consent  does  indeed  have  moral  significance,  especially  when  it  comes  to 
responsibility and self-esteem, yet I reject the view that it establishes legitimacy. Moreover, I 
am not convinced by Simmons' argument that consent is the most effective way to ensure the 
subjects' motivation. It seems more plausible to me that we feel bound by what we perceive to 
be our reasons for consenting, not so much by our actual consent. Throughout my evaluation 
182 Note that I do not thereby claim that either Rawls' or Raz' view is entirely convincing. In this context my aim  
was simply to give some suggestion for how other conceptions could be rephrased to live up to Simmons'  
premise, without however leading to the same conclusion.
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of Simmons' theory I have thus concluded that his aims are appealing, but that they need 
another  normative basis  than  consent.  In  particular,  I  have  argued for  the moral  force  of 
reasons, but I have not yet been able to give an indication as to what sort of reasons are 
relevant for legitimacy, or what sort of reasoning is required. 
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  V. JOHN RAWLS  
  1. Legitimacy as reasonable acceptability  
In the present chapter I will  deal with the conception of legitimacy as presented by John 
Rawls in his famous work “Political Liberalism”. First I will explicate the framework of his 
theory, then I  turn to evaluate its plausibility. In the end I shall not only be able to draw a 
conclusion regarding the merits and holes of Rawls' account, but also determine how it fares 
compared to other theories like that of Raz and Simmons.
I proceed by firstly giving an overview of the main points of his theory. On the one hand, this 
involves an explication of what Rawls assumes to be the subject of legitimacy. As we will see, 
he  emphasizes  the  aspects  “political  power”  and  “coercion”  in  his  account  of  authority. 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify what he means when he says that political legitimacy 
requires a political conception of justice, when at the same time he argues that his is a moral 
approach. With those distinctions made I can turn to flesh out the core of his argument; that  
for the “liberal principle of legitimacy” and argue that its normative force relies on a specific 
notion of the “reasonable” which forms the basis of his thinking. In this context, it will also be 
important to analyze the “Original Position”-method, a hypothetical procedure which is used 
to deduce principles of justice and legitimacy.
After  this  general  overview  I  aim  to  evaluate  Rawls'  conception  by  determining  the 
plausibility and persuasiveness of his  arguments.  Leading questions will  be: Is  the liberal 
principle of legitimacy convincing? How is its normativity established? Is it  successful in 
integrating  moral  claims  for  a  political  purpose?   The  objections  I  consider  regard,  for 
example, his idea of public reason, the original position and its implication of “hypothetical 
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consent”, as well as Rawls' presupposition of democracy. In addition to that I address Rawls' 
notion of reasonableness and analyze its role for legitimacy.
All  in  all  it  should  be acknowledged that  John Rawls  still  is  one  of  the  most  important 
normative theorists today and it is obvious that within the limited scope of this paper I will  
not be able to address his thinking in all its complexity. However, I claim to pick out the main 
ideas relevant for his condition of legitimacy and make them comparable to those of other 
thinkers.
  2. Rawls' theses on legitimate authority  
2.1 Preliminary clarification
Liberal principle of legitimacy vs. justice as fairness
Before turning to a detailed description of Rawls' work on legitimacy, there is one important 
clarification to make. It concerns the relation between his “liberal principle of legitimacy” and 
his conception “justice as fairness” and it is essential, because I believe those two could easily 
be confused.
In fact, before the publication of “Political Liberalism”, Rawls' main work was “A theory of 
justice”183 (often  simply referred to  as  his  “Theory”).  It  was  first  published in  1971 and 
presented a substantive account of how rights and duties can be distributed justly within a 
society. The fundamental moral question he started out from could be stated as:
“what  is  the  most  appropriate  conception  of  justice  for  specifying  the  terms  of  social  
cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal (…)?”184
183 See Rawls, John: A Theory of justice, Belknap, 1971.
184 See the introduction to the paperback edition of “Political Liberalism” (as can be found in  Rawls, John:  
Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005). Here Rawls gives a good overview of how “Political  
Liberalism” is developed compared to the “Theory”.
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On the basis of a well-developed argument he then defended two “principles of justice” and 
integrated them to form a distinct conception of justice, which he called “justice as fairness”. 
He  claimed  it  was  the  most  appropriate  answer  to  this  question,  especially  compared  to 
utilitarianism.  However, the problem he later discovered was this: In his work on justice he 
had failed to acknowledge the fact that the members of a political community are bound to be 
divided by “reasonable pluralism”, i.e. there will always be disagreement on particular issues 
of justice and this disagreement is not the outcome of misguided reasoning, but it is a morally 
neutral fact. Nevertheless it posed a problem to Rawls' conception of justice, because in his 
“Theory” he actually presumed that people, at least under ideal conditions, could all endorse 
those principles based on a shared belief system (or what he came to call “a comprehensive  
philosophical  doctrine”185). In the end that made his argumentation  “unrealistic”186, Rawls 
concluded.
When analyzing “Political Liberalism” this background is of immense importance, because it 
lays  out the aim of  his  argument.  “Political  Liberalism” was not  simply written after the 
“Theory”, it was  written as its adaption. What Rawls is trying to do in this book is to defend 
justice as fairness as the appropriate conception of justice, even against the background of 
reasonable pluralism. To put it differently: Rawls wants to convince people to accept it as the 
most  appropriate  conception  of  justice,  although  they  cannot  be  required  to  endorse  the 
comprehensive moral view that led Rawls himself to endorse those principles. Against this 
background,  one  has  to  be  aware  that  Rawls  starts  off  into  his  argument  with  the  most 
“fundamental ideas” already in place187. Yet he feels the need to adapt them to a quasi-new 
goal; the justification of justice as fairness as the most appropriate conception of justice in a 
pluralistic society.
Note that this is exactly where his concern for legitimacy comes into play. As we will see in a 
later part of this chapter188, legitimacy matters for Rawls because of reasonable pluralism. In 
short: Political authority has to be justified, because it goes along with the imposition of a 
unified system of law. This is in need of justification, because if we view people as “free and 
equal” unification and disagreement seem incompatible at first. Now, what Rawls suggests is 
185 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xvi for Rawls' own assessment. 
186 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xvii
187 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, Lecture I for an overview.
188 See the previous chapter on Simmons for details.
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that a political authority properly justified is a legitimate political authority. Legitimacy can, 
however, be realized through various different conceptions of justice. What they all have in 
common is that they are liberal189 (i.e. take seriously the freedom and equality of persons, as 
well as their right to disagree on  “the good”) and  political190 (i.e. they are based only on 
fundamental public values but do not interfere with people's private convictions). In so far as 
they live up to those conditions, they are all “appropriate” conceptions of justice, and so they 
are all appropriate answers to the question:
“how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal  
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical,  and moral  
doctrines?”191
Nevertheless, Rawls' aim in “Political Liberalism” is to defend justice as fairness as the most 
appropriate conception of justice. As a consequence, what he does in this book is not only to 
frame the problem of legitimacy (by explicating the idea of reasonable pluralism and its moral 
implications) and to develop a normative condition that can be used as a “legitimacy test”. 
Instead, this line of argument is intertwined with all, a description of  justice as fairness, an 
argument for how  justice as fairness lives up to the condition of legitimacy, and a defense of 
justice as fairness as the conception of justice that best realizes that condition. 
Unluckily for me and my aim in this paper, those lines of thought, although separate in their 
aim,  are  not  actually  presented  as  different  lines  of  argument  and  so  his  conception  of 
legitimacy is  quite  mixed up with the  particular  kind of  realization he defends.  This  has 
several implications: First, it means that in the following assessment I will have to be very 
careful  to  determine  which  arguments  Rawls  actually  uses  to  support  which  claim;  i.e. 
whether they are made for claims of legitimacy in general or for claims of justice as fairness 
as  a  particular  version  of  it.  Second,  since  my concern  here  is  for  Rawls'  conception  of 
legitimacy, it means that the only claims I will refer to are those of the former sort, that is 
those ideas he develops for legitimacy in general. Put differently, of the five lines of argument 
developed by Rawls in “Political Liberalism” only two will be analyzed in this paper. I will 
189 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 134-5.
190 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 137-8.
191 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 4
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deal with how he frames the problem of legitimacy and with the normative condition he 
develops. I will not, however, deal with justice as fairness in general (i.e. as a conception of 
justice) or in the context of legitimacy (i.e. as a conception of justice that is claimed to live up 
to  the condition of  legitimacy),   or with the defense of   justice as  fairness  as  the “most 
appropriate” conception of justice.
I urge the reader to keep in mind these clarifications, because they are meant to justify which 
of  Rawls'  momentous ideas  and arguments  I  consider  and which  ones  I  have  decided to 
neglect within the context of this paper. Needless to say that his defense of justice as fairness 
would also make for an interesting and indeed significant research field, but it simply exceeds 
the focus of this work.
  2.2 Definition of legitimate authority
Acceptable constitutional essentials in a democratic society
In his book “Political Liberalism” Rawls develops the “liberal principle of legitimacy” (LP),  
which is defined as follows:
“our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a  
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected  
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”192
For analyzing this definition, I suggest it is helpful to distinguish two parts. Part one concerns 
Rawls' approach to authority and the background assumption he makes for his theory. Part 
two concerns the normative condition he develops for legitimacy. In the present section I 
clarify the first  part,  in the next one I will  then concentrate on explicating the normative 
condition. 
As we have seen, Rawls' LP begins:  “our exercise of political power is fully proper only  
when...”. The first thing that thus  becomes evident is that Rawls does not refer to the term 
192 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137
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“authority”,  but  instead  talks  about  the  “exercise  of  political  power”.  I  believe  this  is  a 
consequence  of  how  Rawls  frames  the  problem  of  legitimacy:  He  contends  that  the 
fundamental issue of political justice lies in the fact that societies are marked by reasonable 
pluralism.  That  is  to  say  people  are  known to  hold  different  convictions  about  religion, 
politics and morality. However, this variety does not (only) stem from people being irrational, 
egoistic  or plain wrong, but it  is  the  “normal result  of  the exercise of  human reason”193. 
Despite that, there is a “need to impose unified law”194, that is, even though the subjects of a 
political authority may well hold different convictions, the law still has to be the same for 
everyone (within a political community). Hence the question is on what principles we can 
base the making of law, if there seems to be disagreement on what the right principles are, and 
if indeed agreement on this issue cannot be expected at all. By putting the question this way, 
Rawls naturally emphasizes the aspect of legitimate coercion, because it is only due to the fact 
that the law is binding on everyone that reasonable pluralism poses a problem. This is why he 
does not concentrate on obligation or the right to rule as much as Raz or Simmons do. I 
nevertheless  maintain  their  theories  are  comparable,  because  as  I  stated  in  my  own 
clarifications all three aspects (justified coercion, obligation and right to rule) can be viewed 
as related under the flag of  “legitimate authority”195. 
Rawls' LP continues stating that the exercise of political power is “fully proper only when it is  
exercised in accordance with a constitution“. What he seems to say is that political power 
ought to be exercised in accordance with a  “constitution”. This is relevant for two reasons. 
For one it suggests that the standard of legitimacy is applied first and foremost to the macro-
level  of  politics.  That  is  to  say,  particular  directives  derive  their  justification  from  the 
legitimacy of the authoritative system as a whole; the LP does not apply to them directly but 
refers to the political framework shaping them. In Rawls' own words, legitimacy applies to 
“the general structure of political authority”196, i.e. the constitution and procedures defined 
therein. It is not about everyday policy-issues, but about the fundamental question of how and 
according to what principles those decisions should be made. Note that this stands in contrast 
to Raz, who claims that the legitimacy of individual directives has to be evaluated197.
193 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xvi
194 Wenar,  Leif:  John  Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/, last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49) – Note that the emphasis was 
added by me.
195 See the previous chapter on preliminary clarifications of this paper.
196 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 393
197 See the previous chapter on Raz of this paper.
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When Rawls mentions a “constitution” in his definition of the LP, I believe he also points to 
another important aspect of his theory: democracy. As a matter of fact, all Rawls ever says  
about legitimacy, is said about legitimacy  “in a democratic society”198. This means that he 
presupposes democracy as a background condition of his theory. Yet he does not make an 
explicit argument for whether democracy is required for legitimacy, nor does he take time to 
justify why he picks this focus. The only thing he clarifies right from the beginning is that he 
assumes “highly idealized”199 conditions in making his argument, and he states that this is for 
analytical purposes. As for the role of democracy, it is left open whether this means that a 
separate  conception of legitimacy would be necessary for  a different  kind of regime (for 
example, different standards of legitimacy might be seen to apply depending on the form of 
government,  whether  it  is  a democracy or monarchy for instance),  or whether  he thereby 
implicitly assumes that democracy is actually necessary for legitimacy in general. In short, the 
question remains whether “democracy” is part of the form or content of his conception of 
legitimacy; whether it merely limits the scope of his theory or whether it itself establishes a 
normative condition. In any case, what we should keep in mind is that he does indeed develop 
his argument against the background assumption of a constitutional democratic regime, i.e. 
“for” a democratic society200.
  2.3 Normative condition of legitimacy
Reasonable acceptability, political justification, hypothetical consent
In the previous section I have explicated Rawls' approach to the problem of legitimacy in the 
context of political authority. I have pointed out that he emphasizes the aspect of legitimate 
coercion,  because  for  him  the  problem  of  legitimacy  arises  against  the  background  of 
reasonable pluralism that persists despite the need to impose unified law. Furthermore, the 
concept of legitimacy applies only to the constitutional essentials of a political authority, and 
he assumes it to be a democratic regime. In the present section I now aim to focus on the 
normative condition Rawls proposes for legitimacy. As a matter of fact, his theory allows for 
three different explications which I will outline in the following.
198 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 3, 11, 14, 35 for various 
points at which he emphasizes this fact. Also see Cohen, Joshua: For a democratic sorciety., In: Freeman,  
Samuel (Ed.): Cambridge Companion to Rawls., Cambridge University Press, 2003 for a good explication of  
democracy's role in Rawls' thinking.
199 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 35.
200 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 169.
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I  begin by interpreting the second part  of  his  LP and argue that  it  proposes “reasonable 
acceptability”  as  the  normative  condition  of  legitimacy.  Next  I  show  how  “political  
justification” can be seen as an alternative explication of Rawls' normative condition. In the 
end I turn to his idea of “hypothetical consent”, which relies on the same principles but is 
arrived  at  from  a  different  line  of  argument.  I  am  aware  that  this  approach  may  seem 
repetitive,  because  as  we will  see,  all  three  argumentations  rely on  similar  concepts  and 
thoughts.  However,  the aim of this  paper is  not  only to assess the plausibility of various 
normative conditions proposed for legitimacy, but also to determine the persuasiveness of 
arguments brought forward to support those conceptions. This is why I deem it justified and 
indeed necessary to assess all three lines of argumentation, because it allows me to conduct a 
more thorough examination.
  2.3.1 Reasonable acceptability
The second part of Rawls' LP states that political power ought to be exercised in accordance 
with a constitution the essentials of which
“all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles  
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”201
In short,  this  seems to suggest that political  authority needs to rely on principles that are 
reasonably acceptable to all citizens as free and equal. “Reasonable acceptability” is then the 
normative  condition  of  legitimacy.  But  what  is  that  supposed  to  mean?  There  are  two 
categories here, first acceptability and second reasonableness.
When Rawls explicates his notion of legitimacy, he claims that the exercise of political power 
must rely on an acceptable constitution.  To clarify what  “acceptability” means may seem 
trivial, but is actually of immense importance for understanding his claim. This is because 
when  talking  about  what  citizens  can  “reasonably  be  expected  to  endorse”202,  Rawls  is 
obviously not concerned with what people do endorse. His claim is not dependent on actual 
acceptance,  but  it  is  about  what  people “can”  accept.  More specifically,  it  is  about  what 
201 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137
202 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137.
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people can reasonably be expected to endorse. This points to the fact that it is not acceptance, 
but accept-ability which matters for legitimacy, which is important, because the latter is a 
hypothetical notion. For something to be acceptable does not mean that it is actually endorsed 
by anyone, but it is sufficient that it  could be endorsed, or that it would be, under certain 
conditions.  Legitimacy  is  then  what  people  could  be  expected  to  accept  under  those 
conditions.
In order to explain what those conditions are, Rawls develops the notion of reasonableness: 
To Rawls a person is reasonable, if he/she is willing to  “propose fair terms of cooperation  
and to abide by them provided others do”203. Thus, a principle one can reasonably be expected 
to endorse is one that a person would accept were they reasonable, i.e. were they willing to 
propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation. Rawls specifies this even further by stating 
that the constitutional essentials need to be acceptable to people's “common human reason”. 
Due to what he calls the “burdens of judgment”204 even reasonable people need not agree, but 
can  reach  different  conclusions  when  it  comes  to  matters  of  justice.  However,  what 
distinguishes reasonable people from unreasonable ones is that they are willing to recognize 
the burdens of judgment and the reasonable pluralism stemming therefrom205. In doing so, 
they also recognize that they can only claim things to be acceptable to others if those things 
can be justified in terms that do not follow from a particular comprehensive doctrine of the 
“good” or “right”, but from  “public reason”206, that is those principles that are acceptable 
from the perspective of all reasonable people simply in virtue of common human reason. In 
short, the exercise of political authority needs to be acceptable from the viewpoint of anyone, 
as long as they are reasonable.  The  “criterion of reciprocity”207 furthermore requires that 
when endorsing a view regarding fundamental constitutional essentials, one must believe that 
others could endorse that view too, that they can “reasonably be expected” to endorse it – 
otherwise one is not being reasonable.
The third and last specification relevant for reasonable acceptability is that citizens must be 
able  to  endorse  constitutional  essentials  “as”  free  and  equal.  Put  differently:  What  is 
acceptable to persons counts for legitimacy only insofar as it is acceptable for them as free 
203 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 54
204 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 54ff.
205 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 54.
206 See Rawls,  John:  The idea  of  public  reason revisited.,  In:  Rawls,  John:  Political  Liberalism.  Expanded 
Edition., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 447 for an overview of how public reason relates to the idea of 
reasonable acceptability and the criterion of reciprocity.
207 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xliv.
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and equal.  Persons not perceiving themselves as free,  or as superior to others,  could thus 
actually accept something that would nevertheless not contribute to legitimacy, because it is 
only  through  acceptance  by  people  as free  and  equal  persons  that  legitimacy  can  be 
established. When talking about acceptance, Rawls thus clarifies: “they [i.e. the citizens] must 
be able to do this as free and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the  
pressure of an inferior political or social position.”208 Only if this condition is satisfied, the 
criterion of reciprocity is properly realized.
I  conclude  that  Rawls'  conception  of  legitimacy relies  on “reasonable  acceptability”  as  a 
normative condition. The exercise of political authority must rely on fundamental principles 
that  are  acceptable  to  all  subjects,  provided  they  are  reasonable  (i.e.  fair-minded  and 
acknowledging reasonable pluralism as well as the genuine need for toleration) and perceived 
as free and equal. Vice versa, the exercise of political authority does not require the support of 
unreasonable  people,  their  consent  has  no legitimizing  force.  In  any case it  is  not  actual 
consent or agreement to a constitution that matters to Rawls, but its acceptability,  i.e.  the 
potential for citizens' endorsement under certain ideal condition. This is his central measure of 
legitimacy.
  2.3.2 Political justification
In the previous section I have explicated Rawls' conception of legitimacy based on the LP he 
formulates. The normative condition I thus developed is “reasonable acceptability”, an idea 
which relies on certain normative notions, the most significant being “reasonable pluralism” 
and  the  “criterion  of  reciprocity”.  In  the  following  I  will  outline  an  alternative  line  of 
argument, which also relies on those notions, but arrives at a normative condition that could 
be called “political justification”. In making this argument, more normative ideas have to be 
introduced, the most important being “political conception of justice” and “public reason”.
As a matter of fact, Rawls claims that in order for the use of political power to be legitimate, it 
has  to  be  exercised  in  accordance  with  a “political  conception  of  justice”.  Several 
clarifications are in order to understand the meaning of this claim.
208 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xlii
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First, he states that political authorities must be guided by a conception of justice. The latter is 
defined as: 
“a set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining (…) the proper  
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”209
What  does  this  mean?  It  means  that  an  authority  ought  to  view  society  as  a  system  of  
cooperation210. In doing so, their subjects ought to be perceived as free and equal persons who 
in  virtue  of  their  two  “moral  powers”  -  “a  capacity  for  a  sense  of  justice  and  for  a  
conception of the good”211 - are able to be fully cooperating members of that society212. Thus, 
for  an  authority to  be  guided by a  conception  of  justice  is  for  them to  rely on a  moral  
conception of the person, of how society should be regulated and in what way the members of 
that society ought to relate to each other. Quite obviously this understanding has implications 
for how the “burdens and benefits” of society ought to be distributed and how these decisions 
ought to be made.
However,  while  it  is  true  for  Rawls  that  any  legitimate  authority  must  rely  on  a  moral  
conception of justice, it is also true that there is no consensus on a specific conception of 
morality. In fact, reasonable pluralism implies that such consensus is unachievable. There are 
two possible conclusions. Either Rawls could contend with arguing that in exercising political 
authority, politicians should live up to some professional ethics in the sense that they do not 
merely act “on a whim” but ascribe themselves to a conception of justice, whichever one it 
may be. In this sense, legitimacy would be realized as long as politics are regulated by some 
moral  conception  of  justice.   However,  this  is  not  the understanding endorsed by Rawls. 
Instead he opts for a second possibility: In order for the exercise of political authority to be 
legitimate,  it  has  to  be  guided  by  a  conception  of  justice  that  can  be  endorsed  by  all,  
regardless of their different fundamental convictions. How is that possible?
Rawls  actually  argues  that  people  hold  different  “comprehensive  doctrines”213,  i.e.  they 
209 Rawls, John: A theory of justice., Belknap, 1971, p. 5. Also see Scheffler, Samuel: The appeal of political  
liberalism., In: Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 1, 1994.
210 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 15. Note that he usually talks 
about society as a “fair” system of cooperation, but I believe this term to be an explication of the specific  
version of a political conception of justice that he is defending, “justice as fairness”, and not to be an integral  
part of all political conceptions of justice.
211 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 19.
212 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 18 and p. 20.
213 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 12. Note that Iris Young has 
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ascribe themselves  to convictions  that  make claims of  what  is  “good” or “right” not  just 
within any one context, but “in general”. Reasonable disagreement makes it impossible to 
agree on any one comprehensive doctrine. If we are to perceive persons as free and equal, 
however,  it  is wrong to impose something on them that they cannot accept;  requirements 
cannot merely be  “externally imposed”214.  As Freeman puts it:  “to be fundamentally free  
requires that we should be in a position to accept (…) the principles of justice regulating our  
basic social structure”215 This suggests that freedom is properly understood as autonomy216 
and it is a key thought of Rawls' thinking: If we take the concepts of freedom and equality 
seriously, that which is imposed on people has to be acceptable to them, because persons are 
free and equal only if they live their lives relying on conceptions that can be their own. Thus, 
the  underlying  moral  claim is  that  authority  and autonomy have  to  be  compatible  if  the 
exercise of political authority is to be legitimate. But how can they be, given that the authority 
must be guided by a conception of justice, when at the same time there is no comprehensive 
conception of justice that is actually acceptable to all?
Rawls' answer appears simple: People need to live under an authority that allows them to 
remain autonomous. Autonomy requires that they are able to accept the political conception of 
justice that guides the exercise of authority. As Rawls puts it:  “full autonomy is realized by  
citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the terms of cooperation they  
would give to themselves”217 No comprehensive conception of justice actually is acceptable in 
that sense. Hence, the conception of justice which can legitimately guide an authority must 
not be comprehensive. It must be “political” instead.
Political conceptions of justice are special, because while they do make moral claims, they do 
so only regarding one specific  area of life – politics218.  They  do not impose a complete 
actually  made  a  rather  interesting  objection  against  this  presumption:  “I  think  that  the  idea  of  a  
comprehensive doctrine is  too thin a concept  to cover  the facts  of  pluralism in ways of  life  in  modern  
societies. No set of ideas, however comprehensive or systematic, usually defines (…) a way of life.” (p.23) 
That is to say, reasonable people do not usually hold only one specific view that gives meaning to every 
aspect of their life, this would simply be a “too totalistic” view. There is more pluralism in any one person's  
value commitments than Rawls admits. [See Young, Iris: Rawls' Political Liberalism., In: Journal of Political  
Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995 for details.]
214 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 98.
215 Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20)
216 See Rawls, John: A theory of justice., Belknap, 1971, p. 252. Also see Freeman, Samuel: Original Position., 
In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996 (online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, 
last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20).
217 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 77
218 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 11.
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conception of morality219; for example they do not say anything about how to make judgments 
in general or how to live a “good life” overall. Instead their claims only address persons in 
their capacity as political agents and subjects (as “citizens”) and leaves them free to endorse 
their personal beliefs of the “good” and “right” everywhere else. Thus, political conceptions 
are not comprehensive and they are also “freestanding”220 in the sense that they do not draw 
on comprehensive doctrines for their values and approach. Instead, they only draw on those 
values  and  approaches  that  are  acceptable  to  people regardless of  the  fundamental 
comprehensive doctrines they affirm.  This means that  they are generated only from  “the 
fundamental ideas implicit to the public political culture”221, i.e. “public reason”.
Before turning to my conclusion, there is one more thing that has to be clarified: Rawls claims 
that  authorities  ought  to  be  guided  by  a  political  conception  of  justice.  This  could  be 
misconstrued  easily,  either  by  objecting  against  the  term  “justice”  or  “political”.  It  is 
important  to  note that  while  Rawls vehemently defends a  distinction between justice and 
legitimacy, he also acknowledges their relation222. That is to say, a legitimate authority needs 
to be guided by a conception of justice, but this does not mean that a legitimate authority by 
doing so is also just. The difference lies in the degree of realization, I think. More importantly, 
however, it lies in the substantiveness – justice requires a comprehensive conception, while 
legitimacy calls for the opposite, that is a freestanding political approach which does not make 
a  claim on  comprehensiveness.  Now the  obvious  question  is  what  makes  the  “political” 
conception of justice that,  political,  if  the claims it  makes are actually moral223.  They are 
moral, because they tell us something about how persons, regarded as autonomous agents, 
should relate to one another – they ought to relate to one another in a way that they could 
justify in terms that are acceptable to all,  as long as they are reasonable224.  However,  the 
conception is nevertheless political, because its claim is restricted to the political area, and so 
are its values. In fact the special condition of political decisions (that they are enforceable and 
bind everyone), is why this special sort of justification is required. For other spheres, different 
conceptions of moral conduct could be defended. As long as the focus is political, both scope 
219 See  Rawls,  John: Political  Liberalism.,  Columbia University Press,  2005, p.  13 for  an overview of how 
“comprehensive” doctrines may in fact be seen to do that (but not political conceptions of justice).
220 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 12.
221 Wenar,  Leif:  John  Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/,   last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49)
222 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 427ff.
223 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 11.
224 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137.
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and content of a theory of justice need to be restricted to what is reasonably acceptable to 
all.225
In a  nutshell,  the concept  of persons as free and equal  requires that political  authority is 
justified. “Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held  
in common”226. However, since there is pervasive disagreement, and since this disagreement 
would persist even if all people were reasonable, the justification of authority cannot refer to 
any comprehensive conception of the “good” or “right”. It needs to be freestanding, but at the 
same  time  it  must  actually  be  acceptable  to  persons,  who  do  in  fact  endorse  various 
comprehensive doctrines. The solution is that of an “overlapping consensus”, a set of ideas 
and principles that is  acceptable from the viewpoint of all  reasonable doctrines. The only 
values  that  can be the focal  point  of this  “overlapping” consensus are  political  values  or 
“public reasons”, that is those values that allow persons to be free and equal and to cooperate 
in a social system perceived as a system of cooperation. All in all, a political authority is thus 
legitimate if it satisfies the normative condition of political justification, or (as Rawls calls it) 
“public justification”227. 
  2.3.3 Hypothetical consent
In the previous section I have shown how Rawls' criterion of reciprocity and his conception of 
the person as free and equal can be combined with his notion of “public reason” in order to 
explicate his conception of legitimacy. As we have seen, “acceptability” is strongly linked to 
the issue of justification and so while the central  concepts of the two argumentations are 
virtually the same,  some significant  ideas  were yet  to  be  added.  In the present  section I 
present a third approach Rawls offers for determining the normative notion of legitimacy: the 
“Original Position”, which leads to the normative condition “hypothetical consent”.
As we have seen Rawls concentrates on the aspect of justified coercion, because he assumes 
that the main problem of politics, from a viewpoint of morality, is that reasonable people can 
be bound by laws they do not fully agree with. Since agreement is unachievable due to the 
225 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137.
226 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 100
227 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 387ff. Note that I nevertheless 
use the term “political justification”, because I fear that “public justification” could be confused with Rawls'  
notion of “publicity” as used in his Theory.
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burdens of judgment, we need a conception for how the exercise of political power can be 
justified anyway. Rawls suggests that since we cannot find agreement on particular policies, 
not even assuming that people are fair-minded and rational, the only acceptability we can 
hope to find is about the basic  principles governing the authority's actions. But how do we 
find  them,  given  that  in  reality  not  all  people  actually  are  reasonable,  fair-minded  and 
rational?
Rawls' solution is a hypothetical thought-experiment inspired by the social-contract tradition; 
the “Original Position” (OP). The underlying assumption is this: Our recognition of what is 
acceptable for persons regarded as free and equal is clouded by the actual inequalities that 
persist  in real-life.  That is to say,  morally arbitrary facts228,  such as differences in gender, 
wealth or education, shape our perception of interests and of the options available when it 
comes to issues of politics. It  is likely that even if,  despite all inequalities,  we were fair-
minded and determined to find a reasonable solution,  any decision stemming from actual 
covenant would still reflect bargaining229. If we aim to find universally acceptable principles 
for guiding politics, we therefore need to abstract from those particularities.
This is why Rawls imagines a hypothetical situation, in which the representatives of all of the 
authority's subjects are under a “veil of ignorance”230, i.e. they know basic facts about human 
nature, life, etc., but they do not know anything particular about themselves or their social 
position.  When  assigned  the  task  to  find  a  conception  of  justice  which  would  make  the 
exercise of political   power acceptable,  one thing they know is that  persons hold diverse 
convictions about what is actually  right or just. Due to the fact that they don't know, however, 
what their particular beliefs are, they will not try to influence the decision as to rely on any 
one  comprehensive  doctrine.  Instead,  they  will  attempt  to  find  principles  which  can  be 
justified from “common human reason” alone; that is principles which are both reasonable 
and can be endorsed from all reasonable viewpoints. Their hypothetical consent would be for 
a “political conception of justice”, i.e. a conception of justice that relies for its sole source on 
values  that  can  be  found in  the  public  political  culture.  It  is  guided  by the  fundamental 
acknowledgment of the freedom and equality of persons, and so it endorses the view that 
228 See  Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20). Also see Rawls, John: A 
theory of justice., Belknap, 1971, p. 79.
229 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 23.
230 See  Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 23. Also see Rawls, John: A 
theory of justice., Belknap, 1971, chapter 3.
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society should be a fair system of cooperation231. These ideas, Rawls suggests, can be the 
focal  point  of  an  “overlapping  consensus”232,  that  is  agreement  among  all  reasonable 
doctrines, because it only reiterates the very idea of reasonableness itself. 
It also satisfies the “stability test”233 Rawls proposes. He argues that besides wondering what a 
legitimate conception of justice is, the parties in the Original Position also have to consider 
whether a society following that approach would actually be stable over time. He suggests 
that  legitimacy indeed provides  stability,  because subjects  would be able  to  “justify  their  
political decisions to one another using publicly available values and standards”234. Since 
legitimate political authority can be justified in terms that are acceptable to all, in the terms of 
“public reason”, the exercise of political power would not be a problem for stability, because 
people  would  be  able  to  accept  and  indeed  endorse  them235.  Note  that Rawls  addresses 
legitimacy  and  stability  as  separate  issues.  In  this  sense,  stability  is  not  a  condition  of 
legitimacy,  but  a  separate  requirement  for  politics.  However,  he  argues  that  the  same 
principles  ensure  both,  and  so  the  fundamentals  of  his  conception  hold  for  both  too  – 
legitimacy as well as stability236. 
  2.3.4 Conclusion 
In the previous sections I have given an outline of Rawls' fundamental ideas and how they can 
be  combined  in  order  to  arrive  at  his  normative  condition  of  legitimacy.  In  fact,  I  have 
suggested that there are three possible ways to do so, all of which are indicated in his book 
“Political Liberalism”. The picture we get is this: Just as Simmons, Rawls starts off from a 
moral conception of the person as “free” and it is in this context that he frames the problem of 
legitimacy.  Unlike Simmons, however,  Rawls does not define freedom as being under no 
obligation, he rather formulates it as a conception of autonomy. On this view, people have a 
right to live under rules that can be their own. This does not mean that people are entitled to 
live only under those rules that they choose for themselves, or that they actually consent to, 
231 See  Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 22. Also see Wenar, Leif: John 
Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  2008 (online at:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/, 
last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49) for the argument that these are the three fundamental ideas.
232 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 149 and p. 164.
233 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 141.
234 Wenar,  Leif:  John  Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/,   last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49)
235 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 143.
236 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 64.
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but  what  is  relevant  is  that  political  authority  can  be  justified  to  them in  terms  that  are 
acceptable. This is significant for two reasons: On the one hand, it  shows that legitimacy 
depends on justification. Only a certain sort of justification, however, makes for a legitimate 
authority.  The justification needs to  rely on reasons that  are  acceptable.  They need to  be 
acceptable, though, only to a certain set of persons – those that are reasonable. The terms in 
which such reasonable justifications can be given are “political” terms; that is they refer only 
to public values that can be the focus on an overlapping consensus. They do not require the 
support of any comprehensive doctrine. If the exercise of political authority is justified this 
way, it is compatible with autonomy, because by being reasonable any person can make the 
authority's guiding principles their own. The test for their reasonableness is whether people 
would  adopt  the  same  principles  were  they  under  a  veil  of  ignorance.  This  impartial 
perspective is the one we ought to adopt when evaluating the legitimacy of any given political 
authority.
  3. Evaluation  
  3.1 Reasonable acceptability
The exclusion of unreasonable subjects from the legitimization pool
As we have seen, Rawls' LP can be explicated to show that “reasonable acceptability” is the 
normative condition of legitimacy. In fact, David Estlund has come to the same conclusion 
and conceptualized it as the RAN-thesis, i.e. the “Reasonable Acceptance Necessary”-thesis. I 
believe it to be an immensely helpful formulation if we aim to evaluate the plausibility of 
Rawls' conception:
“No doctrine is admissible as a premise in any stage of political  justification unless it  is  
acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and it need not be acceptable to anyone else.”237
This is to say: For a political authority to be legitimate, its rule needs to depend on principles 
that  are  acceptable  to  all  reasonable  persons.  What  is  more,  the  justification  of  those 
principles, too, must be possible on the basis of reasons that are acceptable to all reasonable 
237 Estlund, David: The insularity of the reasonable. Why political liberalism must admit the truth., In: Ethics,  
Vol. 108, No. 2, 1998, p. 87
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persons.
There are quite obviously two claims here and at first sight they seem to contradict each other: 
On the one hand, Rawls' implicit assumption is that the conception of the person as free and 
equal requires political authority to be compatible with autonomy. This would then suggest 
that no one should be subjected to a rule that is not acceptable to him/her. However, Rawls 
introduces a significant restriction to this claim when he argues that an authority's rule needs 
to be acceptable only to a certain set of persons: the reasonable ones. But what exactly does it 
mean for unreasonable persons to be excluded from the “legitimization pool”? Does it mean 
that they do not have a right to autonomy? Can an authority really be legitimate in that case?
Marilyn Friedman is quite clear in her judgment. She argues that if freedom grounds a right to 
autonomy,  and  if  political  autonomy  consists  in  not  having  imposed  a  rule  of  law  the 
essentials of which one cannot accept (or even more gravely: which one rejects)238 – then 
Rawls  is  definitely  denying  the  autonomy of  unreasonable  persons239.  In  claiming  to  be 
liberal, that is in claiming to uphold the freedom of persons, a political authority would be 
imposing values on their disagreeing subjects and thus violate their freedom. Does that not 
defeat  the  whole  purpose  of  liberalism,  Friedman  questions  when  she  states:  “political  
liberalism (…) would impose its  coercive power on the nonliberal  persons who reject  its  
legitimacy – just as those persons, if they had the chance”240. What this criticism points to is 
the fact that if acceptability matters, why should in only matter with regards to some and not 
others?
Rawls does not make an explicit argument for why we can legitimately exclude unreasonable 
people from the legitimization pool. However, the underlying assumption would appear to be 
something like this: What matters is not acceptance, but acceptability. That what is acceptable 
is “acceptable to the reasonable” and it need not be more, because with unreasonable people 
you can not reason. We are not denying those people's autonomy, because autonomy does not 
require  –  as  Simmons  assumes241 –  actual  acceptance,  only  acceptability.  By  being 
238 See  Friedman,  Marilyn:  John  Rawls  and  political  coercion  of  unreasonable  people.,  In:  Davion, 
Victoria/Wolf, Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 
2000, p. 29.
239 See  Friedman,  Marilyn:  John  Rawls  and  political  coercion  of  unreasonable  people.,  In:  Davion, 
Victoria/Wolf, Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 
2000, p. 23.
240 Friedman, Marilyn: John Rawls and political coercion of unreasonable people., In: Davion, Victoria/Wolf, 
Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 2000, p. 31
241 See the previous chapter on Simmons for an explication of his theory.
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unreasonable, some people  reject what is actually acceptable, but that does not mean that it 
actually is not acceptable for them. That is to say, by being unreasonable those people forego 
their right to have their acceptance count. Yet, just because the constitution is not justified 
from their point of view does not mean it is not justified with regards to them. They are treated 
as free and equal just as reasonable people are, it is just that their actual acceptance does not  
provide  a  reliable  measure  for  what  is  universally  acceptable  and  so  “reasonable 
acceptability” is not dependent on what they believe to be acceptable.
Put differently: All reasonableness requires is for people to be fair and to respect the fact that  
other fair-minded persons may sometimes be of a different opinion than them when it comes 
to particular issues of justice or morality. Surely this is not too much to ask, is it? It is a 
condition that any person, regardless of their sex, race or age can satisfy and so it is not based  
on any morally arbitrary fact; all persons have the same chance of being reasonable. As a 
consequence,  there  seems  to  be  no  prima  facie  veto  against  making  reasonableness  a 
precondition for acceptability. Rawls claims that what is “reasonably acceptable” is actually 
acceptable to all reasonable as well as unreasonable people. The difference between the two 
groups  is  just  that  reasonable  people  accept  that  what  is  reasonably  acceptable,  while 
unreasonable people refuse to.242
Where does that leave us? Perhaps to exclude unreasonable people is still morally “grey”, 
because if persons are free and equal, of course it seems desirable that the “acceptable” can be 
defined  with  reference  to  what  people  actually  accept,  because  then  they  can  see  for 
themselves that their autonomy is being realized. Yet, the problem with unreasonable people 
is  that  they refuse to adopt a “common” viewpoint,  they only think about  what they can 
accept, but not about whether this is acceptable to others too. Therefore, to include them, and 
have  them  influence  the  essential  rules  of  social  cooperation  –  those  rules  which 
fundamentally shape everyone's life-perspectives – and have them influence them based on an 
unfair mindset, would certainly be worse than excluding them, because if we are to impose 
unwanted rules on anyone, it should be on those who are “immoral”. Unreasonable people are 
immoral,  in  Rawls'  assumption,  because  they  could be  reasonable,  but  they  refuse  to 
(consciously or not). Thus they forgo their right to consideration in matters of acceptance. 
242 Note that this conclusion may be controversial. In fact, Rawls never explicitly admits that “acceptance” by 
the reasonable is a measure for general “acceptability”. However, I agree with Habermas that Rawls needs to  
rely on this view to some extent. [Habermas argues that Rawls must allow an “epistemic relation” between 
the two, so that the validity of certain values is actually confirmed by public discourse. - See Habermas, 
Jürgen: Rawls' Political Liberalism., In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 3, 1995, pp. 122-6.]
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This is why the restriction of the acceptability requirement to reasonable people is justified. In 
an ideal situation perhaps it would not even need to exclude anyone, because everyone does – 
in principle – have the option of being reasonable, and so anyone can be included if they will. 
I imagine that this is what an argument against Friedman's criticism could go; not by rejecting 
the claim that there is indeed something unfortunate about excluding unreasonable people, but 
by arguing that it is the less-bad option (as compared to including them and arriving at unjust 
political  conditions  for  everyone).  Their  exclusion  is  justified,  because  any  legitimate 
authority still has to consider them. The constitutional essentials still have to be so that they 
could accept them were they reasonable, which means that for example their fundamental 
rights may not be violated.  However,  what unreasonable people are  excluded from is  the 
“measure”  for  acceptability.  What  is  reasonably acceptable  must  be  measurable  (to  some 
extent) according to what reasonable people accept. Note that it is not their actual acceptance 
that has normative force, but the universalized conception of acceptability we can deduce 
therefrom. Yet, while their  acceptance is not the normative condition of legitimacy it still 
matters as a “safety net” for testing whether what is  claimed to be reasonably acceptable 
actually is  that.  Unreasonable people are  excluded in so far as their  actual acceptance or 
rejection  has  no  relevance  for  legitimacy at  all.  Now the  question  is  whether  this  seems 
convincing.
In fact, I remain unsure. For example, Friedman has pointed out that reasonable persons are 
defined by a mindset that makes two sorts of requirements – persons will fair cooperation, but 
they also respect disagreement (at least within the group of fair-minded individuals). What if a 
person  lives  up  to  one  of  those  requirements,  but  not  the  other?243 Is  he/she  actually 
unreasonable? And if they are not, who is to decide about the degree of “reasonableness” that 
people have to live up to? Pragmatic implementation of the acceptability requirement seems 
to prove more difficult than expected. In addition to that, Iris Young also objects that people 
seeming unreasonable  might  just  be  “poor  reasoners”244,  who,  as  a  consequence of  being 
inarticulate  for  example,  are  classified  as  unreasonable  and  hence  illegitimately excluded 
from the legitimization pool. Moreover, Estlund has brought up another important objection:
243 See  Friedman,  Marilyn:  John  Rawls  and  political  coercion  of  unreasonable  people.,  In:  Davion, 
Victoria/Wolf, Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 
2000, p. 19.
244 See Young, Iris: Inclusion and democracy., Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.6-7.
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“It is not as if some people are reasonable and others are not (…). Rather, the usual view  
accepts that there is no person or set of persons whose objections are decisive regardless of  
the grounds or other merits of their objection.”245 
The problem he thereby points out is that “no one is unfailingly reasonable”246. Therefore it 
might  actually  be  misguided  to  conceptualize  the  acceptability  requirement  in  terms  of 
“persons”,  because  it  seems  that  on  close  examination,  reasonable  people  can  only  be 
identified  according  to  the  ideas,  values  and  doctrines  they  hold247.  That  is  to  say, 
reasonableness  may well  be defined as  a  “mindset”,  but  there  is  no  way to  classify this 
mindset but with reference to certain substantive concepts. This is because hardly anyone 
consciously  believes they are being unfair,  even when they are.248 So even if people were 
honest about whether or not they are being reasonable, I doubt this would be of any merit for 
the present case. In the end, what Rawls is talking about is not so much people's attitudes, but 
he  is  concerned  with  showing  how  some  doctrines  cannot  be  seen  but  to  stand  for 
unreasonableness. For example, a person endorsing the doctrine of sexism may well sincerely 
believe that they are actually being fair, but I suppose that Rawls would nevertheless reject 
that claim, because this doctrine is not compatible with the conception of persons as free and 
equal. Yet, this is the problem right there, because as  Friedman puts it:  “In a nutshell, the  
problem is that the unreasonable persons who are excluded from Rawls's legitimation pool  
are defined as  such by the  rejection of  certain  ideas  and values.”249 If  reasonableness  is 
defined with reference to certain substantive values, then those values cannot be defended on 
the  basis  that  they  are  reasonable,  because  that  would  be  circular  reasoning  for  sure. 
Reasonableness  is  meant  to  be  an  indication  for  whether  or  not  a  principle  is  properly 
245 Estlund, David: The insularity of the reasonable. Why political liberalism must admit the truth., In: Ethics,  
Vol. 108, No. 2, 1998, p. 91
246 Estlund, David: The insularity of the reasonable. Why political liberalism must admit the truth., In: Ethics,  
Vol. 108, No. 2, 1998, p. 91
247 See Wenar, Leif: Political liberalism. An internal critique., In: Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 1, 1995, pp. 59-62 for 
some interesting observations on how and in which contexts Rawls uses the “reasonable” as a descriptive 
feature. He actually argues that Rawls is not fully convincing in how he connects his notions “reasonable 
persons”, “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” and “reasonable pluralism” and proposes an explication to 
remedy this hole in Rawls' theory. I do not find his clarifications particularly helpful for the present purpose,  
but believe it to be an important observation that Rawls uses “the reasonable” in rather different contexts and  
not  always  consistently  explains  their  relation.  Readers  should  therefore  keep  in  mind  that  my  own 
interpretation – that reasonable persons need to be defined, to some extent, by their holding certain doctrines, 
may be controversial. Wenar, for instance, makes the inverted argument that “reasonable doctrines” can only 
be defined by by reference to reasonable persons.
248 See  Friedman,  Marilyn:  John  Rawls  and  political  coercion  of  unreasonable  people.,  In:  Davion, 
Victoria/Wolf, Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield ,  
2000, p. 29.
249 Friedman, Marilyn: John Rawls and political coercion of unreasonable people., In: Davion, Victoria/Wolf, 
Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 2000, p. 29
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acceptable, but how can we determine what is reasonable if not with reference to what people 
accept?
Apart from this more analytical objection there is one even more fundamental problem: If 
reasonableness is defined with reference to the endorsement of certain beliefs, it is not neutral 
among persons. If it is not neutral, though, how can we shield it from illegitimate biases? To 
me it actually seems we cannot. If we are to define reasonable acceptability substantively, 
there is no way to ensure that biased or unjust values may not find their way in, because the 
reasonable acceptability condition is effective only for those prejudices which we know to be 
that.250 That is to say – in testing my beliefs for reasonable acceptability, I will only know to  
look  out  for  those  biases  which  I  recognize  as  such.  Other  problematic  aspects  of  my 
doctrines  I  may not  even  become aware  of  as  long  as  I  am convinced  that  I  am being 
reasonable.
All  in all  I  come to the conclusion that  the intuition Rawls relies upon is  appealing,  but 
nevertheless  problematic. “Acceptability” is a morally appealing normative criterion only if 
there is some moral test. “Reasonableness” seems innocent enough to hold as such, but only if 
we look past the fact that reasonableness cannot be measured unless it is attached to some 
external  standard,  such  as  what  doctrine  a  person  holds.  However,  defining  an  external, 
seemingly  objective  standard  of  reasonableness  is  risky,  because  it  cannot  be  checked 
according to a “reasonable acceptability” test itself and so it remains uncertain whether the 
exclusion  stemming  therefrom  is  actually  legitimate  or  not.  As  Tim  Hurley  put  it: 
“Comprehensive  doctrines  often  generate  their  own (…) accounts  of  what  is  and is  not  
reasonable”  and  so  what  constitutes  neutrality  “is  precisely  what  provokes  the  fiercest  
disagreement”251.
Can there be a test to ensure the moral permissibility of Rawls' standard of reasonableness? 
This is what I will try to find out in the following sections. 
250 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge., 2009, pp. 134-5 for an argument why those are the 
less problematic biases.
251 Hurley, Tim: John Rawls and liberal neutrality., In: Interpretation, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1999, p. 51
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  3.2 Political justification
The issue of liberal biases
In the foregoing section I have made an objection against Rawls' conception of legitimacy that 
is based on Estlund, Friedman and Young. What their criticisms have in common is that they 
question the justifiability of excluding unreasonable people from the legitimization pool. The 
reason for this is: From Rawls' LP we get the impression that “reasonable acceptability” is the 
normative condition of legitimacy. It can be taken to mean that the constitutional essentials of 
a political authority have to be acceptable to all reasonable subjects. Unreasonable people, 
however, may reject them, without this having any impact on the legitimacy of an authority. 
Now the problem is how to determine who those “unreasonable people” are. The only option 
available is to define them as those who hold “unreasonable views”; and this can only be 
defined with reference to certain values. But who is to define which values are decisive for the 
exclusion of people, who is to define which values no-one may reasonably object to? If we 
exclude  the  wrong  people  this  would  indeed  seem  to  jeopardize  legitimacy  and  so  the 
discrimination between what is “reasonable” and what is “unreasonable” is more problematic 
than it first appears.
My aim in the present section is to show that there is indeed a distinct, but related problem 
within the sphere of the reasonable. That is to say, in the foregoing chapter I was concerned 
with problems that might arise from discriminating between “reasonable” and “unreasonable”. 
Now I will imagine that we accept Rawls' premise that those two spheres actually exist and 
can be properly distinguished. This leaves “acceptability from the viewpoint of all reasonable 
people” as the central normative notion of legitimacy. The focus is then on discrimination 
within the sphere of reasonableness, and I suggest we have to examine carefully how Rawls 
deals with this.
As a matter of fact, Rawls has put much more effort in dealing with what he calls “reasonable 
pluralism”,  i.e.  disagreement  within  the  reasonable,  than  with  mere  pluralism,  i.e. 
disagreement in general and especially between reasonable and unreasonable people.252 The 
puzzle a political authority faces in regards to legitimacy is this: Not all that is reasonable is 
reasonably acceptable  to all.  What does this  mean? It  means that even among reasonable 
252 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 63-4.
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people  there  is  disagreement,  because  they  may  hold  different  comprehensive  doctrines. 
Those are “reasonably acceptable” in the sense that they can be justified from a reasonable 
viewpoint. However, because there is more than one reasonable comprehensive doctrine, no 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine is actually acceptable to all people. Put differently, people 
cannot “reasonably be expected”253 to endorse any one specific comprehensive doctrine, even 
if it is reasonable, and this means that politics cannot depend on one. How do we solve this 
problem?  It  seems  we  need  to  find  a  view  that  is  reasonably  acceptable  without  being 
comprehensive.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  an  answer  is  reasonably  acceptable,  it  must  be 
reasonably acceptable  to all. In short, we need to find a view, that no-one can reasonably 
reject  (or  that  cannot  be  rejected  from  the  viewpoint  of  any reasonable  comprehensive 
doctrine)254.
Rawls deals with this by directing his focus on the issue of justification: If constitutional 
essentials can only be defended by reference to a (reasonable) comprehensive doctrine, then 
the above condition is not satisfied:“It is unreasonable for us to use political power (…) to  
repress comprehensive doctrines that are not unreasonable.”255 Vice versa, if  constitutional 
essentials can be defended from the viewpoint of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines, then 
the above condition is indeed satisfied. If this is to be possible, there needs to be an overlap, a 
focal point, of values or ideas that all reasonable doctrines have in common. Rawls therefore 
introduces the idea of a “reasonable overlapping consensus” which includes principles that are 
acceptable to all reasonable people from the viewpoint of all their different comprehensive 
doctrines. For legitimacy this has the following implication: Legitimacy is realized when the 
exercise of authority is reasonably acceptable to all, i.e. if the exercise of political authority 
can be justified from each of their views. As a consequence, only that which can be the focus 
of  an  “overlapping consensus”  of  all  reasonable doctrines  can function  as  an appropriate 
ground for political justification.
This argument indeed seems rather appealing, because as Young put it:  “The genius of the  
idea of overlapping consensus is that it resolves disagreement not by saying that some of the  
plural and incompatible comprehensive doctrines are wrong, but by limiting the influence of  
each.”256 Nevertheless  we  seem  to  inevitably  arrive  at  a  question  of  substance  again257, 
253 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 137 for this formulation.
254 Note that the formulation of “reasonable rejection” is from the “Theory”.
255 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 61
256 Young, Iris: Rawls' Political Liberalism., In: Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, p. 28
257 See  e.g.  Dreben,  Burton:  On  Rawls  and  Political  Liberalism.,   In:  Freeman,  Samuel  (Ed.):  Cambridge 
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because what  exactly is  it  that  can actually satisfy this  condition and be the focus  of an 
overlapping consensus? Rawls argues that there is only one answer. The only values that are 
neutral  enough  so  we can  support  them without  endorsing  any particular  comprehensive 
doctrine are those that are “drawn from” and “addressed to” a democratic society258. In his 
own words: Only those values that are generated from “the fundamental ideas implicit to the  
public political culture”259 are candidates. That is to say, constitutional essentials have to be 
justifiable in the terms of public reasons, otherwise they are not reasonably acceptable to all. 
Rawls suggests that there are three fundamental ideas that satisfy this condition: the idea that 
society should be a (fair) system of social cooperation260, the idea that citizens are equal and 
the idea that they are free.261 There are many reasonable interpretations of those ideas, and 
hence there is “reasonable pluralism”. A doctrine that rejects any one of those ideas, though, is 
not reasonable in any case.
There are two objections against this view. One thing that has quite often been criticized is 
that Rawls fails in his attempt to present a neutral and un-comprehensive content for public 
reason.  While  he  explicitly  states  that  his  political  liberalism is  not  to  be  understood  as 
“comprehensive”262 or even “Enlightenment”263 liberalism, this does not appear convincing to 
all.264 For example, Friedman has pointed out that Rawls' conception of neutrality is biased in 
favor of liberal values265 and hence far from being acceptable to all. On a similar note William 
Galston has questioned how Rawls even arrives at those principles. By arguing that political 
liberalism is based only on values  that are implicit to the public political culture266, Rawls 
Companion  to  Rawls.,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2003,  p.  339  for  an  argument  that  Rawls'  political 
principles are indeed substantive.
258 See Galston, William: Pluralism and social unity., In: Ethics., Vol. 99, No. 4, 1989, p. 113.
259 Wenar,  Leif:  John  Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2008  (online  at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/,   last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49)
260 Note that in this context the concept of a “well-ordered society” is also relevant, but I do not have time to go  
into detail  here and I do not believe it  is  highly relevant  for the purpose of this paper.  For the sake of 
completeness it might be said that Rawls defines a well-ordered society as one in which “everyone accepts  
and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice and (…) the basic social institutions generally  
satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles”. [Rawls, John: A Theory of justice, Belknap, 
1971, p. 5]
261 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 61 and Wenar, Leif: John Rawls., 
In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008 (online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/,   last visited 
on 24 April 2011, 16:49).
262 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xxix.
263 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xl.
264 See Nagel, Thomas: Rawls and Liberalism., In: Freeman, Samuel (Ed.): Cambridge Companion to Rawls., 
Cambridge University Press, 2003 for a detailed description of the kind of liberalism Rawls endorses.
265 Friedman, Marilyn: John Rawls and political coercion of unreasonable people., In: Davion, Victoria/Wolf, 
Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield , 2000, p. 29
266 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 13.
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presupposes a dubious form of “collective self-understanding”267. What he seems to claim is 
that all reasonable people do perceive themselves as free and equal and that they do perceive 
society as a fair system of cooperation, and this is why those are the fundamental principles 
that can be the focus of a reasonable overlapping consensus. Yet, this is highly unsatisfactory, 
considering that Rawls' whole point in revising his “Theory”  is to make due for the fact that 
people do in fact disagree on views of morality.  What is more,  every single fundamental 
concept  introduced by Rawls,  the “reasonable”,  the “political”,  is  defined by reference to 
those ideas. One would expect more justification for that and this is why I find his way of  
argumentation feeble at this point. It appears that Rawls' fundamental moral claim would be 
better understood in that people ought to view themselves and others as free and equal, they 
ought  to treat society as a (fair) system of cooperation and they  ought to structure political 
authority so that its exercise realizes these ideas. For him this means that political authority 
ought  to have the form of a democratic constitutional democratic regime268. This of course, 
makes  for a  rather  strong claim,  and one that  is  in  need of  justification.  Rawls  does not 
provide for that, though (at least not explicitly), because he takes for granted a constitutional 
democratic regime269.
I conclude that Rawls' conception of legitimacy relies for its normative force on the notion of 
the “reasonable”. It is specified so that only what is “publicly” or “politically” reasonable can 
be acceptable to all. In order to specify the content of this, Rawls draws on three fundamental 
ideas  which  concern  the  person  (as  free  and  equal)  and  society  (as  a  (fair)  system  of 
cooperation). Those ideas indeed seem appealing to me as the basis for the justification of 
authority. Yet I am unconvinced by how Rawls introduces and uses them.
  3.3 Hypothetical consent
The social aspect of justification
In  the  foregoing  sections  I  have  examined  Rawls'  normative  conditions  “reasonable 
267 Galston, William: Pluralism and social unity., In: Ethics., Vol. 99, No. 4, 1989, p. 113
268 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 126.
269 See Gutman, Amy:  Rawls on the relationship between liberalism and democracy.,   In:  Freeman, Samuel 
(Ed.):  Cambridge  Companion  to  Rawls.,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2003.  Note  that  Rawls'  political 
conception of the person is developed for a democratic context. He talks about “citizens” rather than subjects  
because he envisages them as ultimately be the ones to exercise political power “as a collective power” (see  
Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. xliii-xliv).
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acceptability” and “political justification”. In this context I came to the conclusion that the 
underlying concepts and ideas are appealing, but that Rawls might presuppose too much. For 
example, he seems to accept as self-evident that there are unreasonable persons and he is 
unconcerned with how to practically identify them. He also takes too lightly the risk of biases 
within the definition of the reasonable, and it seems to me that his way of determining the 
relevant principles (by way of aiming for an overlapping consensus) is unconvincing too. In 
the  present  section  I  therefore  turn  to  the  one  practical  “test”  he  suggests  as  a  tool  for 
determining the appropriate principles of justice: the original position. 
To be sure,  the  original  position  is  a  hypothetical  device meant  to  help us  abstract  from 
circumstances  that  should  not  influence  the  conception  of  justice  we  adopt;  from 
“contingencies”270 as Rawls calls them. The basic idea is that parties, all of which represent a 
citizen of a common political community, are put in a position where they have to come to an 
agreement which principles of justice should guide their political authority: “In taking up this  
point of view, we are to imagine ourselves in the position of free and equal persons who  
jointly agree upon and commit to principles of social and political justice.”271 What makes the 
original position special, for example compared to classic “state of nature” arguments272, is 
that the parties are only “representatives”273 and not envisaged as the actual subjects of that 
decision.  That  is  to  say,  due  to  what  Rawls  calls  the  “veil  of  ignorance”,  the  agreement 
situation is “fair among all the parties”274, because they enter the bargaining process knowing 
only morally relevant facts about themselves and others, but not those that are arbitrary  or 
“accidental”275 (for instance they do know about the general nature and aims of persons, but 
not the particular interest or talent of the individual they represent). This kind of equality 
makes it  rational276 for the parties to be reasonable, that is to propose terms of cooperation 
that would be acceptable to anyone (as long as they are willing to accept reasonable terms of 
cooperation).  The reason for this  is  the following: If  I do not know in which position of 
society I will end up (for example privileged due to natural talent or not), then it is in my 
rational self-interest to aim for a decision that will leave me well-off in any case. This is the  
270 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 23.
271 Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20)
272 See e.g. Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan. [e.g. Cambridge University Press Student Edition, 2007].
273 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 25.
274 See  Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20).
275 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 23.
276 See  Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20).
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appropriate initial situation for a social contract, because whoever I end up being (or whoever 
the person I am representing ends up being), the terms of cooperation are acceptable to me. 
By abstracting from particular interests this way, I am adopting a “common” viewpoint and 
that is exactly the kind of viewpoint that we need to adopt when making collectively binding 
decisions277 – a viewpoint that all parties can share.
The function of the original position thus is to determine what can be “put forward as good 
reasons”278. It is meant to fulfill  this function by putting people's comprehensive doctrines 
behind a veil of ignorance. As Rawls puts it:
“This  enables  us  to  find  a  political  conception  of  justice  that  can  be  the  focus  of  an  
overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society marked  
by the fact of reasonable pluralism.”279
The outcome of this procedure is legitimate, because it is that which all would agree to under 
fair conditions provided they are rational and reasonable. Hypothetical consent is thus the 
normative condition of legitimacy280. But is it plausible? I believe there are two aspects that 
require assessment. One is whether the original position is effective as a tool for explicating 
the valid form of justification in the context of political authority. The other is whether the 
framework it provides for valid justification is plausible. 
Regarding the first issue I have the following problem: Rawls argues that  “there seems no 
better way to elaborate a political conception of justice(...)  from the fundamental idea of  
society as an ongoing and fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and 
equal.”281 This means that, again, the key values are already in place before the parties engage 
in their reasoning. I am not sure whether this is really necessary – if the parties in the original 
position  did  not  know anything  about  their  position  in  society,  would  they not  agree  on 
treating  citizens  as  free  and  equal  anyway?  I  believe  good  arguments  could  be  made  to 
support this view, which is why I deem it unnecessarily specific of Rawls to presuppose those 
values without justification. That is, perhaps his argumentative framework would allow those 
277 See  Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20).
278 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 25
279 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 25 (footnote 27)
280 Note that Rawls actually calls it “hypothetical agreement” (see Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia 
University Press, 2005, p. 24), but I use the term “consent” because I believe it to be more fitting.
281 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 26
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same principles, and justify them by presenting them as the outcome and not the premise of 
the  procedure  he  proposes.  On  a  similar  note,  Jürgen  Habermas  has  criticized  Rawls' 
argument from the original position in that:
“the concept of the citizen as a moral person, which also underlies the concept of the fair  
cooperation of autonomous citizens, stands in need of a prior justification. Further, it needs to  
be  shown  that  this  conception  is  neutral  toward  conflicting  worldviews  and  remains  
uncontroversial after the veil of  ignorance has been lifted.”282
Apart from that, I believe the original position is only partly effective as a justification device. 
It is supposed to function as a thought experiment that anyone of us can conduct in order to 
test  the  acceptability  of  the  principles  they  defend.  It  tells  us  exactly  what  kind  of 
considerations are legitimate and which contingencies we need to abstract from. In doing so, I 
believe it neither excludes too much nor too little, and as a result it is indeed practicable as a 
sort of “test” we can subject our considered convictions to. What it asks us to do is to put 
ourselves in other's shoes so to see whether they could bring up valid reasons for rejecting my 
claims. It thereby helps us to determine how to restrict our reasons to those that are acceptable 
to others and, hence, to make sense of the notion of  “reasonableness.”
Yet, there is one thing I am actually doubtful about and it leads me to the second aspect of my 
examination. What I question is whether imagining oneself as a party in the original position 
will ever actually change anyone's mind about whether their own proposals are reasonable. 
That is to say, by conducting this sort of thought experimenting I put my convictions to an 
“acceptability test”. If I am sincere it is anything but impossible that it may sometimes lead 
me to discover prejudices that I was previously unaware of, or to discover that my convictions 
are too biased by my own particular interests and that I have to adapt my views in order to be 
able to make valid public claims. However, I doubt that I can actually rid myself from those 
biases as long as the process of justification remains only in my own head.
To  put  it  differently:  I  believe  the  major  strength  of  Rawls'  approach  is  that  he  gives  a 
persuasive account of what kind of reasons should form the basis of fundamental political 
decisions: the reasons “we can share”283. In addition to that, he also gives an account for how 
282 Habermas, Jürgen: Rawls' Political Liberalism., In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 3, 1995, p. 119. 
Note that Rawls has made an attempt to rebut this claim in his article “Reply to Habermas.” [In: The Journal 
of Philosophy., Vol. 92, No. 3, p. 138], but I did not find his arguments there all too convincing. 
283 Note that I have borrowed this formulation from Chrstine Korsgaard although she uses it for a rather different 
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to  determine  those  reasons:  by  adopting  a  “common  standpoint”284.  By  embedding  his 
conception  of  legitimacy  in  the  social-contract  tradition  he  is  able  to  “represent  the  
predominantly  social  bases  of  justice”285.  Political  decisions  are  collectively  binding  and 
therefore I deem it plausible that those decisions should be collectively justifiable too. At first 
sight,  the  OP seems appropriate,  because  “rather  than representing  the  judgment  of  one  
person, it is conceived socially, as a general agreement by members of an ongoing society”286. 
The  fundamental  problem,  however,  is  that  this  form  of  social  engagement  is  strongly 
developed only on the hypothetical level. On the practical level, the equivalent would be his 
conception  of  “practical  reason”.287 There,  too,  he  makes  a  lot  of  effort  to  establish  the 
necessity of shareable justification and to specify the sort of reasons that people may refer to. 
Yet the one thing that he does not demand is that people actually do engage in justification. It 
seems to me that the weakness of his theory is that “justifiability” is valued over the actual  
process of justification. Is it really plausible that all we have to do is be able to offer a certain 
sort  of reasons? Or would not legitimacy require that we actually engage in a process of 
justification, that we do indeed offer reasons to those who we ask to live under the laws we 
propose?
Rawls' “duty of civility” demands that citizens are “able to explain to one another on those  
fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be  
supported by the political values of public reason”288. Note that they need to be able to, they 
must not actually offer those reasons. I think this does not suffice if we take seriously the 
autonomy of persons. We need to be able to live under a constitution the essentials of which 
argumentation (See Korsgaard, Christine: The reasons we can share. An attack on the distinction between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral Values., In: Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1993.).
284 Freeman,  Samuel:  Original  Position.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  1996  (online  at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20)
285  Freeman, Samuel: Original Position., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996 (online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20)
286  Freeman, Samuel: Original Position., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996 (online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/, last visited 7 May 2011, 17:20)
287  Note that in the present chapter I have only dealt with two conceptions of justification offered by Rawls (the 
original position and public reason). Rawls also proposes a third conception, “reflective equilibrium”, which 
constitutes a rather inductive approach. I have not dealt with it in this paper, because as Thomas Scanlon has 
helpfully pointed out, it is not a conception of justification that deals with principles but with persons. That is  
to say, the original position and public reason have in common that they “describe the kind of considerations  
that can justify a claim about justice (or about constitutional essentials)”.  Reflective equilibrium, on the 
other hand, only suggests that a “person has no reason to modify or abandon their judgments”. [See Scanlon, 
T. M.: Rawls on justification.,  In: Freeman, Samuel (Ed.): Cambridge Companion to Rawls., Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p. 140.] The point is that legitimacy refers to the justification of principles and not to 
persons being justified in holding certain views, which is why I have neglected the latter sort of justification 
throughout my evaluation.
288 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 217 
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are acceptable to us provided we are reasonable289. On Rawls' account, if I happen to disagree, 
I have to live with it or find a way to find it acceptable. If we are to exclude unreasonable  
people,  and  I  believe  it  is  plausible  that  we  do,  then  the  least  we  should  offer  them is 
justification. We need to explain to them why we deem them unreasonable and how we come 
to this conclusion. The only way to minimize the risk of illegitimate exclusion is giving them 
the chance to talk back. The duty of civility should not only be a duty of reasonable people to 
be able to reason among each other, but it should also include a duty to listen to those who are 
deemed unreasonable. How else could we ever discover potential biases?
Now some might say that Rawls' conception of legitimacy actually contains an account of 
deliberative democracy that requires us to do just that – reason, justify ourselves, engage in 
discussions. I agree that, on occasion, Rawls seems to imply this290. However, his approach 
nevertheless  seems  unsatisfactory  in  this  context.  First,  because  he  may  imply  it,  even 
presuppose  it  –  but  does  not  explicitly  argue  for  it291.  Second,  I  still  believe  that  the 
hypothetical  element  of  his  theory is  predominant.  It  is  far  more  often  that  he  refers  to 
people's being “able” to accept or justify or offer reasons, than that he actually demands we 
do just that. Last, I found that Charles Larmore has made an interesting argument when he 
oberved  that  Rawls'  idea  of  public  reason  may  well  be  seen  to  stand  for  deliberative 
democracy, but that he negelcts the difference between deliberation as a mode of discussion or 
a mode of decision making.292 In effect, this suggests that even if Rawls' argument is to be 
read so that he encourages discussion in the public forum, this does not necessarily mean that 
those decisions are actually decisive. Put differently, there is a difference between justifying 
and making a decision.
Now, one objection is close to hand at this point. It may appear that I have attacked Rawls'  
preference for hypothetical arguments in general. Going down that road, one might conclude, 
that I was too harsh in my criticism of Simmons. His is a strong plea for actualness and 
particularity and this is exactly what I have argued for in the context of justification. We need 
to engage in actual reasoning with particular people in order to properly justify fundamental 
289 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 98.
290 See espec.  Rawls, John: The idea of public reason revisited., In: Rawls, John: Political Liberalism. Expanded 
Edition., Columbia University Press, 2005, for example. p. 448.
291 See e.g. Gutman, Amy: Rawls on the relationship between liberalism and democracy., In: Freeman, Samuel  
(Ed.):  Cambridge  Companion  to  Rawls.,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2003  or  Cohen,  Joshua:  For  a  
democratic society.,  In: Freeman, Samuel (Ed.): Cambridge Companion to Rawls., Cambridge University 
Press, 2003 for descriptions of how Rawls uses democracy, but never explicitly justifies this.
292 See  Larmore,  Charles:  Public  Reason.,   In:  Freeman,  Samuel  (Ed.):  Cambridge  Companion  to  Rawls.,  
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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political decisions. Why should that not hold for acceptance too? Why contend with things 
being “acceptable” and not call for “acceptance” (or consent) as a legitimizing condition? The 
answer can be found in my analysis of Simmons293: Acceptance can be morally invalid just as 
non-acceptance can be, because what matters normatively is whether it is justified. Moreover, 
Rawls'  discrimination  between reasonable  and unreasonable  people  is  sensible.  Ill-willing 
people's non-acceptance should not have any effect on an authority's legitimacy. That is a 
plausible assumption and so the normative condition of  “justifiability” is central, because the 
normative force of acceptance depends on its being justifiable on the basis of good reasons.
However,  while  it  seems plausible  that  we should  exclude  unreasonable  people  from the 
“acceptance” pool, we must not remove them from the “justification” pool. Just because their 
justification is not properly “addressed” to us does not mean that we do not still have a duty to 
address them. There actually is a risk of bias in Rawls' conception of the reasonable itself and 
this is why justification matters. But it matters also because of the freedom of persons. To 
subject someone to an authority that he/she feels he cannot accept, even if we believe that 
he/she could were he/she just reasonable, is a morally serious issue. It may be legitimate, but 
this does not mean that unreasonable people forego their right to justification. So actualness 
and particularity do matter – but not for consent, rather for justification. Actual reasoning is a 
precondition  necessary  as  a  safeguard  to  ensure  that  constitutional  essentials  indeed  are 
acceptable, at least potentially, to all. This is why I conclude that the OP is appealing as a 
hypothetical device, but not sufficient as a justification tool, because the social dimension of 
justification needs to be actual and particular if legitimacy is to be realized.
  4. Conclusion  
In  the  previous  sections  I  have  examined  the  normative  conditions  Rawls  proposes  for 
legitimacy. At first, I turned to the notion of “reasonable acceptability” and showed why I 
believe it to be problematic to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons the 
way Rawls does. I believe it to be plausible and thus morally permissible that unreasonable 
person's acceptance or non-acceptance cannot be a measure for legitimacy and that they can 
therefore justifiably be excluded from the legitimization pool. I also agree with Rawls that this 
is not a violation of their autonomy. However, from a moral viewpoint to take seriously the 
293 See the previous chapter on Simmons.
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freedom of persons nevertheless makes it necessary that political justification must still be 
addressed to them. To engage in actual reasoning, even with those we deem unreasonable, is 
essential,  because any substantial definition of “reasonableness” refers to values and ideas 
which we believe may not be rejected. This, however, bears the risk of undetected biases or 
prejudices and I do not see how we can identify those if not by taking seriously even the 
unreasonable's  objections.  That is  to  say,  legitimacy may not depend on the unreasonable 
people  directly,  but  it  does  depend  on  us  finding  a  morally  sound  definition  of  the 
unreasonable so to ensure not to exclude the wrong kind of people
In  fact,  I  developed  a  similar  criticism  in  the  context  of  Rawls'  normative  condition 
“hypothetical consent”: I argued that hypothetical thought-experiments can actually be helpful 
for making individuals make sense of the notion of reasonableness, because by adopting an 
impartial view, they can find out which reasons are properly “shareable” and can form the 
basis of political authority. However, I believe that Rawls is too optimistic when it comes to  
the results of sincerity – that is to say, if I sincerely believe my views are reasonable, looking  
for objections inside my head, even if I try to adopt an “impartial” view, will probably not 
change my mind, because my mind can only hold objections that I am already aware of. In 
short, I am unconvinced that the original-position-method makes a difference to what I take to 
be my considered convictions. This is to say, the conceptualization of the original position 
points in the right direction, because it makes us aware of the social basis of justice. However, 
this social aspect of justification needs to be realized on more than a hypothetical level.
I also analyzed the plausibility of Rawls' notion of “political justification” as a normative 
condition of legitimacy.  As a matter  of fact,  legitimacy does not only depend on what is 
reasonable, but it depends on what “all” can reasonably be asked to endorse. He believes that 
there is an “overlapping consensus” among all reasonable comprehensive doctrines and this is 
the proper basis for the justification of political authority. In fact, the constitutional essentials 
may only rely on principles that can be derived therefrom. The content of the “overlapping 
consensus” is provided by what Rawls calls “public reason”, that is those values that can be 
drawn from the “public political culture” itself. He assumes there to be three central ideas: 
society being a (fair) system of cooperation and citizens being free and equal. However, it  
seems to me that  those  presuppositions  hold only (if  at  all)  against  the  background of  a 
democratic  regime.  Rawls  is  not  entirely clear  on  what  status  democracy has  within  his 
theory, although at times he seems to set it as a premise or even assume it as an outcome. I 
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believe this to be the central weakness of his approach, because his conception of legitimacy 
relies on substantive values that he does not explicitly defend.
All in all, I believe there are two major merits to Rawls' theory. First, he provides a plausible 
argument for why reasons matter (because they are what we can share so to justify political 
authority) and what kind of reasons legitimacy depends on (those reasons that we actually can 
share). In this sense his approach seems superior to that of Raz, because he too accounts for 
the normative force of reasons, but his explication is more plausible. Second, I find Rawls' 
understanding of freedom both compelling and plausible. Autonomy does not require that the 
only obligations we have are those that we are willing to accept, but it only requires that those 
obligations are reasonably acceptable to us, i.e. that they can be justified to us in terms that we 
can accept. Here I believe Rawls' theory to be superior to that of Simmons, because his notion 
of freedom is less totalistic and can account for the moral force of justification. Nevertheless, 
I also find that in this context there is a major weakness in Rawls' account, because he is too 
unconcerned with excluding “the unreasonable” at the risk of biases.
In the following I will turn to the work of Fabienne Peter in order to find out whether this 
weakness can be remedied if we make an explicit claim for deliberative democracy, a concept 
hinted at by Rawls but not actually defended and argued for yet.
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  VI. FABIENNE PETER  
  1. Legitimacy via procedure  
In the present chapter I will deal with the conception of legitimacy presented by Fabienne 
Peter. Concentrating on her book “Democratic legitimacy” I first explicate the framework and 
premise of her theory,  then I turn to evaluate the plausibility of her argumentation.  Since 
Peter's work can be seen to continue Rawls' thinking, the aim is to evaluate whether and to 
what extent she succeeds in making good for the weaknesses of this theory. This means that 
the focus will be on her condition of legitimacy and especially on the role of reasons and 
justification therein.
I proceed by firstly giving an overview of the main points of Peter's theory. Although she 
explicitly states that her book does not contain a description of authority I will analyze her 
underlying  assumptions  regarding  the  nature  and  status  of  legitimate  political  authority. 
Following  that,  I  then  give  an  overview  of  the  normative  condition  she  proposes  for 
legitimacy.  She calls  her  conception “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism” and my I  aim is  to 
explicate what exactly she has in mind when she argues that legitimacy is satisfied only if 
politics  are  conducted according to  certain democratic  procedures.  This  means that  I  will 
outline the conditions of “political equality” and “epistemic fairness” that are essential for her 
condition of legitimacy.  Note that  this  part  will  be describing the content  rather  than the 
argumentation of her theory, because the latter will be dealt with in the evaluative sections 
that follow.
In my analysis I suggest that Peter's conception of legitimacy is built on three succeeding 
stages of argument. First, she argues that legitimacy ought to apply to procedures rather than 
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directives. Second, those procedures need to be of a certain kind if we take seriously the fact 
of   “reasonable  pluralism”  discovered  by  Rawls.  Third,  she  assumes  that  this  makes 
democracy a necessary condition of legitimacy. In evaluating the first two claims I will have 
to keep in mind the objections brought forward against Rawls, because one of the leading 
questions will be whether her explicit proceduralism is actually more convincing than Rawls' 
focus on constitutional essentials. Also I assess whether the moral demands embedded in the 
procedures  proposed  by  Peter  are  actually  convincing.  Turning  to  the  third  part  of  her 
argument I then question whether she manages to justify why democracy is necessary for 
legitimacy.
  2. Peter's theses on legitimate authority  
  2.1 Definition of legitimate authority
Right to rule correlating with obligation on part of the subjects
In  dealing  with  Fabienne  Peter's  conception  of  legitimacy,  I  will  focus  on  her  book 
“Democratic legitimacy”294 and a related article, “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”295, that was 
published a year before that. The first thing that has to be noted is that Peter's aim is not to 
give an account of the nature and status of legitimate authority. That is to say, unlike Raz or 
Simmons she does not make an effort to define exactly what distinguishes a legitimate from 
other authorities, or how the legitimacy of that authority's rule changes the normative situation 
of their subjects. Her explicit focus is the normative condition of legitimacy, not so much its 
implications. This is important, because it means that the following outline relies on those few 
remarks on authority that she does make, but not on extensive argumentation. Right at the 
beginning of her book she actually states: 
“Over and above the broad concern with moral standards for evaluating the legitimacy of  
political authority and political obligation (...), the narrower focus of the current debate is on  
the standards that apply to (…) decision-making.”296
294 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009.
295 See Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008.
296 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 2
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With this restriction she sets the agenda for her book, limiting it to the defense of certain 
normative conditions, without thereby going into detail about what conception of authority 
she endorses. This, however, is not to say that she does not nevertheless rely on one, because 
what she assumes is that the “concept of legitimacy qualifies political authority, the right to  
rule”297 and that, in turn, “gives people a binding reason to support or not challenge (...) the  
resulting decisions”298. So legitimate authority consists in a right to rule and this correlates 
with the subjects' duty to accept that right and to “act accordingly”299. 
The reason for her not going into detail at this point is this: In normative political theory there 
are three fundamental concepts – the right to rule, obligation and legitimacy. Most theorists 
actually embrace the understanding endorsed by Peter, that all three of them are connected. 
However,  theorists differ in what they believe to be the most fundamental concept of the 
three.  That  is  to  say,  the  approach  and  conceptualization  of  their  relation  is  different 
depending  on  what  notion  one  starts  out  from.  For  example,  one  could  argue  that  what 
“counts as a legitimate authority depends on the political obligations people have”300. This 
would mean to adopt “obligation” as the essential  concept.  Alternatively,  some argue that 
“political  authority  defines  obligations  and is  separate  from and prior  to  concerns  with  
legitimacy”301. This suggests that the right to rule is fundamental. Peter actually opts for the 
third approach and relies on the idea that “legitimacy is the fundamental concept that grounds  
both authority and obligations”302. On this view, a political authority needs to satisfy certain 
normative conditions in order to count as legitimate. If it is legitimate, it holds a right to rule, 
while  the subjects are  under  an obligation to respect  that rule.  This makes the normative 
conditions of legitimacy central for any moral approach to political authority.
297 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
298 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
299 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57
300 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57 (Note that Peter cites Ronald Dworkin as an  
example.)
301 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 58 (Note that Peter cites John Simmons as an 
example.)
302 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 58
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  2.2 Normative condition of legitimacy
Democratic procedures that realize political equality and epistemic 
fairness
As we have seen, Peter views the normative condition of legitimacy as the central moral issue 
regarding  political  authority.  This  means  that  her  aim  is  not  to  give  an  account  of  the 
implications legitimacy has for the authority itself, or the subjects faced with it, but it is about 
explicating those normative conditions that apply to politics. Note that Peter actually frames 
the  question  of  legitimacy  as  follows:  “What  normative  conditions  should  apply  to  
democratic decision-making?”303 Accordingly, legitimacy is defined as a  “set of conditions  
that applies to the evaluation of democratic decision-making”304.
What this goes to show is that Peter, just as Rawls305, develops her theory for a democratic 
background. Her question is not what makes political decisions legitimate, but what makes 
democratic decisions legitimate.  I  will  come back to this  point  later  when I  evaluate  the 
plausibility of her argument, but for now I will proceed the same way I did with Rawls. That 
is, I will try to generalize her argument so that when she talks about democracy I will imagine 
she refers to politics more generally. For example, instead of legitimacy being defined as a 
normative concept meant to morally justify democratic decisions, I will treat it as to deal with 
political decisions.
Now, what exactly is that “set of conditions” that Peter envisages for legitimacy? In fact, she 
claims that a decision is legitimate  “if it is the outcome of a decision-making process that  
satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness”306. She calls this conception 
“Pure Epistemic Proceduralism” and I believe there are three major aspects to this.
First, Peter classifies her conception as  “proceduralist”. This means that  political decisions 
are legitimate if they are the “outcome” of a certain kind of process. It is not the authoritative 
directives which have to live up to the normative conditions of legitimacy, but it is the process 
that generates them. A political decision is legitimate as and because of being the outcome of 
that process, not because it itself satisfies any external criteria. The normativity does therefore 
303 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 1
304 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 2
305 See the preceding chapter on Rawls for details.
306 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 3
103
not reside in the outcome itself, but in its evolution307. That is to say, we are not to evaluate the 
content, but the process of politics.
In addition to that, Peter's account is not only “proceduralist” but  “purely  proceduralist” in 
nature and this means that there is no standard of legitimacy independent of that process308. As 
a  consequence,  the  legitimacy of  the  process  can  not  be  evaluated  with  reference  to  its 
outcomes.  This  point  is  of  special  importance  to  Peter,  because  she  thereby  rejects 
“instrumentalist” accounts of legitimacy309. Those, too, are known to argue that legitimacy 
requires certain procedures for making political decisions. However, their demand for those 
procedures  depends  on  them believing  that  it  will  somehow  lead  to  the  “best”  possible 
outcomes.  For  example,  Richard  Arneson310 defends  democracy  on  the  basis  that  those 
procedures will lead to “maximum fundamental rights fulfillment”311 and since this is what 
matters most for justice, democratic procedures and the decisions stemming therefrom are 
legitimate.  Beyond  rejecting  this  kind  of  instrumentalism,  Peter  also  objects  to  “rational 
proceduralist” accounts of legitimacy. Those focus on political procedures, but they also adopt 
a second category of conditions, which are meant to apply to the outcomes themselves. As 
Peter  puts  it,  “In Rational  Proceduralist  conceptions,  legitimacy  depends  not  just  on  an  
appropriately justified decision-making process, but also on some standards of justification  
that  target  the  decisions  themselves.”312 Thus,  the  “quality”313 of  outcomes  still  matters 
independent from the generating process and this is what Peter disagrees with.
So far all  we know is that  legitimacy depends on political  procedures.  More specifically, 
though,  legitimacy  depends  on  decisions  being  the  outcome  of  an  “appropriately  
constrained”314 process. But what exactly are those constraints? Peter's answer is this: “Pure 
Epistemic  Proceduralism  requires  public  deliberation  among  members  of  the  democratic  
307 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 123.
308 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 35.
309 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, pp. 62-65 and Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic 
Proceduralism., In: Episteme, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008, p. 35 for her critique.
310 See  Arneson,  Richard:  Defending  the  Purely Instrumental  Account  of  Democratic  Legitimacy.,  In:  The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2003 and Arneson, Richard: Democracy is not intrinsically 
just., In: Dowding, Keith / Goodin, Robert E. / Pateman, Carole (Eds.): Justice and Democracy. Essays for  
Brian Barry., Cambridge University Press, 2004. Note that he does not use the term “legitimacy”, but I have  
nevertheless used it to make the contrast between his and Peter's approach more obvious.
311 See e.g. Arneson, Richard: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy., In: The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2003, p.123.
312 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 92
313 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 65.
314 Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008
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constituency under conditions of political equality and epistemic fairness.”315 Thus, there are 
actually four requirements: deliberation, democracy, political equality and epistemic fairness. 
If  we  combine  condition  one  and  two  this  suggests  that  Peter  advocates  an  account  of 
deliberative democracy. This is important because as Joshua Cohen put it once: “deliberative  
accounts of democracy highlight the importance of public discussion prior to a vote”316. This 
is  also  the  view  endorsed  by  Peter,  because  she  argues  for  both  an  aggregative  and 
deliberative  dimension  of  democracy.  Deliberation  is  what  confers  normativity,  but  the 
aggregative dimension of democracy is still necessary in order  to come to a decision in the 
face  of  disagreement.  That  is  to  say,  because  of  reasonable  pluralism  consensus  is 
impossible317.  Even public  deliberation that  satisfies the conditions  of legitimacy  “cannot  
transcend pluralism”318. This is why voting is still necessary. It is, however, to be preceded 
and  accompanied  by  public  deliberation.  This  deliberation  is  what  Peter's  condition  of 
legitimacy actually refers to.
First, deliberation is to be conducted “among free and equal participants”319. This is what the 
condition  of  political  equality  requires.  It  demands  us  to  “acknowledge  each  other  as  
equals”320, thereby prescribing a certain conception of the person (at least within the political 
context).  Practically  speaking,  it  demands  that  people  have  an  equal  “opportunity  to  
participate in public deliberation”321. This is to say, giving people an equal right to vote is not 
sufficient, they actually need to be able to make use of that right. To put it differently: Formal 
inclusion  is  not  enough,  there also needs  to  be a  fair  chance to  effectively participate322. 
Moreover,  an equal right to vote does not suffice if  people do not also have a chance to 
engage in the public discussions that set the political agenda. Peter's call for political equality 
actually goes along with her “condition of reciprocity”: Persons are to recognize each other's 
capacities and accept that “all have an equal right to use these capacities”323. All are capable 
of participating in politics, hence all have an equal right to do so.
Second, the required deliberation ought to be public. As Peter points out, this is relevant in 
315 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 132
316 Cohen,  Joshua:  Deliberation  and  democratic  legitimacy.,  In:  Bohman,  James/Rehg,  William  (Eds.): 
Dleiberative democracy. MIT Press, 1997, p. 72
317 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 4
318 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 34
319 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p.140
320 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 36
321 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 36
322 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 37.
323 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 38
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two distinct ways: “Publicity is not just about giving one's reasons in public, as opposed to  
deliberating privately, but affects the types of reasons given.”324 And further: “what renders 
reasoning public is not simply the form in which it takes place, but the accessibility of the  
reasons given for a particular view to people who might not share that view.”325 Thus, there 
ought to be a public (instead of private) process of reasoning. This in turn means that the 
process of justification is viewed as social, not individual. It can only be social, though, if two 
conditions are  satisfied.  On the one hand, the process needs to be actual.  People need to 
engage in an actual process of justification with each other; a process where there is  “public  
discussion  and the  exchange  of  reasons”326.  They are  expected  to “voice  and justify  the  
reasons for which they prefer particular social states and their justifications are scrutinized  
by the participant discussants”327. On the other hand, people can only rely on a certain sort of 
reasons when aiming at public discussion. This is because only if  “reasons are of a form that  
makes them potentially accessible to others”328 they can form a legitimate basis of political 
decisions. Note that Peter declares this as a procedural interpretation of Rawls' idea of public 
reason329. 
This third aspect of deliberation is what Peter deals with under the heading of “epistemic 
fairness”.  She  argues  it  “relates  to  people's  opportunity  to  contribute  to  the  constructive  
function of deliberative  decision-making”330. That is to say, epistemic fairness requires not 
just  that  there  is   deliberation  “over  given  policy  proposals”331,  but  the  process  of  fact-
gathering and policy-formulation also needs to be inclusive. All persons need to be granted 
“access  to  consultational stages  of  the  policy-making  process”332.  Fairness  can  thus  be 
understood as equal effective opportunity, just as within the context of political equality. The 
epistemic aspect comes into play when Peter acknowledges that politics is not only a mode of 
problem-solving,  i.e.  a  process  to  pick  the  best  solution  for  social  issues.  It  is  instead  a 
cognitive process too. Discussion need not only be conducted about how to solve a problem, 
but also about what the problems are – this is what epistemic fairness requires333. Diverse 
324 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
325 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
326 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 4
327 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 32
328 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
329 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 5. See the preceding chapter on Rawls for  
an analysis of Rawls' own use of the concept of  public reason.
330 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 91
331 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 126
332 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 126
333 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 126.
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reasons matter to people. Only if all of them are considered epistemic fairness can be realized.
To sum up: Peter argues that legitimacy depends on whether and to what extent the political 
decision-making process realizes the conditions of political equality and epistemic fairness. 
Both of those conditions are seen to require public deliberation and the exchange of reasons. 
Public deliberation is required by political equality, because people need to have an equal 
chance to actually take part in the political process. At the same time, public deliberation is 
required by epistemic fairness, because the social process of reasoning enables a learning-
process that is relevant for defining and solving social problems. Peter suggests her account 
calls  for  deliberative  democracy,  because  this  is  how  the  conditions  of  “Pure  Epistemic 
Proceduralism” are realized. The question is: How plausible are her claims?
  3. Evaluation  
  3.1 Pure proceduralism
As we have seen, Peter's theory relies on the assumption that all of legitimacy's normativity 
stems from political procedure. Decisions are binding as and because of being the outcome of 
a certain procedure, not because they themselves satisfy any procedure-independent criteria. 
In making this argument, she rejects instrumentalist as well as rational proceduralist accounts 
of legitimacy. The former appeals only to substantive conditions for legitimacy, the latter has 
its  focus on procedure but also demands that political  decisions themselves are tested for 
legitimacy. Peter objects to this, and I believe her argument rests on two claims. First, Peter 
argues that if we appropriately design and constrain the political procedure in question, there 
is  actually  no need for further  constraints,  because those could not  confer  any additional 
normative force to the outcome. Second, she argues that substantive criteria are problematic, 
and  indeed  more  problematic  than  procedural  constraints.  This  is  because  the  latter  are 
actually more likely to be reasonably acceptable than the other, given the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. In what follows I will examine both claims in order to find out how convincing 
they are.
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  3.1.1  “Procedure-independent  standards  do  not  add  to  the  
normativity of political decisions.”
In her  article  “Democratic  legitimacy without  collective  rationality”  Peter  argues  that  the 
reasons for which some think that substantive criteria for legitimacy matter actually do not  
hold,  because  they  can  “also  be  covered  by  procedural  criteria”334.  This  suggests  that 
procedure-independent  standards  are  rejected,  firstly,  because  they  are  not  necessary. 
Whatever we believe to be relevant values in regard to legitimacy, they can be implemented 
as a procedural constraint and need not be applied to the outcomes themselves. Peter actually 
gives two examples.
When analyzing Kenneth Arrow's collective rationality requirement she suggests that it  is 
“based  on  the  claim  that  majoritarian  voting  may  otherwise  lead  to  manipulable  (...)  
results”335.  She thereby refers to his discovery of the paradox of voting336,  which William 
Riker has interpreted to suggest that democratic decisions are manipulable, because decisions 
depend  on the  way and  order  in  which  the  agenda is  set337.  Arrow concluded  that  since 
legitimacy cannot rely on arbitrary outcomes, political decisions should themselves be tested 
in regard to their rationality. The underlying assumption is that we can detect manipulation 
best if we look at the consistency of outcomes338. Now Peter argues that while it is plausible 
that manipulation is not compatible with legitimacy, this does not explain why we should 
adopt rationality (or consistency) as an independent standard for testing outcomes. As she puts 
it: “if a decision has come about as a result of manipulation, does that not by itself constitute  
a reason for doubting the legitimacy of the decision?”339 That is to say,  if our reason for 
excluding “irrational”  outcomes  is  an  unjust  (i.e.  manipulative)  procedure,  then  irrational 
outcomes could be avoided simply by designing the procedure appropriately. If the procedure 
is fair there is no need for a rationality requirement and hence the substantive criterion of 
consistency  does  not  confer  normativity  that  could  not  be  captured  by  an  appropriately 
334 Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy  without  collective  rationality.,  In:  De  Bruin,  Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, p. 154
335 Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy  without  collective  rationality.,  In:  De  Bruin,  Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, p. 151
336 See Arrow, Kenneth: Social choice and individual values., Yale University Press, 1963.
337 See Riker, William: Liberalism against populism., Freeman, 1982. 
338 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy without collective rationality., In: De Bruin, Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, pp. 143-5 for her argument why 
rationality is best understood as consistency in this context.
339 Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy  without  collective  rationality.,  In:  De  Bruin,  Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, p. 154
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constrained  procedure.  This,  Peter  concludes,  is  why we do not  need  to  submit  political 
decisions to procedure-independent tests.340
The second argument she gives is actually a little less straight-forward, because it concerns 
the  actual  content  of  policies.  That  is  to  say,  most  people  believe  in  the  necessity of  an 
external  standard  for  the  legitimacy of  political  decisions,  not  so  much because  they are 
worried about potential manipulation or arbitrariness, but because they are worried that any 
procedure may lead to gravely unjust results. For example, some object to majoritarian voting 
procedures, because they fear for the rights of minorities. What if, for example, a democratic 
constituency votes for sexist policies? Even if democratic procedures are fair, for example in 
that they allow women to vote, there seems to be no safeguard against this, and that is why 
procedure-independent standards are necessary. Peter actually rejects this claim in that she 
argues: “If the procedure is genuinely fair, one would (…) not expect a sexist proposal to go  
through”341. That is to say, certain outcomes are not simply the unfortunate outcome of a good 
procedure, but an indication for a “procedure gone wrong”342. Of course we  can disqualify 
those outcomes themselves, but we actually do not need to, because we can simply reexamine 
the constraints applied to the procedure itself, thereby achieving the same result. Note that this 
implies that the procedure has to be of a certain sort, because it has to allow for a “feedback-
loop”, a learning-process that puts decisions under scrutiny even after they are made. Peter 
accepts this implication343, and in fact embraces it because it goes to prove her point that 
procedural constraints are sufficient to ensure the legitimacy of political decisions.
Thus, Peter's conclusion is this: Substantial requirements can be applied to the outcomes, but 
they do not add any normative force, because the legitimacy they can provide could also be 
achieved through the right sort of procedure. This is why she argues for procedural constraints 
rather than procedure-independent tests. In my view, her argument is convincing. She does not 
argue  that  just  any  procedure  renders  its  outcomes  legitimate,  but  she  argues  that  if  a 
procedure  is  appropriately  designed  it  can.  If  it  is,  then  there  is  no  need  for  additional, 
procedure-independent tests. So far, so good. The question that has not yet been answered is 
why we should adopt procedural constraints rather than substantial ones. All that Peter's first 
340 Note that Peter's evaluation of Arrow's theory is of course much more comprehensive and detailed than this. I  
have only picked out one line of argument in order to illustrate her thinking. 
341 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 346
342 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 346.
343 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routlegde, 2009, p. 111.
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claim has stated is that if we design procedures correctly, we do not need additional standards. 
But why would we choose to impose constraints on the procedure in the first place, instead of 
dealing with the political  decisions themselves? This is the question her second argument 
seeks to answer.
  3.1.2  “Procedure-independent  standards  are  less  reasonably  
acceptable than procedural constraints.”
So far  I  have  given an  outline  of  Peter's  claim that  procedure-independent  standards  for 
evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions are unnecessary, because they cannot confer 
any additional normative force. Her second claim goes even further, because she suggests that 
not  only  can  those  criteria  not  add  anything,  they  are  also  less  desirable  from a  moral 
perspective. That is to say: “procedural reasons, surely, can be “publicly agreeable” reasons;  
in fact they are much more likely to be publicly agreeable than reasons that refer to the  
substantive content of a decision”344. So the underlying assumption seem to be something like 
this:  First,  standards  of  legitimacy  need  to  be  “publicly  agreeable”  or,  in  other  words, 
“reasonably acceptable”. Second, standards that apply to political procedures are more likely 
to satisfy this condition than those which apply to policies or the decisions themselves. 
I actually accept the first claim, because it seems to be very similar to the thoughts I have 
already discussed at length in the context of Rawls' theory. People ought to be able to accept 
the rules under which they are asked to live, because otherwise it seems their freedom or 
autonomy is  violated345.  Now the more interesting issue is  what  exactly this  acceptability 
requirement applies to. Rawls'  idea of public reason is actually open to interpretation and 
while I myself  have adopted a procedural view, assuming that his principle of legitimacy 
applies only to the macro-level of politics,  his  writing is not unambiguous346.  In contrast, 
Peter's  claim is  much more  explicit  and indeed  a  bit  narrower,  because  her  standards  of 
legitimacy  are  applied  to  decision-making  procedures  only,  not  to  the  broader  set  of 
“constitutional essentials”.
344 Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy  without  collective  rationality.,  In:  De  Bruin,  Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, p. 153
345 See the preceding chapter on Rawls for a detailed discussion.
346 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, pp. 92-100 for an outline of the “substantive” 
and “procedural” interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason.
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Another aspect of Peter's claim is  therefore more interesting.  She does not argue that her 
constraints  on  procedures  are  not  in  fact  substantial.  All  she  suggests  is  that  applying 
substantive requirements to procedures instead of decisions is more likely to live up to the 
acceptability requirement. Why is that? What she seems to assume is that people are more 
likely to accept certain values or norms when they are applied to the process of decision-
making rather than on the decisions themselves. For example, so her thought seems to go, 
they  would  be  more  likely  to  accept  “an  equal  say”  in  decision-making  than  “equal 
distribution” of certain resources. The underlying idea of both proposals is “equality”, which 
is  a  fundamental  moral  value.  However,  interpreting  it  as  a  procedural  constraint,  an 
imperative for how we should make collectively binding decisions, seems more likely to be 
accepted  by  people  than  interpreting  it  as  calling  for  particular  (distributive)  policies.  I 
actually find this idea intriguing. It is true that Peter could make a more extensive argument 
for this, but on an intuitive level it is certainly appealing.
Remember  that  in  the  context  of  Rawls'  theory  I  have  criticized  that  he  presupposes 
substantial  values  as  the  content  of  public  reason,  more  particularly  that  he  builds  his 
conception  on  the  notion  of  “free  and  equal” citizens  and  society  as  a  “fair  system of  
cooperation”347. The thing I was puzzled by was where those values came from. He started 
out from the fact of reasonable pluralism, defended the need for an overlapping consensus and 
finally concluded that these values are the content of public reason. The question I was left 
with was: Why? Where did those values come from? Why are they the content of public 
reason? How do we confirm they actually are the focus of an overlapping consensus? Peter 
does not answer those questions, but I find that she chooses an elegant path to circumvent the 
problem. This is because she does not deny that the values she imposes are fundamental – she 
does demand substantive equality for example348. She does not deny that viewing persons as 
“free” and “equal” is a fundamental moral claim about how we ought to view or treat persons. 
The point is that she does not need to deny this, because what she assumes is this: Even in the  
face of pervasive disagreement, politics need to be constrained by certain moral requirements 
so to avoid violating justice. It is true, that this is difficult or problematic, because pluralism is 
(at least in part) reasonable349 and so we cannot claim or expect that all people will agree on 
347 See  Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 22. Also see Wenar, Leif: John 
Rawls.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  2008 (online at:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/, 
last visited on 24 April 2011, 16:49) for the argument that these are the three fundamental ideas.
348 See  e.g.  Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy  and  proceduralist  social  epistemology.,  In:  Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 335.
349 Note that  in  a  recent  speech Peter  has  argued that  her  interpretation of  reasonable pluralism is actually 
different to that of Rawls. While he endorses a moralized understanding, her interpretation is epistemic. That 
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what moral constraints are appropriate.
Rawls nevertheless assumes that all reasonable doctrines will “overlap” in viewing persons as 
free and equal and so this can be the basis of a reasonable overlapping consensus. Peter's 
conception allows for avoiding this. She does not need to make claims about what reasonable 
people accept or ought to accept. Instead, her theory allows for the argument that despite all 
disagreement, there need to be some constraints on politics (as it is collectively binding and it  
is  in  everyone's  best  interest  to  avoid  being  harmed  by  those  rules).  If  there  are  to  be 
constraints,  however,  it  is  more  acceptable  that  they  should  apply  to  the  way we  make 
decisions than to the decisions themselves. And this is for one simple reason: With the right 
procedure in place, everyone can still hope that their influence within the procedure will be 
effective so that the outcome reflects their views. Even unreasonable people will have reason 
to subject to a procedure that allows them influence, even if it as at the “expense” of others 
having influence too. Reasonable people, on the other hand, will also agree to submit to fair 
procedures, because they know that this is what all can be expected to accept.
Note that Peter does not explicitly make the sort of argument that I have outlined here. Yet I 
believe that this is one way in which we can explicate the assumptions that underlie her claim 
that constraints are better applied to procedures than decisions because of the acceptability 
requirement350.  She  suggests  that  people  will  effectively  feel  more  bound  by  particular 
decisions  and  so  there  will  be  much  more  controversy  on  what  constitutes  appropriate 
constraints for potential policies. Procedures, on the other hand, also impose constraints, but 
those will not feel as restrictive to people, even if they rely on substantial moral values that  
are – by themselves – contested. That is to say, if a procedure is structured so to give all 
people an equal say, I can still hope for sexist policies (which proclaim the unequal status of 
men and women) to go through. The interesting twist in Peter's theory is that she assumes that 
is to say: He assumes disagreement between “reasonable persons”, implying that reasonableness is a moral 
requirement people ought to live up to (in being fair, etc.). Unreasonable persons thus drop out of focus.  
Peter, on the other hand, offers an epistemic interpretation of reasonable pluralism in that she assumes that  
people can hold different beliefs and all be justified in doing so. This is a less moralized view because it 
seems that mere disagreement is not the effect of some people not living up to the moral requirement of 
reasonableness, rather it is simply the effect of some people not having access to all relevant evidence or not  
judging it correctly. They thus end up holding un-justified views without thereby becoming “unreasonable”  
(i.e. unfair) persons. I believe this to be an extremely significant clarification that we should keep in mind.  
[The clarification was given in a speech Peter gave at the ERC-project conference “Authority, Legality and 
Legitimacy” which took place on May 20 2011 at the Law School of the University of Vienna. Peter has not  
yet published a paper on this topic though.]
350 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy without collective rationality., In: De Bruin, Boudewijn/Zurn, 
Christopher (Eds.): New waves in political philosophy., Macmillan, 2009, p. 153. 
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if  we impose  those  constraints  that  will  nevertheless  not  happen351.  Everyone  can  accept 
reasonable constraints on procedures, because they can still hope for outcomes that satisfy 
their  interests.  However,  reasonable  constraints  will  actually  not  allow  for  unreasonable 
outcomes and so the reasonable procedure will make for legitimate decisions.  
Note that Peter herself acknowledges the potential problem of applying moral standards to the 
procedure, as she argues that it would be “putting the cart before the horse”352 to demand too 
much of the procedures themselves. It is still the goal of the political decision-making process 
to substantiate the demands of justice, and so we may not overload it with constraints that 
allow only for certain outcomes and not others. Peter calls this the  “political egalitarian's  
dilemma”:
“The role of political equality in proceduralist conceptions (…) is to specify the conditions  
that the decision-making process has to satisfy if its results are to be legitimate. As such, the  
content of political equality is not itself the subject of deliberation.”353
The basic idea, as we will see in the following sections, is to design the procedure so that the 
very values the procedure is based on are also subject to scrutiny, just as its outcomes are: 
“all principles governing deliberative processes – whether they are substantive or procedural  
–  should  be  seen  as  contestable  and as  provisional.”354.  Put  differently:  To some extent, 
Peter's  conception  needs  to  rely on  fundamental  values  to  constrain  the  political  process 
appropriately. It is true that those values are always controversial and at the risk of biases, 
which is why they have to be a potential subject to the same process of legitimization that  
other decisions and rules are subjected to. So there are values that we apply to the process and 
in this sense they may seem procedure-independent. Yet they are not fully so, because they 
can be the subject of that same process and this is why they are permissible constraints on the 
political decision-making process. 
351 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 346.
352 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 340
353 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p.87
354 See e.g.  Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy.,  Routledge,  2009,  pp. 89-9. Also see Gutmann,  Amy /  
Thompson, Dennis: Why deliberative democracy?, Princeton University Press, 2004.
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  3.1.3. Conclusion
So far I have not found any reason to reject Peter's claim for a purely proceduralist conception 
of legitimacy. She claims that procedures can be constrained in a way that makes additional 
standards for testing the legitimacy of outcomes unnecessary. She furthermore suggests that 
constraining procedures is more reasonably acceptable than constraining outcomes, even if 
both must rely on fundamental moral values. It is clear that while Peter's claim cannot be 
rejected at this point, we still have to evaluate the details before determining its plausibility.  
That is to say: So far Peter has only made claims about what an “appropriately constrained 
procedure” may accomplish. The question is: Does she succeed in proposing constraints for 
actually making a procedure live up to those claims? This is what I will try to determine in the 
following sections. 
  3.2 Political equality and epistemic fairness
Peter's  conception  of  legitimacy  is  purely  proceduralist  in  that  it  rejects  procedure-
independent standards for the evaluation of political decisions. The only source of normativity 
for those decisions is the fair process producing them. Now in order to generate those sorts of  
outcomes, the procedure has to be of a certain sort. Obviously, not just any process leads to 
politically legitimate outcomes. This is why Peter develops two normative conditions for the 
process  of  political-decision  making:  “political  equality”  and  “epistemic  fairness”.  A 
procedure  that  lives  up  to  those  standards  renders  its  outcomes  acceptable,  and  hence 
legitimate. Remember that while the measure for the legitimacy of outcomes lies only in the 
fairness of the procedure, this is not true for the constraints applied to the procedure itself. In 
what follows I will evaluate the conditions proposed by Peter in order to evaluate whether 
they are plausible for legitimizing the outcomes of a procedure so-designed.
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  3.2.1 Political equality
As we have seen, Peter's conception rests on the premise that political decisions are legitimate 
only  if  they  are  the  outcome  of  an  appropriately  constrained  procedure.  One  of  those 
constraints is imposed by the demand for political equality355. In assessing this claim three 
things have to be considered: First, what does Peter understand by “political equality” and 
what role is it supposed to play in the making of political decisions? Second, what argument 
does she give to support the claim that political equality is actually a reasonably acceptable 
condition? Third, how plausible is this argument and what possible objections are there?
As a matter of fact, there are to ways to ground a claim for political equality. On the one hand, 
one could argue that it is necessary for equal advancement of people's interest356. On the other, 
and this is the approach that Peter adopts, one can argue that people have equal capacities, for 
example  to  rationally  judge  different  social  states.  Now  since  all  have  roughly  equal 
capacities, it seems required that all have an equal right to use them357. However, this poses a 
problem  since  pluralism  is  at  least  partly the  “normal  result  of  the  exercise  of  human  
reason”358. If all people have an equal capacity to use reason, and at the same time their use of 
reason leads to diverging outcomes, then it would seem unfair to privilege one outcome over 
the other. How cope with this? Peter suggests that an equal capacity to judge alternative social 
states ought to give people an equal right to have a say in the decision how to shape their 
common world. As she puts it, “respect for reasonable value pluralism implies that people's  
possibility to participate in the evaluation of alternative social states is constitutive of  (…)  
legitimacy”359. The assumption of equal capacities thus leads to a claim for equal political 
participation of all subjects. She furthermore argues that political equality is not sufficiently 
realized by granting formal rights of participation360. The right to participation needs to be 
“effective”, not merely nominal.
The  most  obvious  way  of  criticizing  Peter's  account  is  to  question  either  whether  it  is 
355 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 132.
356 See e.g. Christiano, Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2008 for this sort of argument.
357 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 38.
358 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. xvi
359 Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 36
360 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 37.
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plausible that  all  people are assumed to have roughly equal capacities, or to object to her 
claim that this gives all an equal right to participate in political decisions. The latter is actually 
more significant. As I have argued, Rawls' concern for unreasonableness is not unjustified361. 
What if people are unwilling to cooperate? What if people are egoistic, irrational or unwilling 
to  be  fair?  Giving them a  right  to  participate  in  political  decisions  bears  the  risk  of  the 
outcomes  reflecting  those  values  and,  from  a  moral  perspective,  that  certainly  seems 
undesirable. It would pose a problem for legitimacy because it is doubtful that the outcomes 
would  actually  be  “acceptable”.  The  standard  response  would  be  that  the  exclusion  of 
unreasonable people is the “lesser evil”; i.e. that it is unfortunate to exclude them although 
they have an equal capacity of reason, but that since they have this capacity they also have the 
capacity of reasonableness and this means that their exclusion need not be permanent – they 
simply need to become reasonable and they will be rewarded with an equal right to political 
participation.  This  argument  is  not  entirely  implausible.  Yet,  there  is  one  fundamental 
problem: Who are the unreasonable ones? How do we identify them? Who has the authority 
to judge what counts as reasonable and what does not?
It seems that in order to make a case for political equality, Peter has to argue that either there 
is no such thing as harmful unreasonableness or that it is impossible to correctly identify it. In 
fact, she opts for the second approach and in the following section I will therefore examine 
whether  her  arguments  for  epistemic  fairness  actually  succeeds  in  supporting  political 
equality.
  3.2.2 Epistemic fairness
In addition to political equality, the second constraint that Peter calls for in the context of 
political decision-making is “epistemic fairness”362. But what does this mean and how does it 
matter?
It seems the underlying claim is this: A political decision-making process ought to enable a 
361 See the preceding chapter on Rawls.
362 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 132.
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“learning  process”363 for  the  agents  involved  in  it364.  This  requires  a  process  of  public 
deliberation prior to the actual decision-taking. Deliberation ought to be so that people engage 
in a “mutual exchange and public scrutiny of reasons”365, because those are the main input to 
decision-making. Reasons – not preferences – matter, because they are how we can make our 
own  personal  deliberation  accessible to  others366.  This  is  important,  because  political 
decisions are collectively binding. By stating a preference for a certain social state we make 
the claim about how our common world is to be shaped. Since our claims affect others, they 
are in need of justification and so what we need to do is explain ourselves to others367. What 
are our reasons to endorse this view? What reasons do we believe others to have to endorse 
the same view? We owe to them not only to provide reasons, but a certain sort of reasons 368, 
and we owe to them not only to provide reasons, but to engage in a process of reasoning 
together369. Now the claim is that the process ought to be designed so that our own preferences 
can transform370,  for example because we begin to consider a point of view that we were 
previously unaware of. Peter argues in favor of a “proceduralist social epistemology”, which 
defines “knowledge as what results from an appropriately designed process of inquiry”371.
Now the point is  this:  The process of political  decision-making is  a process of inquiry,  a 
learning-process, aimed to determine the best “social state” and how to realize it. This is why 
conditions  of  “epistemic  fairness”  apply.  Put  simply,  espistemic  fairness  requires  that 
knowledge  is  produced  in  an  unbiased  and  fair  way.  This  means  that  in  the  process  of 
reasoning neither the gathering of facts (or the definition of what is to count as a fact)372, nor 
the consideration of evidence373 can be designed so to privilege certain values over others. 
Political equality requires that all can participate in the process of reasoning, but epistemic 
fairness requires that all reasons have a chance of being considered. As Peter puts it:
363 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 117
364 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 3.
365 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
366 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 32. 
367 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 32.
368 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
369 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
370 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33.
371 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007.
372 See Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 47.
373 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 343.
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“pure epistemic proceduralism portrays public deliberation as an ongoing process of critical  
engagement and learning with conflicting representation of what the problems are, what it  
takes to solve them, and the reasons people have for valuing alternative options”374
This  means  that  we  cannot  a  priori  exclude  certain  reasons  or  modes  of  knowing  as 
“inappropriate” (or unreasonable), because this would not be fair to the various ways in which 
knowledge is produced, in which reasons are “known”. One example would be “rationality”. 
To demand  that  only “rational  reasoning”  is  appropriate  for  the  public  forum may seem 
uncontroversial at first sight. Yet, it allows “emotional” reasons to be excluded. Combined 
with the stereotype that women are the more emotional gender this might then perpetuate the 
idea  that  they  simply  are  “worse  reasoners”  than  men,  thus  justifying  their  exclusion375. 
Excluding modes of knowing can thus be as problematic as excluding people, because it often 
amounts to just that. This is why Peter states  “political and epistemic fairness are just two  
sides of the same coin”376.  Political  decision-making needs to rely on a process of public 
reasoning that is free, open and sustained377, and this means that we cannot exclude people for 
their mode of reasoning, even if we believe them to be stupid, irrational or unreasonable.
The question is: How does epistemic fairness contribute to legitimacy? Or put differently: 
How is it a source of normativity? Peter provides two answers to this: First, the exchange and 
public  scrutiny of reasons matters,  because the only knowledge is  that  which is  social378. 
Hence, the only reasons which we can rely upon in making political decisions are those which 
are collectively confirmed. This does not require consensus, but it requires those reasons to 
pass  the  test  of  public  scrutiny.  For  example,  how  are  we  supposed  to  know  what  is 
reasonable, i.e. what is acceptable to others as fair terms, if we do not engage in a process of 
justification  with  others  and  respond  to  their  potentially  different  view?  Basically,  the 
procedure envisaged by Peter is meant to help us discover previously unknown biases instead 
of avoiding those we already know about379.  Second, the exchange of reasons matters also 
374 Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 50
375 See  Friedman,  Marilyn:  John  Rawls  and  political  coercion  of  unreasonable  people.,  In:  Davion, 
Victoria/Wolf, Clark (Eds.): The idea of a political liberalism. Essays on Rawls., Rowman & Littlefield ,  
2000, p. 24 for an examination of a similar idea.
376 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 347
377 See Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 43.
378 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology., In: Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007. Note that she refers to John Dewey here.
379 See  Peter,  Fabienne:  Democratic  legitimacy.,  Routledge,  2009,  pp.  134-5.  She  calls  this  the  “bias-as-
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because it makes the outcomes of the political decision-making process acceptable. This is 
because of two aspects: On the one hand, everyone has a fair chance of having their reasons 
considered.  At  the same time,  even if  my reasons are  rejected,  they may not  be rejected 
without proper justification. Furthermore, since deliberation on social states is an on-going 
process, both sides' reasons and views can undergo a learning-process and transform, so that 
new hybrid views or reasons are produced. Even those subjected to a decision they have not 
supported  themselves  have  good reason to  accept  it,  because  it  is  the  outcome of  a  fair 
process. This,  according to Peter,  is  the  “real argument for why the exchange of reasons  
matters”380.
  3.2.3 Conclusion: Reasons – reasoning – justification 
In my view, Peter actually succeeds in making a convincing argument for why the exchange 
of reasons matters. They do not matter simply because they are some sort of factual basis of 
justification, the way Raz seems to assume381. They matter, because they are what people can 
use  to  justify  things  to  each  other.  This  means  that  reasons  are  a  way of  responding  to 
Simmons'  requirements  of  particularity  and  actualness382 –  but  only  if  we  interpret 
justification procedurally as well  as socially,  as “intersubjective reasoning” the way Peter 
proposes. The conditions of political equality and epistemic fairness hence seem convincing 
as legitimizing criteria for a political decision-making process. Outcomes that are generated 
through a public deliberative process defined this way are indeed acceptable, and since – as I 
have  argued  before  in  the  context  of  Rawls  –  acceptability  is  a  plausible  criterion  for 
legitimacy, the outcomes thus generated are legitimate.
Remember that I also criticized Raz' theory for not giving an account of what reasons actually 
matter.  He  argues  that  legitimacy  depends  on  authority  making  us  better  comply  with 
reasons383. But which reasons exactly is he talking about? It seems there are different sorts of 
reasons and not all of them ought to be relevant for the political context. For example, rain 
resources”-view.
380 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 116
381 See Raz, Joseph: Reason, reasons and normativity., In: Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5, 2010. Also see 
Korsgaard, Christine: The constitution of agency. Essays on practical reason and moral psychology., Oxord 
University Press, 2008, pp. 209-10.
382 See the preceding chapter on Simmons of this paper.
383 See the preceding chapter on Raz for an explication and evaluation of his “Normal Justification Thesis”.
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provides a person with a reason to use an umbrella. One could call this a valid reason, perhaps 
a “reason of prudence”. Yet it seems dubious that an authority would only be legitimate if it 
makes me comply with those sorts of reasons. In contrast, Rawls' notion of public reason is 
meant to specify what sort of reasons matter in the political context: those, that are reasonably 
acceptable to all384. This suggests that only those decisions can be enforced that are based on 
reasons  all  reasonable  people  can  share.  This  is  indeed  a  plausible  restriction,  yet  I  am 
unconvinced that it could actually solve the problem at hand, because is not rain a “reasonably 
acceptable” reason to use an umbrella? Christine Korsgaard has actually argued that “the only  
reasons that are possible are the reasons we can share”385. This suggests that it is the very 
nature of reasons that they are potentially shareable among those who have the capacity of 
reason. Does this  mean that all  reasons are acceptable as the basis  of political  decisions? 
Perhaps not if we take Rawls' theory to mean that only those reasons that are acceptable as 
the basis of collectively binding political decisions provide legitimate justification. This is 
plausible, but not very satisfactory, because yet again it does not really give us an explicit 
account of which reasons this is true for.
Can Peter solve this problem? One might deny it, arguing that Peter's conception is actually 
faced with the same problem. She argues that only “public” reasons, i.e.  reasons “of a form 
that makes them potentially accessible to others”386,  are legitimate as a basis  for political 
decisions and this seems very similar to Rawls' account. Yet, this is not the core of her theory. 
The core of her conception of legitimacy is that she invokes a  procedural interpretation of 
Rawls' idea of public reason387. Along those lines one could suggest that the question what 
reasons can form the basis of legitimate political decisions is a misleading question in the first 
place, because what reasons matter cannot be determined without a social process of reason-
ing. Reasons are normatively basic, but their normative force is realized only procedurally 
through the process of reasoning. To be collectively binding, though, the process itself ought 
to be collective too, this is where Peter's claim for the “social” aspect stems from.
I thus conclude that Peter's normative condition of legitimacy is actually both plausible and 
384 See the preceding chapter on Rawls for an explication and evaluation of his idea of public reason.
385 Korsgaard, Christine: The reasons we can share. An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and 
agent-neutral values., In: Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1993, p. 33
386 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 33
387 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 5. See the preceding chapter on Rawls for  
an analysis of his own use of the concept of public reason.
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persuasive.  She  manages  to  account  for  the  normative  force  of  reasons,  but  due  to  her 
procedural  interpretation  she  avoids  running  into  the  problem  of  having  to  distinguish 
between reasons that count and those that are inappropriate for the political context. She is 
convincing in her argument that the normative condition of justification is not satisfied by the 
mere presentation of reasons, but only through a process of reasoning that is reciprocal as well 
as responsive. This means that she does not have to exclude the unreasonable the way Rawls 
does and I believe that from a moral perspective this is desirable. All in all, this means that 
legitimacy is satisfied if political decisions are the outcome of a process that satisfies political 
equality and epistemic fairness. The more the exercise of political authority lives up to this 
condition, the more legitimate it is. Does this mean democracy is necessary for legitimate 
political authority? This is the question I seek to answer in the following section.
  3.3. Democracy
So far I have examined whether pure proceduralism can form a viable basis for legitimacy and 
whether  the specific  procedural  design suggested by Peter  is  plausible.  Now I turn to  an 
aspect I have so far neglected in dealing with Peter's theory: democracy388. As with Rawls, 
Peter too, sets out to develop conditions of legitimacy meant to apply to democratic decision-
making389.  At  the  same  time,  however,  she  claims  that  democracy  is  an  “irreducible  
component of” legitimacy390. What does that mean; what role is democracy supposed to play 
in Peter's theory? Is it meant as a restriction of scope or as a normative condition?
As a matter of fact, I will argue that Peter is not clear on this and this poses a significant  
problem for the coherence of her theory.  First,  however,  we need to take a look at  what 
indications Peter gives for either of the two interpretations.
In a previous chapter I have specified the notion of political legitimacy so that it applies to 
political procedures  only.  Along  those  lines  it  would  stand  to  reason  that  “democratic 
388 Note that I have already outlined a similar argument in an earlier MA paper of mine, “Democratic franchise  
and legitimacy. An analysis with reference to England's history of electoral law.”, produced in 2010 (to be 
found  online  at:  http://othes.univie.ac.at/11139/1/2010-09-12_0500608.pdf,  last  visited  on  16  May 2011, 
13:19).
389 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 2.
390 Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 36
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legitimacy”  – since democracy is  defined as a particular  form of politics – is  a concept 
applying only to  democratic  procedures. Furthermore, if political legitimacy is understood 
normatively, as specifying conditions that politics ought to live up to, democratic legitimacy 
could  be  assumed  to  set  standards  for specifically  democratic  politics.  However,  one 
implication may strike us as odd: If democracy is nothing but a particular form of politics – 
why should we need a specialized concept of legitimacy at all? It would mean either that 
conceptions of political legitimacy are too crude or too general than to apply to democracy, or 
that democracy is so distinct from other forms of political procedures that a conception of 
political legitimacy needs to at least be supplemented, i.e. supplemented to such an extent that 
it  makes sense to call it a conception of its own. Viewing democratic legitimacy this way 
would have the implication that the normative conditions thus developed are not valid for 
other forms of politics, at least not before a separate argument has been made to prove that. 
Put differently, those normative conditions would not be universal, but would only be apt to 
legitimize  the  exercise  of  democratic  authority.  Other  forms  of  political  authority  could 
depend on rather different normative standards of legitimacy. At several points, it seems to me 
that Peter might actually endorse that view, for example right at the beginning of her book 
“Democratic legitimacy”, when she states: 
“my aim (…) is to offer a systematic treatment of the requirements of democratic legitimacy,  
interpreted  as  the  set  of  conditions  that  apply  to  the  evaluation  of  democratic  decision-
making.”391
True,  she  does  not  specifically state  that  democracy is  the only form of  politics  that  her 
conditions are meant for. However, what she does state is that she develops condition to apply 
to democracy. Democracy is then the subject, not a condition, of evaluation. 
Yet when proceeding to read her book, we actually get a rather different picture: Instead of 
viewing democratic legitimacy as a specialized version of political legitimacy (in the sense 
that  it  specifies  normative  conditions  for  a  particular  political  process  –  democracy),  she 
seems to assume that  it  is  not just  one version of,  but  essentially itself  a  requirement  of 
political legitimacy. Only if a political procedure is democratic and lives up to the normative 
391 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 2
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ideals associated with that, it can be called legitimate at all.  For example, Peter rejects what 
she calls democratic instrumentalism for that it “wrongly denies how democratic procedures  
are  constitutive  for  legitimacy”392 and  demands  that  “democratic  procedures  are  (...)  
necessary  for  legitimacy”393.  This  suggests  that  there  is  virtually  no  legitimacy  outside 
democracy. Political legitimacy, essentially, is democratic legitimacy, and democracy thereby 
becomes part of the measure instead of a procedure to be evaluated.
It seems to me that this latter claim can only rely on an argument (or assumption) of the 
following kind: In a first step, requirements of legitimacy are developed (= “stage one”). In 
Peter's case, this means defending a purely proceduralist conception of legitimacy that relies 
on  the  values  of  political  equality  and  epistemic  fairness394.  Second,  one  shows  how 
democratic political procedures satisfy those conditions (= “stage two”). For instance, Peter 
claims  that  deliberative  democracy395 can  actually  satisfy  the  requirements  of  legitimacy, 
because it allows for public deliberation that can be regulated by the principles of political 
equality and epistemic fairness. The act of voting does not violate legitimacy as long as it is a 
way  of  selecting  a  particular  outcome  “for  now”,  not  thereby  ending  the  process  of 
deliberation. Finally,  it  is concluded that the fact that democracy lives up to legitimacy is 
proof that the democratic procedure itself is a requirement of legitimacy. The premise of this  
claim is that the democratic process does not only live up to those standards, but that it is 
unique in doing so, and that it is thus the only political procedure that satisfies the conditions 
of legitimacy (= “stage three”).  This last claim is actually central,  because just because a 
procedure lives up to certain standards does not mean that it becomes necessary for realizing 
them. This is true only if  that procedure is the only way to realize them. Note that Peter 
actually does not provide any argument for this third stage. This is to say, she does not make 
any effort to rule out other forms of government as potentially realizing her conditions of 
legitimacy.  Instead,  she  simply  assumes  that  since  democracy  can  be  legitimate,  it  is 
necessary for realizing it and thus itself required396. 
Where does this leave us? In my view, contrasting the two possible interpretations actually 
makes Peter's approach seem highly questionable. If we look at the structure of an argument 
392 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 64
393  Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 65
394  See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 3.
395  See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 3. 
396  See e.g. Peter, Fabienne: Pure Epistemic Proceduralism., In: Episteme, 2008, p. 36.
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necessary to support the claim that democracy is a requirement of legitimacy, then it seems 
that it all falls apart if one assumes democracy as a premise. Stage one is to develop plausible 
conditions of legitimacy,  stage two is  to  show how democracy can realize them. Now, if 
democracy is already assumed during the first stage (because what one means to do is find 
conditions of legitimacy for democracy), then stage two seems irrelevant. That is to say – if 
democracy can realize conditions of legitimacy that were actually developed for democracy 
then that is no great finding. All it goes to show is that one has developed coherent principles. 
In addition to that, stage three seems even more problematic. On the one hand, it is dubious 
that she actually does not provide an argument for why democracy is uniquely able to realize 
requirements  of  legitimacy.  Perhaps  it  is  not  uncommon  to  assume,  for  example,  that 
democracy is the only way to properly realize political equality. However, I believe that from 
an analytical perspective there still is need for argumentation. Beyond that, I am uncertain of 
the implication that  stage three has  for the  normative nature of  Peter's  theory,  because it 
makes it seem as if the conditions of  legitimacy are not external to democracy, but constitute 
its  very nature.  It  boils  down to  the  assumption  that  democracy needs  to  satisfy  certain 
conditions in order to be legitimate, but only if it is legitimate it even counts as democratic – 
there is no truly democratic illegitimate democracy397. To put it differently: From a normative 
perspective,  democratic legitimacy is supposed to be a conception that specifies standards 
which democracy ought to live up to, but which it does not necessarily do live up to. If it  
does, it is a legitimate, if it is not, it may not be legitimate, but it is nevertheless democratic. 
In contrast, incorporating democracy within the notion of political legitimacy itself means that 
there is no standard to actually evaluate democracy's own legitimacy. This is because political 
legitimacy requires  it  is  democratic.  If  it  is  democratic  it  is  thus  legitimate.  Hence,  it  is 
legitimate because it is democratic, not because it lives up to an external normative standard. 
This  implies that  what counts as legitimate authority is  derived from some conception of 
democratic legitimacy.
The conclusion I am left with is that Peter is actually not clear about the role of democracy in 
her theory. It seems to me that what she wants to claim is that democracy is necessary. Yet she 
does  not  provide an argument  for  it.  Instead she merely presumes it.  Even as a  premise, 
397  Note that Roland Pennock, too, has observed that “much of the criticism of democracy heard today is in the  
name of the ideal. It claims only that democratic institutions are not working democratically.” (Pennock, 
Roland: Democratic Political Theory., Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 122).
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though, democracy's significance is not unambiguous. From the way she frames the aim of 
her work it seems as if democracy is a premise, but the way she refers to it throughout her 
argument makes it seem as if she presumes it as a normative requirement, implying that there 
is no legitimacy without democracy. In the end I find this to be a significant weakness of 
Peter's theory.
  4. Conclusion  
In the present chapter I have set out to explicate and evaluate the conception of legitimacy as 
presented by Fabienne Peter.  She actually defends a purely proceduralist  interpretation of 
legitimacy, arguing that normative conditions apply to the political decision-making process, 
not  its  outcomes.  The  conditions  she  argues  for  are  “political  equality”  and  “epistemic 
fairness” and both call for an inclusive deliberative procedure.
In my assessment I have not found any reason to reject Peter's claim for a purely proceduralist 
conception of legitimacy. It is actually plausible that we do not need any additional standards 
for testing the legitimacy of outcomes if the procedure itself is designed appropriately, i.e. so 
that the outcomes are acceptable. It also seems convincing that standards are more reasonably 
acceptable  if  applied  to  the  process  rather  than  the  decisions.  Turning  to  the  normative 
conditions themselves I concluded that they are indeed persuasive in a way that make them 
seem superior to those proposed by Raz, Simmons or Rawls. Peter argues that legitimacy 
requires an actual process of reasoning and justification among all those who are subject to a 
political  authority.  Through this process the outcomes are made acceptable to the affected 
people, but at the same time its inclusiveness allows for a learning-process and the production 
of knowledge. Reasons are discovered, shared and produced and this is what the normative 
force of the process stems from. 
Peter thus manages to account for the normative force of reasons, but due to her procedural 
interpretation she avoids running into the problem of having to define “reasonable” reasons 
and is therefore not forced to exclude unreasonable people from the process of justification. 
However, despite the convincing account of legitimacy she proposes, Peter's theory is actually 
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problematic when it comes to the role of democracy. She presumes a lot without providing 
much of an argument, and it seems to me that she is not clear on what role she wants to claim 
for this particular form of politics. This, I suggest, is an aspect of her work regarding which 
some more clarification would be in order
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  VII. CONCLUSION  
In the present paper I have dealt with the subject of political authority from the normative 
perspective of legitimacy. The focus was on different normative conditions of legitimacy, i.e. 
on those moral conditions which lend authority normative force. For me the central research 
question was what conception of legitimacy provides the most plausible normative condition 
of legitimate political authority and I proceeded by evaluating four different proposals.
First, I turned to the theory of Joseph Raz. He proposes two normative conditions, the more 
important of which is the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT). It states that legitimacy depends 
on whether we comply better  or worse with our applying reasons when subjecting to the 
authority's  rule.  The  second  normative  condition,  consent,  can  render  an  authority's  rule 
legitimate beyond the scope of the NJT, but only if that authority is at least reasonably just.  
What is interesting is that the obligation arising from both, the NJT and consent, depends on 
the  same  normative  basis:  reasons.  An  authority  is  legitimate  if  it  is  justified,  and  this 
justification depends on practical reasons which exist independent of the authority's rule and 
which oblige the individual whether they are under an authority or not. In fact I found Raz' 
view that legitimacy depends on justification intuitively appealing. Yet, it seemed to me that 
his  account  is  not  plausible  in  the  way he  tries  to  conceptualize  the  normative  force  of 
reasons. For example it is not obvious why individual “compliance” to reasons is the most 
fundamental  moral  goal  and  thus  the  legitimizing  condition  of  authority.  Even  if  it  is, 
however,  it  seems that  Raz would have to  clarify or limit  what  the relevant  reasons are, 
because it is not convincing that all reasons matter equally. For example, rain might give us a 
practical reason to carry an umbrella, but even if compliance to this reason could be seen as 
an obligation (and I am actually not sure that it should), it seems trivial at best and this would 
127
only make for a rather feeble basis for legitimization. Beyond that, I think we should question 
whether reasons are actually just “there” applying to us as Raz would have us believe. The 
way he puts it, reasons are very much like raindrops that happen to fall on us, but this account 
of  practical  reason  is  rather  dissatisfying  and  does  not  capture  our  actual  experience  of 
practical reasoning as active process of the mind. 
In the second chapter  I  turned to the theory of John Simmons. For him it  is  central  that 
legitimate authority has to be distinguished from merely justified authority, because the latter 
– while rationally desirable and morally permissible – does not infuse the subjects with an 
obligation to obey. The reason for this is that all persons are born free, and therefore they can 
be under no obligation unless they themselves defer  the right to make binding decisions. 
Legitimacy therefore depends on the free consent of individuals, because only this transaction 
can found the special  link between an authority and its subjects. Furthermore,  only if  the 
subjects  have  consented  to  an  authority's  rule  they  are  motivated  to  comply  with  their 
obligations,  and  this  is  relevant  because  only  an  effective  authority  can  be  a  legitimate 
authority. The main objection I have raised against all of these arguments for consent is that I 
do not believe it actually has the normative force ascribed by Simmons. It seems to me that 
consent can only be binding if it does not oppose morally fundamental reasons or rights, and 
when it is binding it is so because it lives up to those reasons. Actual consent does indeed 
have moral  significance,  especially when it  comes to responsibility and self-esteem, yet  I 
reject the view that it  establishes legitimacy.  Moreover,  I am not convinced by Simmons' 
argument  that  consent  is  the  most  effective  way to  ensure  the  subjects'  motivation.  It  is  
plausible that we feel bound by what we perceive to be our reasons for consenting, not so 
much by our actual consent. Despite his neglect for the normative force of reasons, though, I 
found that Simmons' demand for actualness and particularity in the context of legitimization 
is significant and indeed helps us make sense of a fundamental moral intuition – normativity 
has to attach to us personally in order to be binding.
The third conception of legitimate authority that I have analyzed is that of John Rawls. I 
argued that his theory allows for the explication of three related normative conditions. First 
there  is  the  notion  of  “reasonable  acceptability”.  I  argued  that  it  is  plausible  to  view 
legitimacy  in  terms  of  justification  and  in  turn  to  rely  on  “acceptability”  as  the  central 
measure.  However,  I  believe  it  to  be  problematic  to  distinguish  between  reasonable  and 
unreasonable persons the way Rawls does. On the one hand, there is the risk of undetected 
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biases  in  the  very  definition  of  reasonableness.  On  the  other,  while  it  is  plausible  that 
unreasonable people's acceptance or non-acceptance should not be a measure for legitimacy, it 
seems paternalistic to exclude them from the process of public justification. Rawls' second 
normative  condition  is  “hypothetical  consent”.  I  argued  that  thought-experiments  can  be 
helpful to take an impartial view, but that I believe Rawls to be too optimistic when it comes 
to  the results  of  sincerity.  That  is  to say,  if  I  sincerely believe my views are reasonable, 
looking for objections inside my head, even if I try to adopt an “impartial” view, will probably 
not yield any new outcomes,  because my mind can only hold those objections that  I  am 
already aware of. Last I evaluated “political justification” as a normative condition. Rawls 
thereby states that legitimacy does not only depend on what is reasonable, but it depends on 
what “all” can reasonably be expected to endorse. He believes that there is an “overlapping 
consensus” among all reasonable comprehensive doctrines and that this is the proper basis for 
the justification of political authority. The central ideas are: society being a (fair) system of 
cooperation and citizens being free and equal. I am not fully convinced by Rawls' assumption 
that those ideas are such that no-one can reasonably reject them, because he does not provide 
any argumentation.  This  I  believe  to  be a  central  weakness  of  his  approach,  because his 
conception of legitimacy relies on substantive values that he does not explicitly defend. I 
concluded that there are two major merits to Rawls'  theory.  First,  he provides a plausible 
argument for why reasons matter (because they are what we can share so to justify political 
authority) and what kind of reasons legitimacy depends on (those reasons that we can share). 
In this sense his approach seems superior to that of Raz, because he too accounts for the 
normative  force  of  reasons,  but  his  explication  is  more  plausible.  Second,  I  find  Rawls' 
understanding of freedom both compelling and plausible. Autonomy does not require that the 
only obligations we have are those that we are willing to accept, but it only requires that those 
obligations are reasonably acceptable to us, i.e. that they can be justified to us in terms that we 
can accept.  Here, I  believe Rawls'  theory to be superior to that of Simmons, because his 
notion  of  freedom is  less  totalistic  and  can  account  for  the  moral  force  of  justification. 
Nevertheless,  I  also find that  in  this  context  there is  a major  weakness in  Rawls'  theory, 
because  he  is  too  unconcerned  with  presupposing  substantive  notions  like  that  of 
“reasonableness” and he thereby ignores the risk of biases. By excluding unreasonable people 
from the  legitimization  pool  he  also  seems  to  exclude  them from the  process  of  public 
justification and I find that highly problematic. What I was wondering is: Do we not owe 
reasons especially to those who  do object against our views (even if it is because they are 
unreasonable)?
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Last, I turned to the conception of legitimacy presented by Fabienne Peter. She defends a 
purely proceduralist interpretation of legitimacy, arguing that normative conditions apply to 
the political  decision-making process, not its outcomes. The conditions she argues for are 
“political  equality”  and  “epistemic  fairness”  and  both  call  for  an  inclusive  deliberative 
procedure.  In my assessment I have not found any reason to reject her claim for a purely 
proceduralist  conception  of  legitimacy.  It  is  actually  plausible  that  we  do  not  need  any 
additional standards for testing the legitimacy of outcomes if the procedure itself is designed 
appropriately, i.e. so that the outcomes are acceptable. It also seems convincing that standards 
are more reasonably acceptable if applied to the process rather than the decisions. Turning to 
the normative conditions themselves I found that they are indeed persuasive in a way that 
make them seem superior to those proposed by Raz,  Simmons or Rawls.  She argues that 
legitimacy requires an actual process of reasoning and justification among all those who are 
subject to a political authority. Through this process, the outcomes are made acceptable to the 
affected people, but at the same time its inclusiveness allows for a learning-process and the 
production of knowledge. Reasons are discovered, shared and produced and this is what the 
normative force of the process stems from. 
This is why I conclude that Peter's conception of legitimacy is actually the most plausible of 
the assessed theories. She manages to account for the normative force of reasons, but in a way 
that  also  accounts  for  the  special  nature  of  political  authority.  Political  decisions  are 
collectively  binding  and  coercively  enforceable.  Legitimacy  is  therefore  realized  only  if 
political decisions are (in general) acceptable to all those subjects to the authority. This cannot 
exclude unreasonable people, because they too are subject and have a right to justification. 
Justification, however, cannot consist merely in having “good” or reasonable reasons to hold a 
certain view or to enforce a certain decision, and that is for two reasons: On the one hand,  
there is the risk of bias. On the other, the autonomy and equal capacity of persons means that 
we owe them our attention. It is not sufficient to have good reasons, but we need to actually 
offer them to others. Reasoning cannot be a one-way-street, instead it needs to be a reciprocal 
process where people are responsive to each other's reasons. Political decisions must therefore 
rely on an actual process of reasoning and justification among the authority and its subjects 
and  among  the  subjects  responsively.  Only  if  this  condition  is  satisfied,  and  if  certain 
normative conditions hold, legitimacy is realized. That is to say, the more a political authority 
relies on a political decision-making process so designed, the more legitimate it is. 
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Now, the obvious question that is to follow at this point is whether this renders democracy 
necessary for legitimacy. Peter indeed makes that assumption and the normative conditions 
she defends sure seem to ring all the right bells for democratic theorists. Yet I am not entirely 
convinced that one could not make an argument to show that democracy, or the act of voting, 
is not as necessary as some would have us believe – even if the process of reasoning under 
conditions  of  equality  and  epistemic  fairness  are  accepted.  In  any  case  the  examined 
argumentation is insufficient to ground the claim that democracy is more than permissible as a 
form of legitimate political authority. Further details would have to be provided so to exclude 
all other forms of government from potential legitimacy, but this project exceeds the scope of 
the present paper. I conclude that we should be cautious to simply presuppose democracy, as 
its defense is at the core of a fundamental normative discussion we should not skip through.
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